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Abstract  
 
This thesis studies two key risks that have the potential to dethrone the US dollar’s position as 
the dominant global reserve currency. Specifically, it contends the first risk stems from a future 
loss of confidence in the US dollar’s value from excessive indebtedness and unintended 
consequences from the implementation of unorthodox monetary policies. The second risk 
could come from other major states circumnavigating the US dollar by utilising and facilitating 
the rise of other reserve currencies. To examine these two risks, an interpretive methodological 
approach is utilised to study a wide variety of relevant qualitative and quantitative data. Based 
upon this, the thesis seeks to answer the following question: will the US dollar remain the sole 
key global reserve currency in the future? It finds that the US dollar is in danger of being 
dethroned and is unlikely to retain its position as the sole key global reserve currency. Yet, if 
managed properly by elected leaders, excessive indebtedness will not significantly affect the 
US dollar’s status. However, the rise of other currencies, most notably the Chinese Yuan and 
the inherent potential of new gold backed and cyber backed currencies, is a risk that cannot be 
completely mitigated. Therefore, in the future, the US dollar will likely lose its monopoly as 
the key reserve currency and have to be content with the US dollar being the first or second 
most important currency in a duplicity/multiplicity key reserve currency world.  
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Introduction  
According to Investopedia (2017), a reserve currency is a “currency held by central banks and 
other major financial institutions as a means to pay off international debt obligations, or to 
influence their domestic exchange rate.” In effect, it is the global currency that nations use to 
trade with one another. Since 1944, the US dollar has been the sole key global reserve currency. 
In addition to the United States’ (US) economy being globally the biggest by a large margin, 
what has helped the US dollar remain as the key reserve currency is that virtually all main 
commodities, such as oil, natural gas, gold, etc., are traded globally in US dollars. Before the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it was almost inconceivable to think that the US dollar’s 
role as the key global reserve currency was in any risk of being dethroned. This was due to the 
fact, that at the beginning of 2008, US dollars made up 64% of all global reserves (IMF, 2017).  
 More importantly, there was no other alternative that had any credibility in challenging the US 
dollar as the key global reserve currency. The euro, yen and pound, while very important 
supporting reserve currencies, were just too small to challenge the US dollar’s role of being the 
sole key dominant reserve currency. While a large currency, the Chinese yuan, in 2008, was in 
no position to rival even the euro, pound or yen. This is because the Chinese financial system 
and economy was, and still is, relatively closed. Finally, at the time of the financial crisis, gold 
was on the whole seen as a relic and cyber currencies did not exist. As a result, virtually all 
market commentators believed the US dollar’s role as the sole key reserve currency was going 
to remain unchallenged for the foreseeable future. 
However, in the aftermath of the GFC, there was some emerging signs that some world leaders 
have grown tired of the US dollar’s role as the key global reserve currency. In a March 2009 
essay, written by the head of the Chinese Central Bank Governor. Zhou Xiaochuan, which 
came as a surprise to the West, outlined that due to the “inherent vulnerabilities and systemic 
risks in the existing international monetary system, the creation of a single currency made up 
of a basket of global currencies controlled by the IMF would help achieve the objective of 
safeguarding global economic and financial stability.” (China Daily, 2009, Para.1).  With 
regard to Russia, their leader, Vladimir Putin, arguably the biggest critic of the US dollar, has 
had plenty to say on the matter. In one case, in August 2011, he was quoted as saying the US 
dollar is a “parasite” on the global economy and that there should be other reserve currencies 
(Reuters, 2011). Chinese and Russians officials would go on to make similar statements 
between 2011 and 2017. 
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Although Russia and China are the two biggest challengers to the current global economic 
system, other prominent nations, such as Iran, Brazil and India, have also questioned the current 
international currency structure. The reason why these nations are dissatisfied is because the 
US has an unfair advantage in their view as it is cheaper for the US government to borrow, it’s 
cheaper to purchase foreign goods and there is reduced exchange rate risk.  While these nations 
are dissatisfied with the current economic order, the US will make it as hard as possible for 
these nations to circumnavigate the use of the US dollar when trading globally because of the 
advantages it has for the US. While the US will have to be aware of some nations trying to 
circumnavigate the US dollar, another major challenge and disruption to the US dollar’s role 
as the sole key reserve currency is their own economic instability from excessive levels of 
indebtedness. If confidence is lost in the ability for the US government to pay its debt, 
confidence in the underlining value of the US dollar will also be lost. Therefore the growing 
levels of sovereign debt should not be ignored.  
In the wake of the GFC, the US, as well as other key global economies, have amassed a 
considerable amount of sovereign debt. This was required to stimulate their economies out of 
the worst downturn since the great depression. As well as this large build up in debt, unorthodox 
monetary easing policies have been implemented from the US Federal Reserve (Fed) as well 
as from other key central banks globally. In addition to these unorthodox monetary policies 
stimulating their economies, they have also had the intended effect of lowering the costs for 
governments to service their debt. However, long term, when interest rates start to normalise, 
it is going to be increasingly harder for nations to meet their debt obligation while also paying 
for the traditional services governments provide.  
As a result, there are two key significant risks that could potentially challenge the US dollar’s 
position of being the sole key reserve currency. The first risk being lost confidence in the US 
dollar’s value from excessive indebtedness and unintended consequences from unorthodox 
monetary policies.  The second risk being other countries circumnavigating the use of the US 
dollar through the potential rise of other reserve currencies. Therefore, with regard to the key 
research question for this thesis, it will be the following, Will the US dollar remain the sole 
key global reserve currency in the future?  
While this thesis is predominantly focused on the US sovereign debt situation and its post GFC 
monetary policies, six other key economies will also be briefly studied. These include the 
economies of Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain who are the third, 
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fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth biggest global economies, respectively. As you can 
see from Figure 1, as of 2016, these six countries plus the US, are responsible for 46.8% of the 
world’s economy (IMF, 2017). It is important to briefly study these six nations, as like the GFC 
showed, the world is increasingly global and interconnected financially.  Furthermore, these 
six countries are all first world nations who have also seen similar accumulations of debt and 
similar unorthodox policies implemented, like the US has, in the post GFC era. As a result, as 
will be discussed in this thesis, sovereign debt problems with these nations potentially become 
economic problems for the US and the US dollar in this increasingly interconnected world if 
confidence in the US debt is also placed in question due to a domino effect.    
It is central to note, excluding China, who makes up 14.9% of the world’s economy, from the 
list of seven countries is a notable country to not include. However, there is rationale behind 
this. Compared to the other seven countries, China’s economy and financial system is 
noticeably far more closed as was mentioned. Plus, being quasi-communist, with a very large 
percentage of their economy being comprised of state owned enterprise assets, their economy 
operates remarkably different from first world open democratic nations. Additionally, due to 
their debt and monetary policy dynamics being sizeably different, China will not be a main 
country studied in this thesis. The above is not to suggest that China cannot substantially impact 
the world economy and global financial markets. Therefore, while China’s debt and monetary 
policy situation will not be studied in this thesis, China’s economic rise and the yuan’s future 
in the world’s economy as a potential reserve currency will be studied in the last chapter.  
In conclusion, this thesis will argue that the evidence it has examined shows that there are two 
key risks threatening the US dollar’s ability to remain the sole key reserve currency globally in 
the future. These two risks being lost confidence in the value of the US dollar due to excessive 
indebtedness in conjunction with unorthodox monetary policy and the risk of the potential rise 
of other reserve currencies that could challenge the US dollar. As these risks have a wide 
variety of factors and dynamics to consider, determining to what extent these risks will have 
on the US dollar’s ability to remain the sole key reserve currency will be central to this thesis.  
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Methodology  
The primary research question of this thesis is: ‘Will the US dollar remain the sole key global 
reserve currency in the future?’ The reason why this research question does not place a date on 
the event, for example in 20 years, is because there are inherent problems formulating a 
research question that involves looking into the future. For example, if you only look at 20 
years, you have to justify why you did not look at 30 years. Additionally, events that are 
predicted to happen in 20 years could transpire in five years. Finally, as qualitative data is more 
valuable in addressing this research question, it is hard to extrapolate with any certainty based 
off data.  This thesis is not intended to precisely predict a date when the US dollar as a key 
reserve currency may potentially decline in importance, as it is an event that will not happen 
overnight. What the thesis is attempting to do is focus on how the two key risks over time will 
impact the US dollar as the sole key reserve currency. Therefore the research question is 
intended to look into the broad future instead of a specific timeframe, as it is very difficult to 
place a specific date on the event. 
It is impossible to provide a definitive answer to this question. The saying that ‘if you have five 
economists you will get six opinions’ captures the essence of this point. This is because there 
are far too many variables and unforeseen events that will influence the future role of the US 
dollar globally. As such, to answer the primary research question of this thesis, interpretive 
research is the chosen research paradigm due to the inherent subjective aspect of making 
projections into the future. Interpretive research is a method of research used when there is no 
simple ‘yes or no’ answer or where multiple conclusions can be drawn from studying the same 
sources of information and evidence. Therefore interpretive research is best geared towards 
formulating and discovering, through the use of qualitative research, what an involving process 
or phenomenon means within a wider context. Effectively, by analysing and interpreting the 
qualitative data, a degree of understanding and educated conclusions can be drawn and the 
evidence and analysis throughout this thesis provides a firm footing to attempt this.  
While there are a variety of different risks and threats that can impact the future role of the US 
dollar as the sole key reserve currency, an educated assessment and conclusion for this research 
question can be formulated by studying the two significant risks that were highlighted in the 
introduction. These risks are currently highly relevant and vital to understanding the evolving 
phenomenon.  
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Chapter Outline 
Before the two risks mentioned are studied, a literature review will be conducted to highlight 
and explore potential literature gaps surrounding these two key risks. This will be done in order 
for this thesis to provide a unique prospective that will add to the literature in this field. 
Following this, Chapter 1 will provide a historical perspective on the evolution of reserve 
currencies over the last 500 years and the rise of the US dollar to its current position as the sole 
key reserve currency. This provides essential context and a foundation to understand the scope 
of this topic. Once this is studied, the rest of the thesis will focus on the two key risks facing 
the US dollar.   
With regard to studying the first risk of excessive sovereign debt, Chapters 2–5 will address 
this. In order to address this risk, it is important to have a theoretical lens of analysis in order 
to understand the risk of excessive indebtedness. For this thesis, the main theory that will be 
used is the Debt Super Cycle Theory, which will be covered in Chapter 2 along with other 
supporting theories. The Debt Super Cycle Theory does not state a specific level of debt that is 
considered excessive or a level of debt that would be deemed too risky. However, what the 
theory does explain is that there are four ways in which a government can deal with excessive 
indebtedness. These include grow your way out of the debt, implement austerity measures, 
inflate the debt away and finally default on the debt. This theoretical framework is used to 
examine America’s sovereign indebtedness and its impact on the US dollar’s value and hence 
its ability to function as a reserve currency.  
Once the economic theory is covered in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will address the actual state and 
level of sovereign debt in the US. Additionally, the sovereign debt position of Japan, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain will also be explored. Following Chapter 3, the role 
unorthodox monetary policy has played in generating economic growth and in decreasing the 
cost of borrowing for the US government, as well as the six other nations, will be studied. Once 
both Chapters 3 and 4 have been explored, Chapter 5 will combine the theory outlined in 
Chapter 2 with the findings in Chapters 3 and 4. Specifically, Chapter 5 will have to cover two 
key points. Firstly, an analysis why, in an increasingly interconnected global economy, 
sovereign debt problems and unorthodox monetary policy in other key nations can have 
impacts on the US economy and hence the US dollar.  
This is why this thesis also studies the sovereign debt position and unorthodox monetary 
policies of the key global economies of Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France Italy and 
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Spain.  Secondly, this chapter will explore all four debt reduction paths the US government 
may face in the future as outlined by the Debt Super Cycle Theory. In addition to trying to 
determine which of the four options are more likely to be implemented compared to the others, 
an analysis on the impact each path would have on the US dollar’s future role as the sole key 
reserve currency will be discussed to gauge just how large of a threat sovereign indebtedness 
could be for the US dollar. Once this is discussed, this thesis will focus on the second risk 
facing the US dollar’s future role as the sole key reserve currency.  
With regard to the second risk, while only one chapter is required to adequately address it, it 
does not mean it is less important or less relevant in addressing the research question. As such, 
Chapter 6 will explore the potential rise of other currencies such as the Chinese yuan, Russia 
ruble the euro, etc. Additionally, as part of this chapter, a variety of different forms of 
currencies, other than the common fiat currency, will be discussed. As part of this analysis, the 
merits, pitfalls and viability of these different types of currencies will be studied. Finally, 
potentially a different form in the US dollar may provide and lead to increased confidence in 
its underlining value. Therefore it’s important to study and interpret the viability of the US 
government doing this. Potentially, by transforming the US dollar away from being fiat in 
nature, the US government could restore faith in the US dollar’s value, and hence ensure it 
remains the sole key reserve currency if a sovereign debt crisis does transpire in the future.  
Finally, after both risks to the US dollar’s future are studied, an answer to the research question 
will be delivered in the form of a conclusion. While both risks to the US dollar are different, 
they are inherently interconnected. This is because a loss in confidence in the US dollar’s value 
due to excessive indebtedness means that another currency will have to rise to take its place. 
This is particularly true when there are nations such as China and Russia who, given the 
opportunity, would like their currencies to play a greater role globally. Additionally, if another 
reserve currency is to rise in the future it will have to challenge the US economically, and it is 
hard to see how this challenge will be successful if the US does not experience a sovereign 
debt crisis. Therefore, as both risks are interconnected, a conclusion will answer the question 
of whether the US dollar remains the sole key global reserve currency in the future based on 
the extent of the combined risks.  
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Chapter Outline Flow Chart 
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Data Sources  
Lastly, with regard to chosen data sources, a wide variety of qualitative secondary sources will 
be used. These include academic journal articles, non-fiction books by academics and 
professionals working in the fields of economics and finance and a wide variety of accredited 
and reputable newspapers, such as the Financial Times, The New York Times, CNBC, 
Bloomberg, etc. Additionally, in a supporting role to the qualitative information, quantitative 
data will be used to highlight and reinforce the qualitative information. For example, time series 
data on economic growth rates, inflation rates, debt-to-GDP ratios etc., will be of importance 
to incorporate within this thesis in order to appropriately address the research question. 
Databank sources will be used for this qualitative information and will include sources from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank, The Federal Reserve Economic 
Databank (FRED), OECD etc.   
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Literature Review  
The decline of the US dollar as a key reserve currency is a subject that is widely explored and 
examined within the academic literature. While the literature discusses a variety of different 
reasons as to why the US dollar role as the key reserve currency will decline, there are two 
commonly cited reasons in the literature. These include the rise of other currencies, such as the 
euro or yuan, and excessive indebtedness of the US government that could lead to lost 
confidence in the US dollar’s value. Therefore this literature review will focus on both reasons 
and where applicable highlight areas where there are gaps in understanding in the academic 
literature.  
Rise of Other Currencies  
A commonly cited currency that academics have argued could replace the US dollar as a 
reserve currency is the euro. Founded in 1999, academics such as Spiegel, (2005); Chinn and 
Frankel, (2005) and Papaioannou, Portes, and Siourounis (2006), pre GFC, all felt that the euro 
was going to reach parity with the US dollar. Chinn et al. (2005) even went farther and reasoned 
it would surpass the US dollar. However, these academics felt this would be the case for a 
variety of different reasons. Spiegel (2005) discussed that over time countries will want to 
hedge the US dollar more, so in the future the euro provides an ideal hedge for many nations. 
Papaioannou et al. (2006) believed that the petrodollar would weaken the advantage of the 
euro. Finally, Chinn et al. (2005) argued that the eurozone economically over the long term 
will surpass the US economy. 
However, academic literature after the GFC argues that the euro currency is not in a position 
to become the key global reserve currency (Costiganm, Cottle, & Keys, 2017; Carbaugh, 2011). 
The viewpoint of Costiganm et al. (2017) is that the sovereign debt crisis and the threat of the 
nations of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS) make the US dollar still the key 
reserve currency of choice. Both Costiganm et al. (2017) and Carbaugh (2011) contended that 
until the eurozone is a fiscal union and not just a monetary union, the euro will not be able to 
challenge the US dollar. Costiganm et al. (2017) added to this point by saying it is not going to 
happen as the Germans and the Greeks are diametrically opposed financially and could never 
agree on how a fiscal union would look. From a different point of view Gupta and Goyal (2014) 
argue that the eurozone economically is stagnating and for the foreseeable future is going to be 
growing at a slower rate than the US economy. Finally, Mastanduno (2009) claims that the US 
dollar will remain king as it is still seen as the ultimate safe haven currency. Evidence for this 
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is that despite the GFC originating in the US the US dollar appreciated rapidly (Mastanduno, 
2009).   
While the majority of post GFC literature on the euro’s future as the key reserve currency is 
not favourable, there are some academic literature that is still bullish on the euro’s future. 
Morgan (2009), Bulkot (2013), and Jayakumar and Weiss (2011) all argued that as the US 
dollar weakens in the future, the future will be a world where there are multiple reserve 
currencies with the euro being one of them. From a different point of view, Galati and 
Wooldridge (2009) argue that European countries will want to do more trade with euros, 
particularly when purchasing energy from overseas. On the whole, decides these three 
academic sources, there is little literature that is pro euro as a reserve currency in the post GFC 
era.    
Another widely cited currency in the academic literature that could surpass the US dollar as 
the key reserve currency in the future is the Chinese yuan. Compared to the post GFC era, 
academic literature prior to GFC about the Chinese yuan rising to reserve currency status is not 
as extensive. However, Wilson (2007) and Matsat, (2006) do discuss the possibility all by 
arguing a different point. Wilson (2007) said that one day China will be as powerful, 
economically, as the US. It is because of this that Wilson (2007) argues that it is logical China 
will want to have the yuan to rival the US globally. Matsat (2006), on the other hand, reasons 
that as China continues to be the world’s factory into the future, they will want to trade more 
in yuan in order to save on currency transaction costs.   
In the post GFC era there is more on the subject. Mallaby and Wethington (2012), Yeh (2012) 
and Lee (2014) agree with Wilson (2007) in that a stronger Chinese economy on par with the 
US will one day lead to the yuan being a reserve currency. Wang, Huang, and Fan (2015) add 
that China’s One Belt One Road initiative will continue to economically integrate countries 
towards China. The point being that the Chinese yuan will become more widely used globally 
the more China integrates with countries (Wang et al., 2015).  From a different point of view, 
Bhat (2013) and Prasad (2013) argue that the yuan will be a reserve currency in the future 
because of the weakness and long-term demise of the US dollar due to the aftermath of the 
GFC. Where Bhat (2013) and Prasad (2013) disagree is that Prasad (2013) felt the yuan will 
one day fully replace the US dollar, whereas Bhat (2013) felt the yuan and US dollar would 
both share the role of being reserve currencies.   
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While there are many academic sources that believe the yuan can challenge the US dollar long-
term, there is also a large body of research that argues differently. Lee (2014), Gao and 
Coffman (2013) and Chong (2013) all argue that the Chinese economy needs to continue to 
open up before the yuan can be considered a reserve currency. Lee (2014) and Gao and 
Coffman (2013) both contend that the yuan is to be unpegged before this happens, whereas 
Chong (2013) claims that China needs to have an open debt market to international investors. 
Chinn (2015) reasoned that while the yuan could be a reserve currency with close neighbours, 
it is unlikely to be able to dethrone the US dollar with America’s close allies as long as the US 
economy remains strong. Lai (2015) and Chanda (2013) from a different point of view cited 
that China has reached its peak growth rate and is going to economically stagnate in the future. 
Lai (2015) argued China could face a Japanese style decline whereas Chanda (2013) cited 
demographic problems that will hamper China’s ambition for the yuan to act as a reserve 
currency.  Finally, Brooks & Wohlforth, (2016) and Shimazu (2015) say that the US economy 
will remain strong long-term which will prevent the yuan from fully replacing the US dollar.  
Although not as widely cited as the euro and the yuan, there is academic literature by 
Eichengreen (2012), Pop (2016) and Dailami and Masson, (2010) that discusses the future of 
a gold standard. All three journal articles though a gold standard would mitigate the impacts of 
lost confidence in fiat currencies.. Where they disagree is that Eichengreen (2012) and Pop 
(2016) felt a gold standard like the Bretton Woods agreement would be ideal, whereas Dailami 
et al. (2010) felt that a gold standard like what was commonplace globally in the second half 
of the 19th century would be the best. Differently from the three, Jordan (2015) felt that a world 
currency that was backed by a combination of gold and other commodities, such as silver and 
platinum, would be the best. 
Another potential future reserve currency mentioned is the IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR).   
Chey (2012) and Costiganm et al. (2017) felt that the (SDR) currency would be a viable 
currency in the future in the event of another GFC. Chey (2012) felt that it could fully replace 
the US dollar, whereas Costiganm et al. (2017) argued it could be used temporarily to allow 
governments to renegotiate a new economic order. Finally, the last currency to mention is cyber 
currencies. While there is a sizeable amount of literature about the future of cyber currencies, 
what is missing from the academic literature is an understanding about the potential of cyber 
currencies acting as reserve currencies in the future. While not the same thing, Costiganm et 
al. (2017) and Pop (2016) both argue that all currencies will eventually go cashless and 100% 
digital, which would also include the US dollar as a reserve currency. However, a digital 
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currency is different from a cyber currency, so again there is a gap in the literature on this 
subject.  
Lastly, the other major apparent gap in the literature is the combination of other currencies with 
different forms of currencies. For example, literature discussing how the Chinese could back 
the yuan by gold to dethrone the US dollar do not appear to exist. Any academic literature on 
how cybercurrencies could be fussed with existing currencies today also are not found. As a 
result, this is an important area to study as these are real possibilities that could transpire in the 
future.   
Excessive Indebtedness  
A different branch of academic literature discusses that lost confidence in the ability of the US 
government to pay its debt will lead to the demise of the US dollar as a reserve currency. 
Keaney (2017) and Merki (2015) point to rising yields and lower value of US bonds will lead 
to nations converting their reserves into euros, yen and pounds. Pop (2016) disagrees with 
Keaney (2017) and Merki (2015) by arguing that all fiat currencies will be at risk and hence 
governments will rush to convert their reserves into intrinsically valued goods, such as gold, 
oil and other commodities. Eichengreen (2012) also had this viewpoint but only citied gold as 
being the new reserve currency of choice in the aftermath of a collapse in the bond market.  
Sharma (2011) and Prasad (2010) argue that the problem in the future of excessive 
indebtedness could be caused if foreign nations dump the US debt as a form of economic 
warfare. The likely source of this according to Prasad (2010) would be China who is the foreign 
government who owns the most US debt. While not cited as a form of economic warfare, 
Carbaugh and Hedrick (2008) and Jordan, (2015) also acknowledge that there is the risk of 
foreign nations selling US debt. Carbaugh et al. (2008) argued that this could happen because 
of a run on confidence in the value of US debt whereas Jordan (2015) discussed how this could 
happen if foreign nations felt there is a risk of being defaulted on through inflation. Both are 
effectively the same point with the exception that Jordan (2015) explicitly points to inflation 
being the risk factor.  
From a different point view of view, Kovačević (2014) and Greenspan (1999) argue excessive 
indebtedness will only be a problem to the US dollar if it is not clear how it will be paid for. 
Effectively, as long as markets believe the US government can pay its debt then the US dollar 
is not at risk of losing its reserve currency status (Greenspan, 1999). However, Bergsten (2009) 
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and Cox (2012) disagree and contend that confidence can be lost for a variety of reasons. 
Bergsten (2009) discussed how lost confidence in the US dollar can be due to new economic 
policy announcements, whereas Cox (2012) argues it’s impossible to know or predict why 
markets can lose confidence in the value of sovereign debt.  
With the above said, it is also important to study the commonly cited concept known as the 
Triffin Paradox. This paradox states that in order for a reserve currency to exist the home 
country has to be willing to run budget deficits to allow foreign nations to have reserves to 
invest in (D'arista, 2004).  However, running budget deficits indefinitely place stress on 
confidence of the reserve currency; hence the paradox between short-term domestic and long-
term international objectives. Bordo and McCauley (2016), Sharma (2011) and Cox (2012) cite 
the Triffin Paradox as the reason why debt levels in the post GFC era will eventually undermine 
the US dollar’s reserve currency status. However, other academics, such as Carbaugh (2011) 
and Heldring (1988), believe the Triffin Paradox is a not relevant. Carbaugh (2011) discusses 
how other liquid assets other than debt can be used as reserves. Whereas Heldring (1988) 
argued that the US government could run budget surpluses and still allow foreigners to own 
US debt at similar levels by having domestic owners of US debt decrease their holdings.  
While there is a clear body of literature pointing to the negative implications of US debt with 
regard to the US dollar, there are other academics who argue that the sovereign debt problem 
is not a major concern for the US dollar and its role as the key reserve currency (Gupta, et al. 
2014; Pop, 2016; Kristijan & Dejan, 2016). Gupta et al. (2014) citied Japan’s sovereign debt 
levels as reasons why the US government will be able to borrow far more into the future. From 
a different point of view, Pop (2016) argues that the US dollar could be placed back on a gold 
standard which would restore confidence. Finally, Kristijan et al. (2016) discussed that as all 
other major currencies globally have sovereign debt problems, it does not matter as there are 
no other alternatives.   
There is not a shortage of literature that studies the impact of unorthodox monetary policy and 
sovereign debt. However, other than Mitry and Matula (2012), who discuss zero interest rates, 
and Kovačević (2014), who discusses Quantitative Easing, both with respect to how both can 
restore confidence in the US dollar, there is very little academic literature discussing the 
interconnectedness of unorthodox monetary policy, sovereign debt and the US dollar as the 
key reserve currency. Consequently, this thesis will attempt to advance the knowledge the role 
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unorthodox monetary policy impacts on the role of the US dollar as a reserve currency in effort 
to add to the academic literature. 
Conclusion  
In concluding the literature review, there is a deep and diverse body of academic literature that 
pertains to how the rise of other currencies as well as how sovereign indebtedness could lead 
to the demise of the US dollar as the key reserve currency. While there is a deep level of 
understanding among academics in these two research areas, there are still gaps in the literature. 
Specifically, two key gaps in the literature were discovered. The first is that there is very little 
written about how a fiat currency like the yuan could be transformed into a different form of 
currency to undermine the US dollar. The second is that very little has been written that 
highlights the interconnectedness of unorthodox monetary policy, sovereign debt and the 
ability of the US dollar to remain a reserve currency. Therefore this thesis will attempt to 
advance and add an understanding to the academic literature in these two areas of limited 
understanding.  
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of Global Reserve Currencies 
Introduction  
The key objective of this chapter is to study the economic history and evolution of the global 
reserve currency. Throughout history, if a Central Bank for a country was non-existent, the 
government would hold the foreign reserves (Investopedia, 2017). Over the last 500 years, 
various nations at different stages have had the privilege of having their currency act as the 
global reserve currency. Each country that has had their currency as the global reserve currency 
will be studied. Specifically, the key factors that enabled them to be a reserve currency, as well 
as why they lost this position will be discussed. The countries that will be studied, in order, are 
Spain, Netherlands, France, Great Britain and the US. Finally, the last section of this chapter 
will discuss why the US dollar today is the sole key reserve currency based on key economic 
metrics. 
The main intention of this chapter is to show that reserve currencies rise and fall for various 
reasons. Subsequently, while the US dollar currently is the undisputed sole key global reserve 
currency, history shows it may not always stay the undisputed sole key global reserve currency. 
This is a very important point to get across as the US government cannot be complacent in 
believing the US dollar will remain the sole key global reserve currency forever. Reasons for 
this will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3–6.  
Spanish Silver 
Although global trade transpired before 1500AD, mainly through the Silk Road, it was the 
development of ocean-going Galleons during this time that allowed world trade to grow rapidly 
in size (Graeber, 2014). It was during this time that Christopher Columbus of Spain discovered 
the America’s in 1492, Vasco Da Gama of Portugal who in 1498 first reached India through 
the southern route around the horn of Africa, and Rodrigo de Bastidas of Spain who discovered 
Panama and subsequently South America in 1501 (History, 1991). Consequently, with world 
trade increasing in volume, the need for a commonly accepted means of exchange was needed.  
What turned out to fill this void was Spanish silver. Spain, with their good fortunes over the 
first half of the 16th century, found an immense amount of silver in their South American 
territory (Graeber, 2014). So much silver, and to a smaller degree gold, was found in South 
America that Spain gained the majority control of global precious metals (Weatherford, 2009).  
With silver being sent back to Seville, Spain by the tonnes, the minting of Spanish silver coins 
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transpired on a large-scale (Weatherford, 2009). As so many newly minted coins were created, 
the Spaniards were then able to trade with other civilisations globally in silver as opposed to 
bartering which previously was common place (Graeber, 2014). As silver does not degrade, 
other civilizations that accepted Spanish silver could then in turn use their silver to trade with 
other civilizations for goods (Weatherford, 2009). As a result, around the mid-16th century was 
the birth of the first global reserve currency (Weatherford, 2009). 
However, the Spanish silver coin as the global reserve currency eventually faded over time due 
to a number of factors. Firstly, due to so much silver being brought back to Spain, the value of 
silver eventually fell by around two-thirds (Weatherford, 2009). This consequently led to rapid 
appreciation in prices of goods in terms of silver that ultimately led to what is known as the 
‘Price Revolution’ (Graeber, 2014). During this time between 1540 and 1640, prices of goods 
throughout Europe rose by a factor of approximately 6–8 times (Graeber, 2014). What the 
Spanish failed to understand was the value of precious metal is not absolute. The Spanish 
ultimately learnt that increasing the money supply faster than the rate of economic growth, all 
else equal, leads to price inflation (Graeber, 2014). Despite this inflationary period, world trade 
and economic growth dramatically increased (Graeber, 2014). 
Secondly, the Spanish Empire ultimately declined (Weatherford, 2009). This was largely due 
to the 40 plus wars that the Spanish fought in the 16th and early 17th century which, ultimately, 
left them bankrupt eight times in the years of 1557, 1560, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1652, 
and 1662 (Ferguson, 2009). Additionally, Spain fell in the trap of the resource curse where they 
failed to diversify their economy adequately enough from just mining precious metals 
(Graeber, 2014). Finally, as so much silver was leaving Spain and not returning in the forms of 
export receipts, a lot of the silver, especially in places like China, was melted down and re-
casted into new silver coins (Graeber, 2014). All of these reasons led to the fall of the Spanish 
silver coin as the global reserve currency. With the decline in the use of Spanish silver, the 
door was open for the rise of the Dutch guilder.    
Dutch Guilder  
The Dutch guilder did not become the global reserve currency overnight. Instead, it was due to 
a number of factors. These include the establishment of the first Central Bank in 1609, the rise 
of the Dutch East Trading Company and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which 
marked the end of both the Eighty Years’ War between the Spanish and the Dutch and the 
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Thirty-year religious war between the Catholics and Protestants (Ferguson, 2009; Weatherford, 
2009).  
The first Central Bank in the world was established in Amsterdam in 1609 and was formally 
called the Amsterdam Exchange Bank (Historyworld, 2001). Its key purpose was to solve the 
practical problems merchants faced, with as many as 14 different currencies circulating among 
the different provinces (Weatherford, 2009). The Amsterdam Exchange Bank originally 
accepted all the different currencies and then eventually standardised them into one common 
currency known as the Dutch guilder (Ferguson, 2009). In effect, The Amsterdam Exchange 
Bank pioneered the system of cheque and direct debit transfers that we use today in modern 
banking (Ferguson, 2009). The Amsterdam Exchange Bank, in addition to precious metals, 
also handed out bank notes (Weatherford, 2009). These bank notes were almost 100% backed 
by precious metal reserves until as late as 1760 (Weatherford, 2009). This made a run on the 
bank virtually impossible and is largely responsible for the price stability and strong growth 
during what is known as the Dutch Golden Age.   
The second factor that played a major role in the Dutch guilder becoming the global reserve 
currency was the establishment of the United East India Company in 1602; the first publicly 
traded company globally (Foucheéa, 1936). During this time, it was a very risky prospect 
sending ships to the East Indies in search of spices, mainly due to the risk of attack from the 
Spanish and Portuguese (Foucheéa, 1936). Of the 22 ships that set sail in 1598, only 12 returned 
safely (Ferguson, 2009). In order to improve the profitability, and hence lower the risk for the 
six trading companies of the day, it made sense to combine forces, grow larger and spread risk 
(Foucheéa, 1936). Hence the Dutch State General, the parliament of the united provinces, 
proposed the six East Indies trading companies of the day join forces to form the company to 
be known as the United East India Company (Foucheéa, 1936). 
 In order to grow the size of the company even quicker, it was proposed to raise capital from 
the citizens who would be compensated in the future from the profits obtained from selling 
spices i.e. a dividend payment (Foucheéa, 1936). In total, 6.45 million Dutch guilders were 
raised (Ferguson, 2009). Compared to the English rival East India Company, privately owned 
and founded two years prior, its value was approximately 820,000 guilders, making the United 
East India Company by far the biggest in the world (Ferguson, 2009).  
Between 1603 and 1607, 22 ships set sail to Asia with the main intention of establishing trading 
posts and factories (Ferguson, 2009). With more ships being sent and, crucially, more coming 
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back with spices, the value and profitability of the United East India Company grew (Foucheéa, 
1936). The first dividends were paid in 1611, followed by 1612, 1613 and in 1618 (Ferguson, 
2009). Over time, thanks in large part to the development of the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, 
a stock exchange formed for trading shares in United East India Company in a secondary 
market (Ferguson, 2009). This was the birth of the first stock market in the world (Ferguson, 
2009).  
Throughout the 1630s and 1640s the United East India Company became extremely successful 
as it continued to expand its presence in the Southeast Asian region as well as continuing to 
bring ever larger quantities of spices back to Europe (Foucheéa, 1936). By 1650 they 
effectively had a monopoly on cloves, mace and nutmeg coming back to Europe (Ferguson, 
2009). In addition, they acted as a trade hub for Asian trade between India, China and Japan, 
making them more profits in return (Foucheéa, 1936). The last major factor that contributed to 
the rise of the Dutch guilder was the conclusion of two devastating and costly wars, which 
ushered in a new, prosperous era for the Dutch (Ferguson, 2009).   
The Eighty Years’ War was fought against Spain from 1568 to 1648 over the 17 Dutch 
Republic provinces wanting independence from the Spanish Empire in order to avoid the 
cripplingly high taxes the Spanish imposed (Kissinger, 2015). The war was fought off and on 
over the 80 years making it one of the longest wars in European history (Kissinger, 2015). 
During the later stages of this war, the entire continent of Europe was fighting itself on the 
basis as to whether a nation wanted to be catholic or protestant (Kissinger, 2015). Known as 
the Thirty Years’ War, which started in 1618, this war is regarded as one of the bloodiest in 
European history, where over a third of the continent were killed (Kissinger, 2015).  
Both wars reached their conclusion with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
(Kissinger, 2015). The signing of this treaty is regarded as the beginning of the concepts of 
states as we know them today. Essentially, the treaty outlined that each nation would respect 
other nations’ right to exist and would not interfere with internal affairs within other nations 
(Kissinger, 2015). With this signing, the Dutch now had their own state and were free from 
having to worry about their right to existence (Kissinger, 2015). Having this security, as well 
as having the ability to focus resources away from war, only increased the Dutch’s growing 
economic dominance globally (Ferguson, 2009).   
By the 1650s the Dutch were the leading global power in trade, which subsequently brought 
them a huge amount of wealth and prosperity (Economic History, 2003). Additionally, the 
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Dutch made great advancements agriculturally, which in turn led to further prosperity, as more 
time and resources could be diverted and focused in other areas (Economic History, 2003).  
This trend in continued growth transpired for well over another century during the Dutch 
Golden Age (Economic History, 2003). This world trade conducted by the United East India 
Company was funded in Dutch guilders which, due to the size of trade as well as factoring in 
the safety and stability of the Dutch guilder thanks to the Bank of Amsterdam, made it the 
undisputed reserve currency of the time (Ferguson, 2009; Economic History, 2003). From as 
late as the 1760s, the Dutch were still responsible for as much as three times more of global 
shipping than the British (Ferguson, 2009). 
 However, gradually, over many decades in the first half of the 1700s, the Dutch guilder as the 
sole reserve currency declined (Ferguson, 2009). The guilder declined not because of the 
Dutch’s mismanagement but because of the rise of France as a super economic power 
(Weatherford, 2009). Although the guilder eventually lost its position as the sole reserve 
currency, it remained important globally due in large part to the Dutch’s continued financial 
dominance of the 18th century (Ferguson, 2009).    
The French Livre 
The French livre gained reserve currency status due to the rise of France economically, the 
reestablishment of a non-fiat livre and the fact that the Age of Enlightenment was centred in 
France (Graeber, 2014). During the 1700s there were four main superpowers in Europe. These 
included France, Great Britain, Prussia and Austria (Graeber, 2014). Italy and Germany were 
fractured states, Spain was in long-term decline thanks to prior centuries of over expansion, 
Russia was too isolated, and the Dutch and Scandinavian Republics lacked the population to 
be considered a superpower (Weatherford, 2009). What made France stand out most among 
the other three superpowers was its population (Weatherford, 2009). In 1700 the population of 
France was approximately 21 million which was the most at the time (Weatherford, 2009). 
Whereas the population of Great Britain, Prussia and Austria was approximately 9 million, 5 
million and 3 million, respectively (Weatherford, 2009).  
In addition to France’s large population, France was also home to some of the most fertile 
farming land in all of Europe (Ferguson, 2009). These two factors, in combination with the 
adoption of major agricultural advancements made by the Dutch, led to massive economic 
growth (Graeber, 2014). Over time, France’s new ability to produce large amounts of food led 
to a large rise in French exports (Graeber, 2014). What aided French agricultural exports was 
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the reestablishment of a non-fiat French livre silver coin in 1726 (Ferguson, 2009). Six years 
prior, the fiat French livre lost all form of value due to the South Sea Company bubble— 
regarded as the first stock market crash in history (Ferguson, 2009). As a result, the 
reestablishment of non-fiat currency made foreign nations more confident in bilateral trade 
with France due to the intrinsic value of the silver coin (Graeber, 2014). 
Another important factor to consider in the rise of the French livre is the fact that the Age of 
Enlightenment was centred in France (Ferguson, 2009). The Age of Enlightenment, which 
spanned from 1715 with the death of King Louis XIV to 1789 with the start of the French 
Revolution, was a period of the intellectual movement of ideas (Weatherford, 2009). The fields 
of science, philosophy, politics, to the creation of economics in 1776, were all greatly advanced 
during this period (Ferguson, 2009). After the death of King Louis, the ideas of individual 
liberty and religious tolerance promoted by the people greatly contributed to France, and in 
particular Paris, being the centre of Europe during this revolutionary period (Weatherford, 
2009). As a result, French hegemony during the 18th century greatly benefited the French 
economically. This made the French livre a popular currency globally which in turn made it 
the undisputed global reserve currency of the 18th century. 
France through the 18th century continued to gain power on a relative basis compared to other 
European nations (Ferguson, 2009). This is despite the multiple wars the French fought over 
this time (Ferguson, 2009). However, the expansion of the French Empire came at the cost of 
rising debt for the French government (Ferguson, 2009). This, in combat with years of bad 
harvests, led to the French Revolution starting in 1789 and finishing in 1799 with the rise of 
Napoleon (Weatherford, 2009). The Napoleon Wars that transpired from 1803 to 1815 were 
fought between France against all other major European nations, including Russia (Ferguson, 
2009). Fighting so many nations at one time left the country bankrupt, severely damaged their 
economy and ultimately led to the decline of the French currency, at this stage now called the 
French Franc, as the global reserve currency (Weatherford, 2009). The British Sterling would 
replace the French Franc, which coincides with the rise of the British Empire.   
The British Pound in the Early 19th Century  
The British pound began its transition as the sole global reserve currency around the fall of 
Napoleon in 1812 and the victory at Waterloo in 1815 (Ferguson, 2002). Specifically, there 
were three contributing factors around this time that led to this transition. Firstly, it was during 
this time that British inventions made in the first industrial revolution started to pay off 
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economically (Ferguson, 2002). Secondly, thanks to the Rothschild family’s global dominance 
in banking, they were able to create the first global secondary bond market (Ferguson, 2009). 
Finally, the rise of British colonisation can also be contributed to solidifying the British pound 
as a reserve currency; particularly in the second half of the 19th century (Ferguson, 2002).  
The first industrial revolution, which spanned from 1760 to 1830, benefited Great Britain more 
than any other nation (Ferguson, 2002). Most of the inventions from this time were British-
made, including the power loom, the piston steam engine, the cast iron blowing cylinder, the 
train and many more (Ferguson, 2002). Therefore Britain had a head start in the productivity 
gains that transpired from these new inventions (Ferguson, 2002). These productivity gains led 
to large sustainable increases in population. Over the 19th century, the population increased by 
a factor of four, from 7.7 million to a population just under 30 million (Ferguson, 2002). This 
large population growth, with remarkable gains in living standards, led to Great Britain 
becoming immensely wealthy and the dominate superpower of the world by the 1850s 
(Ferguson, 2002).    
The second factor that aided in the rise of sterling as a global reserve currency is the invention 
of a global bond market thanks to the Rothschild family (Ferguson, 2009). After making money 
in the textile industry, Nathan Rothschild and his four brothers started their banking business 
(Ferguson, 2009). Nathan was located in London, with the other four to be permanently located 
in Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam with the fourth travelling around Europe where needed 
(Ferguson, 2009). Their business model was taking advantage of the different prices of gold in 
these cities; a practice known as price arbitrage (Ferguson, 2009). Nathan Rothschild made his 
first vast fortune speculating on the fact that if Britain won the battle of Waterloo, the price of 
British bonds would rise due to a decrease in future borrowings of the British government 
(Ferguson, 2009). Great Brittan did indeed win the battle of Waterloo, which in turn made the 
Rothschild family excessively rich (Ferguson, 2009).  
In the aftermath of Waterloo, the Rothschild banking empire continued to expand until it was 
the dominate bank in all of Europe (Ferguson, 2009). Thanks to the Rothschild’s wide presence 
across Europe, they became the first bank to pay out sterling bonds to depositors all over 
Europe (Ferguson, 2009). This new type of bond came to be in 1818, making it possible for 
someone in Amsterdam to be paid out in sterling without having to travel to London to be paid 
(Ferguson, 2009). This proved to be so successful, sterling denominated bonds for French, 
Prussian, Russian, Austrian and Brazilian government debt were also issued, which, like the 
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British bonds, could be redeemed anywhere in Europe where the Rothschild’s had a presence 
(Ferguson, 2009). It was the beginnings of the first truly global bond market. Having the 
majority of the bonds being denominated in sterling, plus having the sterling’s intrinsic value 
tied to silver and gold, greatly helped establish the sterling as the dominate reserve currency of 
the 19th century (Ferguson, 2009). As a result, the Rothschild family indirectly played a large 
role in promoting the rise of the sterling.  
The final aspect to consider in the rise of the sterling is the vast expansion of the colonies under 
the British Empire. It’s important to note, British colonisation had been transpiring during the 
16th, 17th and 18th century mostly in the Americas and Caribbean (Ferguson, 2002). However, 
during the beginning of the 19th century, particularly after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Britain 
expanded its colonial reach to all four corners of the earth. South Africa, parts of India, 
Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and parts of North Eastern Africa were all colonised by the 
1840s (Ferguson, 2002). Eventually, by 1919, the peak of the Britain Colonial Empire and in 
the aftermath of World War Ⅰ, Britain controlled a third of Africa, all areas of present day 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand, Papa New Guinea, Hong Kong and other 
various smaller islands located globally around the world (Ferguson, 2002). Without question, 
Britain was the global superpower of the day, controlling more foreign territory than any other 
great power by a large margin (Ferguson, 2002).  
Having all these colonial territories was very valuable for Britain, particularly during the era 
of the second industrial revolution between 1870 and 1914 (Ferguson, 2002). These colonies 
provided the raw materials required for Great Britain to economically grow to the extent that 
it did during the 19th century (Ferguson, 2002). Secondly, Britain’s colonies on the whole were 
only allowed to trade with Britain directly tariff free, whereas if permitted, colonial trade with 
other powers often had steep trade tariffs (Ferguson, 2002). Additionally, with most of this 
trade being carried out in sterling, sterling was acting as the reserve currency (Ferguson, 2009). 
As a result, while sterling was already a reserve currency, even before the colonisation era, the 
colonies cemented the sterling’s status as a global reserve currency. 
Ultimately, like the Roman Empire, Britain was overextended globally, particularly after 
World War Ⅰ (Rickard, 2011). Additionally, under Winston Churchill’s orders as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Britain returned the sterling to its pre-war gold peg, as he felt it was a point of 
honour and would place a healthy check on Britain’s finances (Rickards, 2011). However, the 
results were devastating for the British economy, which eventually led to Great Britain being 
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the first major economy to enter the Great Depression (Rickards, 2011). Winston Churchill 
would later write this decision was one of the “greatest mistakes in his life” (Rickards, 2011). 
With the Great Depression being felt globally, Britain finally broke its peg with gold in 1931, 
which only aided in the deterioration of trust in the sterling (Rickards, 2011). Meanwhile, the 
US, who was largely not impacted by World War Ⅰ, was rapidly becoming an economic 
powerhouse during the 1920s aided partly by their isolationist stance (Rickards, 2011). While 
the Great Depression did indeed hurt the US economically, it ultimately did not stop its long-
term economic rise and, after World War Ⅱ, it was clear the British Sterling’s role as the reserve 
currency was over (Rickards, 2011).   
The Bretton Woods Era 1944–1971 
The Bretton Woods conference, formally known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference, took place between the 1st and 22nd of July 1944 in the later stages of World War 
Ⅱ (Federal Reserve History, 2013). The meeting involved 730 delegates from 44 key countries 
which was held in Bretton Wood, New Hampshire in the US (Federal Reserve History, 2013). 
From this conference a new world economic order was created. By this stage in World War Ⅱ, 
it was becoming clear the allies would likely win (Conway, 2016). Additionally, with the 
exception of Pearl Harbour, the US had not been attacked on home soil and when compared to 
Europe, was in significantly better economic shape (Conway, 2016). As evidence of this, by 
this stage of the war, the US controlled two-thirds of the world’s gold supply (Rickards, 2014).  
Finally, the US was not going to make the same mistake they did after World War Ⅰ by being 
isolated from the global economy (Steil, 2014). Consequently, this meeting was the beginnings 
of a new world order controlled by the US.  
At the conclusion of the conference, it was agreed that the US Dollar would be pegged to the 
price of gold at $35 dollars. With regard to other currencies, they would be pegged to the US 
Dollar, which indirectly also pegged them to the price of gold (Steil, 2014). Additionally, as 
part of the agreement, The US would convert US Dollars into gold for all investors and 
countries that wished to do so (Steil, 2014). Having other currencies fixed to the US dollar was 
of huge advantage to the US, as it gave them exchange rate predictability for the growing export 
powerhouse (Steil, 2014). This made the US dollar the global reserve currency and facilitated 
the vast majority of economic transactions. 
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In addition to the establishment of fixed exchange rates, the Bretton Wood Agreement also 
outlined the creation of the IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), which formally became known as The World Bank in 1995; and started the discussions 
for the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was 
founded in 1948, that later became known as the World Trade Organisation in 1995 (Steil, 
2014).  
The IMF was established to make temporary loans and give financial advice and guidance to 
countries that found themselves in financial trouble (Conway, 2016). Effectively, the IMF has 
been able to provide the crucial role that gunboat diplomacy used to in prior centuries. 
Ultimately, the IMF has been an important institute for providing global economic stability 
internationally between nations in ways that are of benefit for the US global economic order.  
The World Bank was created to provide loans to developing countries to help fund important 
infrastructure projects, such as dams, transportation links, ports, etc. in order to help them grow 
economically.  In total, since its 1947 inception, 12,746 loans have been made, all of which 
help foster American economic hegemony (World Bank, 2017).   
Finally, the GATT, which was established in 1948, was set up with the purpose of promoting 
international trade through reducing and eliminating tariffs, quotas and other such trade barriers 
(Conway, 2016). With 164 member countries as of October 2017, the WTO is the largest global 
economic organisation in the world (Steil, 2014). Overall, this institution has been very 
important in promoting a free trade global economic order to American standards, which in 
doing so, has aided in American economic dominance (Steil, 2014). What is important to note 
is that all three institutions have helped improved the US’s economic hegemony which, in turn, 
helps maintain the US dollar as the sole key reserve currency.  
In saying this, these institutions did not stop the collapse of the Bretton Woods Systems. 
Although remarkable growth was achieved during the 1950s, the 1960s, under the Kennedy 
and Johnson presidencies, saw stagnant growth, rising trade and budget deficits and rising 
inflation largely due to President Johnson’s guns and butter programme (Rickards, 2014). To 
fund the budget deficits, America abused their power of being the sole reserve currency by 
printing money to finance the Vietnam War and the social programmes back home (Conway, 
2016). Nations who had a surplus of US dollars began to worry about what the future value of 
these US dollars would be (Steil, 2014).  
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Consequently, starting with France in January 1965, the French asked for $150 million in US 
dollars to be converted into gold with an additional $150 million to be converted soon after 
(Rickards, 2011). French President Charles De Gaulle famously offered to send the French 
navy to help with the gold transfer (Rickards, 2011). Soon after, Spain followed with a $60 
million dollar conversion (Rickards, 2011). Over the next few years, the nations of Switzerland, 
Netherlands and Italy would follow suit (Rickards, 2011). 
 With a run on the US dollar slowly starting to take place, the IMF in 1969 created a new 
currency called a Special Drawing Right (SDR) (IMF, 2016). The SDR’s value was originally 
derived from the value of gold where one SDR was worth 0.888671 grams of gold which was 
worth about US$1 (IMF, 2016).  The SDR was meant to supplement the role of settling 
international accounts that both gold and the US dollar facilitated during this time (IMF, 2016). 
Thus only countries, and not individuals, could own SDR’s (Rickards, 2011). The SDR system, 
while still currently in place today, ultimately did not replace the US dollar (Rickards, 2011).  
Despite the instalment of the SDR system, there continued to be a run on the US dollar as 
countries continued to sell US dollars and buy US gold (Federal Reserve History, 2013). 
Ultimately, it was a one-sided trade that was depleting the stock of US gold (Federal Reserve 
History, 2013). Thus, President Richard Nixon, on August 15th, 1971, officially announced 
that US dollars were no longer convertible into gold (Steil, 2014). At the time, there was 8,000 
tonnes of gold in US reserves, a fraction of the 20,000 tonnes a decade prior (Rickards, 2011). 
President Nixon’s closing of the gold window, formally known as the Nixon Shock, officially 
marked the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods era (Federal Reserve History, 2013).   
It was not just the US dollar that now began to freely float. The British pound, French franc, 
German mark, Japanese yen and eventually all other major currencies would become freely 
floating fiat currencies (Steil, 2014). In addition to closing the gold window, President Nixon 
also adopted a 90-day wage and price freeze as well as a 10% import tariff to combat the 
growing balance of payments deficit that was largely blamed on growing Japanese and German 
export dominance (Rickards, 2011). This 10% import tariff had the same impact as a 10% 
devaluation in the US dollar. It immediately gave the US export market a desperately needed 
economic lifeline (Steil, 2014). Two weeks after the Nixon Shock, Japan, who were being 
protected militarily by the US from China and Russia, agreed to float their currency (Rickards, 
2011). This resulted in an immediate one-day US dollar devaluation of 7% against the yen 
(Rickards, 2011).   
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In late September, a G10 meeting of finance ministers from the world’s biggest economies met 
in London (Rickards, 2011). The US demanded a $13 billion swing in the balance of trade from 
its current $5 billion deficit to an $8 billion surplus (Rickards, 2011). Until this happened the 
10% import surcharge was there to stay (Rickards, 2011). Two weeks later the key members 
met in Washington for an annual IMF meeting (Rickards, 2014). More nations started to 
appreciate their currency against the dollar ranging from the 3–9% range (Rickards, 2011). 
This was not enough from the Americans perspective, but it did lead to the US softening its 
threats as the US indicated it would consider dropping the surcharge as long as the balance of 
payments moved in the right direction (Rickards, 2014). 
In early and mid-December of 1971, the G10 finance members met in Rome and then in 
Washington where it was finally agreed that the US would devalue the price of the US dollar 
of gold by about 9% from $35 to $38 (Rickards, 2011). Although the US gold window was still 
closed, it did increase the value of foreign nations’ gold holding in US dollars, as the US 
indicated they would maintain a peg to gold at the new $38 level (Rickards, 2011). As for the 
devaluation of foreign currencies, the US dollar was devalued by 3–8% against the major G10 
nations giving a total adjustment of 12–17% when including the gold devaluation (Rickards, 
2011). Japan, being the strongest economy, was devalued by 17% (Rickards, 2011). With fixed 
exchange rates restored at a level fairer from the American’s perspective, the US import 
surcharge was dropped (Rickards, 2011).  
The short-term benefits the devaluation provided to America was short-lived. By 1973 the US 
was in the worst recession since the Great Depression (Steil, 2014). Additionally, the United 
Kingdom, also in economic turmoil, was forced to devalue the pound by 6% on June 23rd, 1972, 
which, by the end of the year, fell even more to 10% against the US dollar (Rickards, 2011). 
Immediately, speculation that the Italian lira would have to devalue emerged. Not helping 
matters, President Nixon was infamously quoted saying, “I don’t give a shit about the lira” 
(Rickards, 2014).  A week later West Germany enacted currency control on the 29th (Rickards, 
2011). Then by July 3rd the Swiss franc and the Canadian dollar began to float (Rickards, 2011). 
The IMF and the US Fed quickly responded by establishing swap lines and short-term currency 
lending facilities with central banking globally, in order to try and stop the currency turmoil 
(Steil, 2014); however, the damage was done.  
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Post Bretton Woods 1973–-Present 
In the beginning of 1973, the IMF officially claimed the Bretton Wood era to be over (Conway, 
2016). From this point forward, it was the wild west in terms of the value of currencies. Each 
major countries’ currency was free to float where market forces determined the exchange rate 
(Conway, 2016). Additionally, with no currency being backed by gold, or any other 
commodity, it was the beginning of the era of fiat currency that exists today (Conway, 2016). 
The question of whether the US dollar would remain the global reserve currency was up for 
debate.  
Although the US was still a global superpower and still the most powerful economically, 
inflationary pressures by late 1972 were rapidly growing (Shilling, 2010). These inflationary 
pressures placed a question mark over whether the US dollar could remain a store of value for 
excess saving. Inflation really set in from October 1973 (Shilling, 2010). In response to western 
support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War, OPEC nations placed an oil embargo on the nations 
of Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US (Shilling, 2010). Although 
it only lasted seven months, over this time the price for a barrel of oil skyrocketed from $3.50 
to $11.50, which released massive inflationary pressures throughout the economy (Shilling, 
2010).  
In order to re-establish confidence in the US dollar, as well as to secure America’s energy 
sources, Richard Nixon and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger developed the Petrodollar 
system in 1974, which has been an immensely successful policy for the US to this day (Katusa, 
2015). The Petrodollar system initially involved only Saudi Arabia selling oil in US dollars, as 
well as investing all surplus oil profits in the US. In exchange, the US guaranteed the safety 
and legacy of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Family as leaders of the country (Katusa, 2015).  
Over time, due to Saudi Arabia’s large influence in OPEC, the Petrodollar extended to all 
members of OPEC (Katusa, 2015). As a result, to this day, with the exception of some Russian 
and Iranian transactions, any nation wanting to buy oil has to pay with it in US dollars. In doing 
so, it provides a massive floor for the demand in US dollars (Katusa, 2015). However, this 
policy, while it has helped in the long-term, did not shore up confidence in the US dollar right 
away, nor did it help with inflationary pressures within America (Katusa, 2015).          
Despite the rise in interest rates, a cycle of future inflation expectations was established into 
the economy, which led to the continuation of inflation throughout the decade (Steil, 2014). 
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Between 1977and 1981, the value of the US dollar lost 50% of its purchasing power (Steil, 
2014). The price of gold in 1971 as discussed was $35 (Steil, 2014). By January 21st, 1980 it 
peaked at over $843 as can be seen in Figure 2 (FRED, 2017). This dramatic rise in the price 
of gold was a reflection of the markets not trusting the US dollar as a reserve currency (Steil, 
2014). By this stage, the US economy was in economic stagnation (Steil, 2014). If the US dollar 
was to maintain its reserve currency status, the US government had to get inflation under 
control.  
Paul Volcker, elected as chairman of the Fed in August 1979, in an unpopular move among 
citizens, rose interest rates sharply (Steil, 2014). At their peak, he raised interest rates to 20% 
in June 1981, as can be seen in Figure 3 (FRED, 2017). Additionally, the tax cuts implemented 
by President Reagan helped companies grow while also enticing foreign investment, which in 
doing so, helped restore faith in the US dollar (Conway, 2016). The shock therapy from the 
interest rate rise and the benefits from tax cuts worked. Inflation fell from 13.5% in 1980 to 1.9 
% by 1986, as shown in Figure 4 (FRED, 2017). The policies were so successful that the US 
dollar’s value went from a position of being weak in 1980 to a position, in the eyes of the 
Americans, of being too strong by 1985 (Conway, 2016).   
By 1985 the US was running a large trade deficit, particularly vis-a-vis Japan and West 
Germany (Rickards, 2011). This led to the September 1985 Plaza Accord, in which the finance 
ministers of West Germany, Japan, France and United Kingdom met in New York (Steil, 2014). 
With these nations still being protected by the US in the Cold War, they agreed to slowly over 
time devalue their currencies against the dollar (Rickards, 2011). This policy was very 
successful. Between 1985 and 1988, the dollar declined 50% against the Japanese yen, 40% 
against the French franc, and 20% against the German mark (Rickards, 2011). This led to the 
February 1987 Louvre Accord, signed in Paris, where the same nations agreed to stop the 
decline in the US dollar which ultimately stabilised its value (Conway, 2016).  
From this point on, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the world economy 
entered the period referred to as the great moderation in which economic growth worldwide 
was strong, inflation low and confidence in the US dollar as the global reserve currency high 
(Conway, 2016). Even the bursting of the 2000 Dot Com bubble and the Great Financial Crisis 
2008, both crises that originated in America, did not dent the US dollar’s perception as the 
global reserve currency (Rickards, 2014). If anything, both crises strengthened the US dollar’s 
roll, owing to the fact the US dollar is perceived as a safe haven currency, or more 
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pessimistically, in the words of legendary bond investor Bill Gross, “The cleanest dirty shirt” 
(CNBC, 2012). To understand why this is the case, it is important to study key economic 
metrics that explain why this is the case.  
The US Reserve Currency Today  
There are a couple of key metrics that can be studied in order to understand why the US dollar 
is the sole key reserve currency globally. These included studying both the unallocated and 
allocated reserves globally, the total currency distribution of global foreign exchange 
transactions and looking at foreign owned debt denominated by currency.  
 Allocated and Unallocated Reserves 
Focusing on reserves held by nations globally, there are two different types being either 
allocated or unallocated. Looking at Figure 5, it shows the size and growth of both types of 
reserves overtime (IMF, 2017). The essential difference between the two is that allocated 
reserves are where countries globally tell the IMF precisely how much of each main type of 
currency they own (Conway, 2016). Whereas unallocated reserves are countries that disclose 
to the IMF how much total reserves they own, valued in US dollars, but do not disclose the 
specific breakdown of what they own; i.e. how many euros, yen, pounds, etc. (Conway, 2016). 
As of 2017, 149 countries globally report their allocated reserves and only 52 report reserves 
on an unallocated reserve basis (IMF, 2017).  
Focusing solely on allocated reserves, Figure 6 and Figure 7 show it is evident that the US 
dollar is the dominant global currency and hence why the US dollar is considered the sole key 
reserve currency globally (IMF, 2017). As both graphs show, the composition of US dollars 
owned as foreign reserves is by far the greatest among any of the other large currencies’ IMF, 
2017). While not as high as the 72% in 1999, at 64% as of 2017, the US dollar is very much 
still the sole key reserve currency in regard to global allocated reserves as the next two biggest 
currencies on this basis are the euro and the British pound at 19.7% and 4.4%, respectively 
(IMF, 2017).  
Total Currency Distribution of Global Foreign Exchange Transactions  
The second metric to study is the percentage of global trade that is conducted in US dollars. As 
Table 1 shows, between 87–90% of all foreign exchange transactions globally since 2001 have 
been conducted in US dollars (BIS, 2016). The next biggest currency used is the euro that has 
fluctuated between 31 and38% over this time period (BIS, 2016). It is important to note these 
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figures are out of a total of 200% as there has to be two currencies for each transaction (BIS, 
2016). Expressed differently, approximately 43–45% of every single transaction globally 
involved the use of the US dollar on one side of the trade. It is important to note that the Bank 
of International Settlements methodology does not account for offshore trading, which explains 
why China’s figures appear to be lower (BIS, 2016).  
Foreign Owned Debt Denominated by Currency  
The final metric to study is the percentage of total foreign owned debt that is denominated in 
US dollars. It is important to note that while the majority will be US government debt, both 
Yankee bonds and euro-dollar bonds are included in this data (BIS, 2015). These are two types 
of bonds that are both denominated in US dollars but are issued by a foreign non-US entity or 
issued by a US entity to non-US investors, respectively (Investopedia, 2017). Expressed 
differently, both the Yankee bonds and euro-dollar bonds are denominated in US dollars but 
are not official US sovereign debt (Investopedia, 2017). Table 2 shows that as of June 2015, 
the largest currency used for total denominated debt owned by foreign entities was the US 
dollar at 42.7% (BIS, 2015).  
The reason why this metric is important when studying reserve currencies is that in order to be 
a reserve currency, foreign governments have to have an ability to invest their excess reserves 
(Eichengreen, 2012). This is because it would not be profitable for a government to hold 
physical currency as inflation would erode its value. Therefore governments need an asset to 
invest their excessive reserves. While this can be done with equities and other financial assets, 
the most common is debt, as it is highly liquid and is generally regarded as a conservative 
investment that does not wildly fluctuate in value (Eichengreen, 2012). As a result, a country 
that wants its currency to be a reserve currency has to require foreign entities to purchase their 
debt (Eichengreen, 2012).  
The second largest currency for this dataset is the euro at 39.2% (BIS, 2016). This figure would 
suggest that the US dollar could not be considered the sole key reserve currency under this 
metric due to the US dollar and euro being effectively the same. However, the reason why this 
is not the case is that a large percentage of euro denominated debt is owned by other European 
countries (BIS, 2016). For example, Germany owns the largest percentage of French sovereign 
debt, as they both share the same currency, the 39.2% overstates the importance of euro 
denominated debt as a reserve currency for non-EU nations (BIS, 2016). As a result, the US 
dollar under this metric is still clearly the most important reserve currency globally.   
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Conclusion  
 In conclusion, this chapter has outlined the history of the rise and fall of the key global reserve 
currencies. Specifically, these have included the Spanish silver, Dutch guilder, French livre, 
British pound and the rise of the US dollar. Arguably, at the height of their global influence, 
none of these reserve currencies would have appeared to be at risk of being superseded. 
However, as was discussed in this chapter, all at some stage were. As a result, just because the 
US dollar’s role as the key global reserve currency appears to be unrivalled today, it does not 
mean it will be in the future. In saying this, the final section of this chapter shows that the US 
dollar is without question the sole key reserve currency as of 2017. This is based on allocated 
and unallocated reserves, the percentage of total world trade that uses the US dollar and for the 
fact that US dollar denominated debt is the largest currency owned by foreign entities and 
governments. Therefore, under these metrics, it would not appear the US dollar’s status as the 
sole key reserve currency is in imminent risk.  
Ignoring the rise of other currencies (which will be covered in Chapter 6), as mentioned in the 
introduction, the main threat that will challenge the US dollar’s ability to function as the sole 
key global reserve currency is lost confidence in its ability to act as a store of value. More 
specifically, lost confidence in its ability to act as a store of value is determined by the US 
government ability to pay their debt. As a result, when looking at the potential demise of the 
US dollar’s ability to function as the key global reserve currency, it is important to study the 
overall sovereign debt position of both the US and the six key countries mentioned in the 
introduction. However, before this, the Debt Super Cycle Theory, along with other supporting 
theories and economic concepts, needs to be covered as will be done in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Economic Theory  
Introduction  
As will be discussed in this chapter, this thesis will use the Debt Super Cycle Theory as the key 
theoretical framework. However, there are a variety of other important theories and concepts 
that underpin and support the key aspects of the Debt Super Cycle Theory which will be 
covered.   
These include the following: 
 
 
Debt Super Cycle Theory 
The term debt super cycle was first coined by the influential economist Tony Boeckh back in 
the early 1970s (Mauldin & Tepper. 2011). Prior to this, super cycle theories in economics had 
been applied to areas such as interest rates, money velocity, bank liquidity etc. (Forbes, 2010). 
However, Boeckh, based on the underpinnings of Irving Fisher’s work, was the first to apply 
the term super cycle with debt (Forbes, 2010). It’s important to note, Boeckh’s work and 
writings focused only on sovereign debt (Forbes, 2010). The idea behind the Debt Super Cycle 
Theory is that during the recession and trough years on the economic business cycle, both 
Keynesian inspired fiscal expansion policies and easy monetary policies are implemented 
(Mauldin & Tepper, 2011).  This, in turn, increases sovereign debt (Mauldin & Tepper. 2011). 
When an economy enters another recession, the same policies are implemented. The issue is 
that generally more sovereign debt is acquired during the recession/trough stages than is paid 
off in the expansion and peak years (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). As a result, over time, the long 
run trend is total sovereign debt levels continue to increase with each business cycle, even if 
some years experience debt reduction (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011).   
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In the post GFC era, the Debt Super Cycle Theory has increasingly entered into academia and 
financial market conversations. As discussed in Chapter 3, debt since the end of World War Ⅱ 
has been consistently increasing over time with larger jumps in debt generally after recessions 
(Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). However, the Debt Super Cycle Theory says that this cannot be 
sustained indefinitely. There comes a point where no new debt can be taken on (Skarica, 2014). 
Eventually, confidence is lost in governments’ ability to pay, bond markets revolt, borrowing 
interest rates go up, which ultimately make it too expensive for governments to service the debt 
and pay for public goods (Skarica, 2014). It is important to note, the theory does not try and 
predict when debt levels will become unsustainable, i.e. when debt to GDP ratio equals 250%, 
as market confidence is inherently unpredictable (Skarica, 2014). What it does show is that 
based on the underlying economic fundamentals, eventually there will be a loss in market 
confidence leading to a debt crisis if nothing is done to improve the underlining economic 
fundamentals reduction (Mauldin, & Tepper. 2011).   
To illustrate this point numerically, Japan’s finances will be used. Japan’s 2017 budget is 
outlined to spend ¥101 trillion (The Japanese Times, 2016). For this budget, they are using the 
assumption that the average rate of borrowing will be 1.6% (The Japanese Times, 2016). If this 
is the case, the debt servicing cost will be ¥24.62 trillion, which is 24.37% of their total 
spending (The Japanese Times, 2016). Put differently, 75.63% of the budget can be used to 
spend on public goods, such as health, infrastructure, education, welfare, etc. If interest rates 
were to double to 3.2%, an interest rate that is common for advanced nations in normal 
economic times, effectively half of the budget will be going towards paying off interest. In this 
case, the Japanese government would have to cut approximately a third of their expenditures 
on public goods, assuming tax revenue is not increased, just to pay off the interest on the debt, 
let alone thinking about paying off the principle. This would be socially destabilising and 
ultimately not sustainable without some form of debt restructuring.  
When a government finds itself in this situation, they have four choices. The first choice is 
grow their way out of the debt (Skarica, 2014). This is by far the most appealing method as 
debt reduction can transpire while economic growth continues. However, this option is also the 
hardest to achieve (Mauldin & Tepper. 2011). Moreover, this option requires leaders to be 
proactive and deal with the crisis before being forced to (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). The next 
three options are generally implemented when markets force leaders to react and are 
economically painful. These include an austerity path, debt defaults and inflating the debt away 
(Skarica, 2014). All four options are discussed below.  
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Firstly, if governments take a proactive approach by attempting to grow their way out of debt, 
they can achieve this by either increasing their population or increase their productivity per 
worker (Skarica, 2014). Increasing their population is relatively straightforward. Either 
increase net immigration or provide incentives for woman to have more children (Skarica, 
2014). Increasing worker productivity is a lot harder to achieve. This can be done by lowering 
taxes, cutting regulations, increased infrastructure spending, promoting the adoption of new 
technologies, etc. (Skarica, 2014). The most crucial aspect to this growth option working is that 
sustained government surpluses over the medium- to long-term have to be run in order to 
reduce the debt burden (Skarica, 2014). At the very least, as long as growth rates are greater 
than the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, then the total debt to GDP ratio will slowly 
decline despite net debt levels increasing (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011).  
What makes this option so hard to achieve when debt levels are high is that often measures to 
increase productivity also increase government expenditure, i.e. infrastructure spending 
(Skarica, 2014). Known as the economic term ‘priming the pump’, advocates for this option 
point out that spending money leads to greater increases of growth down the road if spent 
properly (Skarica, 2014). While there are merits to this argument, the payback in increased 
productivity can have a substantial time lag, i.e. investments in education, and there is still a 
limit to how large debt can get (Skarica, 2014). Finally, it is also important to note, if 
government actions and words are seen as credible in growing the economy/running budget 
surplus, market confidence, all else being equal, will increase, which, in turn lowers borrowing 
costs, reducing the risk of experiencing a painful debt crisis (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011).   
The second option that governments generally only choose when the markets force them to is 
to undertake austerity measures. Austerity is where governments reduce public expenditure or 
increase government revenue, to an economically painful level, in order to improve their 
financial position (Skarica, 2014). For this policy to be successful, and hence to reduce their 
debt burden, budget surpluses eventually need to be run for multiple years to both lower the 
debt principle and to restore confidence in the bond market in order to reduce borrowing costs 
(Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). Additionally, if government actions and words are credible to 
honour their debt, confidence in the bond market as well as faith in the underlining currency 
can be restored (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). Running austerity budgets over a medium term is 
economically very painful as expenditure cuts into pensions, welfare checks, health care, etc. 
This makes everyday citizens worse off (Skarica, 2014). As a result, while austerity measures 
may be necessary, they are obviously not a politically popular path to pursue.   
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The third way governments can service their debt is to default. Defaulting on debt can be done 
in a variety of ways, from partial haircuts of the principle, lowering interest rates, increasing 
the debt maturity date to outright refusing to pay the entire principle (Skarica, 2014). 
Throughout the centuries there are hundreds of examples of countries defaulting on their debt. 
Notable examples in recent times include Russia in 1998, Turkey 2001, Argentina in 2001 and 
2003 and, of course, Greece that has restructured their debt terms at the expense of creditors 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). Going down this route, while it may help lower the debt, creates a 
host of problems. As they say, “There is no free lunch.” Effectively, defaulting just places the 
economic burden onto another group, i.e. bond holders, both domestically and foreign, losing 
the value of their bonds. Defaulting also leads to a loss of confidence, inability to borrow more, 
at least at cheap interest rates, and often comes at the expense of private citizens’ wealth. This 
is very harmful for short to medium term economic growth (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). As a 
result, defaulting on debt is not a painless option.  
Finally, the last way in which governments can service their debt is to inflate their way out of 
debt, often done by printing money (Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). Again, looking over the prior 
centuries, there are hundreds of examples of nations debasing their currency to allow them to 
pay off their debt. As debt is generally fixed in nominal terms, paying off the same debt with 
inflated currency is an option (Skarica, 2014). However, this increased level of inflation, 
particularly if it is hyperinflationary, is very destructive to the wider economy (Mauldin & 
Tepper, 2011). Any citizen who had cash assets quickly finds its value, and hence its purchasing 
power is far less in high inflationary times. This leads to lower standards of living and wealth 
(Mauldin & Tepper, 2011). 
Financial Instability Hypothesis 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis, developed by Hyman Minsky, was revisited and seen in 
a whole new light after the 2008 GFC (Wray, 2015). Famed economists from Nobel Prize 
winning Paul Krugman, to current Fed Chairwoman Janet Yallen, have acknowledged the deep 
and insightful ideas of Minsky as being far ahead of his time (Wray, 2015). Although he died 
in 1996, his theories pointed to future financial crises (Wray, 2015). As a result, Minsky’s work 
was seen in a whole new light due to the fact so few economists foresaw the GFC.  
At the heart of this theory is a phrase he coined: “stability is destabilizing” (Wray, 2015). 
Hyman argued that financial crises are embedded in capitalism as periods of economic 
prosperity incentivise borrowers and leaders to act in an increasingly riskier manner (Wray, 
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2015). This increased risk-taking and excessive optimism leads to financial bubbles that 
eventually burst (Wray, 2015). As a result, capitalism is predisposed to moving from periods 
of financial stability to instability (Wray, 2015).     
Hyman’s theory works from the Keynesian view that investment spending fluctuates with 
changes in the business cycle (Wray, 2015). Hyman adds to this by incorporating the financial 
markets to this economic phenomenon. Specifically, Hyman argues that the purchase of assets, 
such as capital equipment for businesses or houses from households, requires borrowing from 
the bank in the modern era (Wray, 2015). It is this need for financing that generates structural 
fragility. In times of increasing prosperity, both banks and borrowers become more optimistic 
about the future which, in turn, leads to increased risk-taking (Wray, 2015). Banks start to ease 
up on credit quality eligibility for borrowers, down payment requirements and the type of 
collateral accepted as down payment (Wray, 2015). Borrowers start to commit larger portions 
of their expected income to debt service as well as start relying more on short-term lending as 
opposed to long-term (Wray, 2015).  
With increased loans being made, underlying values in assets, particularly housing and land, 
increase in value. This increase’s incentives for borrowers to purchase these assets which leads 
to higher prices in a self-reinforcing cycle (Wray, 2015). Eventually, borrowers feel prices of 
assets can only go up (Wray, 2015).  Explicitly, Hyman outlined three different phases of 
financial instability that transpire through the upside of a business cycle. The first phase is the 
hedge phase where all debt borrowed can have both the interest and principle paid from the 
expected income of the borrower (Wray, 2015). As more risk-taking transpires, financial 
instability reaches stage two, the speculative phase (Wray, 2015). It is in this phase where the 
borrower can pay back only the interest portion of the loan from the expected income (Wray, 
2015). The final phase is the Ponzi phase in which neither the interest nor principle can be paid 
from expected income (Wray, 2015). This phase sees the principle of the loan itself increase. 
The Ponzi phase lasts as long as the bank is willing to refinance and allow the borrower to 
continue borrowing (Wray, 2015).   
The speculative leading cannot last forever. Eventually, when asset prices stop rising, both 
borrowers and lenders realise their positions, leaving them short of cash to meet their 
obligations (Wray, 2015). It is this moment when the financial system turns from being stable 
to unstable. This is called the Minsky Moment (Wray, 2015). Both the borrower and the bank 
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liquidate their assets to meet their borrowing requirements which leads to a deflationary credit 
crunch (Wray, 2015).  
Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis theory complements the Debt Super Cycle 
Theory as it provides an explanation on why too much debt eventually becomes unsustainable. 
While the Financial Instability Hypothesis has been discussed in terms of household debt and 
cooperate debt, it can also be applicable with sovereign debt. The only difference is the bond 
market is the bank and the household or firm is a government borrowing. Despite these small 
differences, the same three phases of debt build-up can be modelled with sovereign government 
debt. As a result, this theory is useful in explaining why governments are eventually forced to 
choose between austerity, defaulting and inflating their way out of debt if economic conditions 
deteriorate.  
Debt-Deflation Theory  
A very insightful theory worth outlining for this thesis is Irving Fisher’s ebt-Deflation Theory. 
This theory was published during the height of the great depression in October 1933 under the 
title The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions (Irving, 1933). His insights into the cause 
of the Great Depression is both relevant in explaining the 2008 Financial Crisis as well as the 
potential for future crisis. In total, there are nine steps to Irving Fisher’s Debt Deflation Theory.  
The theory starts by assuming there is a period of over indebtedness throughout the economy 
(Irving, 1933). This leads to (1) debt liquidation by either debtors, creditors or both as they 
become worried about their ability to pay off debt (Irving, 1933). This debt liquidation leads to 
distress selling, leading to (2) a contraction of the deposit currency as bank loans are paid off 
(Irving, 1933). As the money supply decreases, the velocity of money correspondingly 
decreases (Irving, 1933). Both the contraction of deposits and the slowdown in the velocity of 
money lead to (3) a fall in the level of prices or, in other words, an appreciation of the dollar 
(Irving, 1933). This is assuming that the fall in prices is not interfered with by artificial 
inflationary measures (Irving, 1933).    
If this is the case, then there will be (4) a greater fall in the net worth of businesses which will 
lead to increased bankruptcies (Irving, 1933). This leads to (5) a fall in profits in a capitalist 
economy (Irving, 1933). With the fall in profits, (6) both a reduction in output and an increase 
in unemployment result (Irving, 1933). With output falling and unemployment rising, (7) in 
pessimism in growth and a loss in confidence transpires (Irving, 1933). This leads to (8) 
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hoarding and a continual slowing of the velocity of money (Irving, 1933). In total, the above 
eight steps lead to (9) a complicated disturbance in the rate of interest particularly as the 
nominal rate decreases and the real rate rises (Irving, 1933).  
A very important consideration that Irving Fisher notes is that the value of the dollar may 
appreciate in value faster than the number of dollars owed shrinks as a part of the liquidation 
process (Irving, 1933). Or in other words, due to the deflationary pressures that come with 
liquidation, the real value of the debt gets bigger despite portions of it being paid off (Irving, 
1933). This theory fits well with the Debt Super Cycle Theory as it provides an additional step 
by step process explaining how too much indebtedness leads to a deflationary environment. 
This theory, like Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, is useful in explaining why 
governments can find themselves in a position where they must choose between defaulting, 
austerity measures or inflating the debt away.  
Quantity Theory of Money  
This theory relates to the inflation option of the Debt Super Cycle Theory. Specifically, this 
theory explains how money printing by a Central Bank leads to inflation and, in some cases, 
hyperinflation. This theory was developed by Milton Friedman in the 1970s and is a central 
theory related to the Monetarist economic school (Investopedia, 2017). Although the ideas 
underpinning the Quantity Theory of Money can be traced back to classical economic thinkers, 
as well the work of Irving Fisher, it was Milton Friedman who advanced its implications 
(Investopedia, 2017). Monetarist’s view inflation primarily as being positively correlated with 
the monetary supply (Investopedia, 2017). At the centre of this view is the Quantity Theory of 
Money, which can be expressed as M x V = P x Y (Investopedia, 2017).  
M being the money supply which can take on various definitions (M0, M1, M2, M3).  
V is the velocity of money which is simply the rate a dollar changes hands. For example, a 
money velocity of three represents a single dollar changing hands three times within a given 
time period, usually a year.  
P represents the price level (inflation level) for a given time period.  
Y represents the real GDP or income for the economy for a given period.  
Key aspects of this theory include assuming velocity of money is constant, an increase in the 
money supply will lead to an increase in inflation (P) and/or real growth (Y) (Shilling, 2011). 
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However, if the economy is at full capacity, then the increase in the money supply will lead to 
a direct increase in only the inflation rate (Shilling, 2011). If you relax the assumption of the 
velocity of money being constant, then an increase in the money supply can lead to two 
outcomes. Firstly, both inflation and real growth can remain constant if the velocity of money 
decreases by the same percentage as the increase in the money supply (Shilling, 2011). 
Secondly, a combination of all three variables can change if the mathematical identity is held 
(Shilling, 2011).   
As money printing according to the Monetarist School is inherently inflationary, central banks 
should solely focus on price stability by only incrementally changing the money supply to 
accommodate the needs of growth (Shilling, 2011). It is also important to note that an increase 
in the money supply can have a time delay between when it is increased and when it impacts 
on inflation (Shilling, 2011). For example, money that was printed in the US during the 1960s 
did not result in elevated levels of inflation until the late 1970s (Rickards, 2011). As a result, 
just because immediate inflation does not transpire from money creation, it does not mean it 
will not lead to inflation in the future. 
The Fisher Equation  
The Fisher equation was derived in the 1930s by Irving Fisher, the same economist behind the 
Debt-Deflation theory (Investopedia, 2017). Simply, the real interest rate is equal to the 
nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate (r = i – π) (Investopedia, 2017). From the 
perspective of a debtor, they want negative real interest rates. Negative real interest rates, as 
the equation above shows, is when the inflation rate is greater than the nominal interest rate 
(Middelkoop, 2015). Debtors want a negative real interest rate as is it means the debtor can pay 
off the creditor in the future with dollars worth less than today, as inflation erodes the value of 
each dollar (Middelkoop, 2015).  
In a complete reverse to this, having positive real interest rates is bad for debtors and good for 
creditors. This is because debtors have to pay more money in real terms as inflation rates are 
not high enough to erode the higher nominal interest rate required to pay (Middelkoop, 2015). 
Looking at this from a government’s perspective, they want inflation rates to be greater than 
the interest payments they have to pay on their sovereign bonds (Middelkoop, 2015). This is a 
very important point that will be addressed at length in Chapter 4 when looking at monetary 
policy implementation in the post GFC era.  
 
45 
 
Complexity Theory 
It is a well-known fact that economics as a science is notoriously horrible at predicting 
recessions. It is of little surprise individuals such as Laurence J. Peter have joked “an economist 
is an expert at telling you tomorrow why the predictions he made yesterday did not come true 
today” (Shilling, 2011). In the 13 US recessions since the Great Depression, the consensus 
among economists have not predicted a recession before it occurred (Shilling, 2011).  
A relatively new branch of science that is being pioneered in terms of its application to financial 
markets is Complexity Theory. Edward Lorenz developed Complexity Theory in 1960 when 
he studied the unpredictable nature of meteorology (Rickards, 2016). Lorenz was studying 
atmospheric flows and found that minute changes in initial conditions can lead to widely 
different outcomes in flow (Rickards, 2016). In effect, all being equal, one small change to a 
system on a particular day can lead to dramatically different outcomes to other days. It is from 
this work where the famous ‘butterfly effect’ comes from. The idea being a butterfly’s wings 
flapping in New York can create hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico (Rickards, 2016).  
Since Lorenz’s development of Complexity Theory, it has been applied to a wide range of 
systems that are both manmade and natural. Some examples of manmade systems include 
nuclear bombs or traffic jams and earthquakes, solar flares and avalanches for natural systems 
(Rickards, 2016). It’s important to note, systems such as a Swiss watch may be complex, but 
they are not a complex system because there is no unpredictable nature to the systems function. 
For example, the hands do not suddenly spin counter clockwise. However, as mentioned, 
Complexity Theory is also highly applicable to financial markets.     
To be a complex system there needs to be four aspects. Firstly, there needs to be agents which 
are simply independent actors in a system (Rickards, 2016). With regard to the finance market, 
the agents are the investors who participate in the financial markets. Secondly, the system 
should have a feedback or an adaptive behaviour aspect from the agents (Rickards, 2016). This 
means that the agents can learn from and adjust their behaviour based on prior moves in the 
system. In the stock market, an investor who loses money is likely to adjust their investment 
strategy in the future to prevent further losses. Similarly, if an investor sees other investors 
buying an asset in large quantities, a herd mentality of investors following the ‘smart’ money 
can transpire.  
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Thirdly, the agents need to be diverse (Rickards, 2016). If they are identical then the adaptive 
behaviour will be weak as one agent’s behaviour will reinforce the other agent’s behaviour 
instead of changing it. Looking at the financial markets, investors are located all across the 
globe coming from a wide range of economic backgrounds. Additionally, investors can be 
small retail investors or large institutional investors and everything in between. Finally, the last 
aspect of a complex system is there has to be a channel of communication and interaction 
between the different actors to facilitate feedback and adaptive behaviour responses (Rickards, 
2016). With the internet and TV, news media outlets (such as CNBC, Bloomberg and Reuters) 
can connect investors with current market conditions in real time in a highly efficient manner. 
As a result, due to the financial markets strongly demonstrating all four aspects of a complex 
system, using Complexity Theory as a framework is valuable for insight into the financial 
market’s stability.   
An implication of Complexity Theory is that the system is inherently unstable and will 
eventually move from being in a state of calm to a state of chaos (Rickards, 2016). Additionally, 
you cannot tell the key event that will trigger the complex system to change its state from calm 
to chaos, just like you cannot predict the one snowflake that will cause the avalanche or the 
one hydrogen atom in the sun that will trigger a chain reaction causing a solar flare. However, 
what you can do with Complexity Theory is study the underlying dynamics of the complex 
system and make observations about the degree of instability in the system as a whole 
(Rickards, 2016). This is the equivalent of studying the size of the snow pack and its potential 
for creating an avalanche.           
This idea of complexity fits very well with the Debt Super Cycle Theory, as Debt Super Cycle 
Theory, like Complexity Theory, does not specify a specific debt to GDP ratio when debt 
becomes unserviceable/unsustainable. Instead, as has been discussed, the Debt Super Cycle 
Theory says that debt at some point becomes unsustainable by looking at the underlying 
financial foundation of debt levels. Therefore Complexity Theory explains why it is more 
important to look at the stability of the overall sovereign debt levels instead of trying to predict 
a specific level of debt or event in which debt levels become unstable. For example, the Debt 
Super Cycle Theory could not predict why Greece entered their debt crisis at a debt to GDP 
ratio of 170% whereas Japan, with a debt to GDP ratio of 235%, has remained crisis free. But 
Complexity Theory can explain that Japan’s debt level is unstable and becomes increasingly 
susceptible to a crisis the bigger it gets and the longer the time goes before it is addressed.   
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Bond Vigilante 
The last important concept to cover is the term Bond Vigilante, which was coined in 1983 by 
US investment strategist Ed Yardeni (CNBC, 2016). This term describes a bond market 
investor who protests, or stands up against, fiscal or monetary policies they consider to be 
inflationary, by selling bonds which increases the interest rate on the bond (Roubini & Miam, 
2010) Generally, Bond Vigilante respond to over indebtedness of a country or company who 
have an elevated risk of defaulting (Roubini & Miam, 2010). Investors not wanting to be 
defaulted on, sell their bonds (Roubini & Miam, 2010). This leads to a decrease in the value of 
the bond which, in turn, leads to more investors selling in fear of further downside (Roubini & 
Miam, 2010). This cycle becomes self-reinforcing until the country or company takes measures 
to reduce their default risk or when speculative investors buy in an attempt to get a bargain 
(Roubini & Miam, 2010).   
There are two notable examples of this phenomenon transpiring. In the US, from October 1993 
to November 1994, 10-year bond yields increased from 5.2% to 8.0% (Forbes & Ames, 2014). 
This was due to fears of the Clinton administration’s budget (Forbes & Ames, 2014). In the 
years that followed, the Clinton administration balanced the budget and ran three budget 
surpluses which ultimately restored confidence in the US bond market (Forbes & Ames, 2014). 
The second notable example is from the European sovereign debt crisis where the nations of 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS) all saw their bond yields dramatically rise 
(Forbes & Ames, 2014). Just looking at Greece in September 2009, their 10-year bond was 
trading at a 4.5% yield (Forbes & Ames, 2014). By April 2010 it was 9.1%. Ultimately, it 
reached its peak of 36.6% in February of 2012 (Forbes & Ames, 2014).  This concept is useful 
as it provides insight into how debt goes from being sustainable to unsustainable through the 
channel of loss in market confidence; a concept that complements the Debt Super Cycle 
Theory.  
Conclusion  
To conclude this chapter, the key theory for this thesis is the Debt Super Cycle Theory which 
states when a government is in a situation of unsustainable indebtedness, the only way to deal 
with the debt is to grow out of the debt, reduce expenses and/or raise taxes through austerity, 
inflate away the debt or default on the debt. Additionally, other supporting theories to the Debt 
Super Cycle Theory that are also valuable for other aspects of this thesis were covered in this 
chapter. These included the Financial Instability Hypothesis, Debt Deflation Theory, Quantity 
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Theory of Money, the Fisher Equation, Complexity Theory, and the concept of Bond Vigilantes 
With the theory section of this thesis now completed, attention can now focus on the first aspect 
of the thesis that explores the sovereign debt position of the US and the other six countries 
studied in this thesis.   
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Chapter 3: The Rise of Sovereign Debt  
Introduction  
This chapter will be divided into two key sections. The first section will focus on the US 
sovereign debt. Specifically, this will involve studying how the US sovereign debt has built up 
over time, where it is likely to head under the Trump administration and the risks involved with 
the current debt levels. The second section of this chapter will focus on the other six key 
countries that are being studied in this thesis. This will involve studying the current debt 
position of these six countries while also highlighting metrics of the perceived risk of their 
sovereign debt.    
The United States Sovereign Debt 
Firstly, looking at the US sovereign debt levels, it is clear they are very high compared 
historically. As of September 2017, the US official sovereign debt surpassed $20 trillion (US 
Government Debt, 2017). Figure 8 shows at a percentage of GDP, the debt to GDP ratio stands 
at 106%. Historically, this is the second highest level the debt to GDP ratio has ever been. The 
record at 119% was during when large amounts of debt were required to finance the war (US 
Government Debt, 2017). As a result, the US debt to GDP ratio is close to being at its all-time 
high. This section will study the historic build-up of the US sovereign debt followed by the 
future trajectory of US sovereign debt.  
Historical Build-Up of US Sovereign Debt 
 After the war, the US entered one of the most prosperous periods in which the debt to GDP 
ratio dramatically depreciated (Merki, 2015). This was due to the fact the majority of budgets 
were slightly positive or balanced but mainly because the pace of economic growth was 
outstripping the growth in debt by a wide margin during one of the most prosperous times in 
US history (Merki, 2015). However, in the 1970s the debt to GDP ratio reached its lowest post 
WW Ⅱ level. Since then the subsequent debt build-up that the US has experienced is part of 
the debt super-cycle (Federal Budget, 2017). 
By the time President Ford entered office in 1974, the debt as a percentage of GDP was at its 
lowest, standing at around 31.2% (US Government Debt, 2017). President Carter, who 
inherited a percentage of 33.8%, would maintain a debt to GDP level hovering around 31–35% 
level (US Government Debt, 2017). However, after President Reagan took office, the debt to 
GDP ratio has rose substantially. Under President Reagan, the debt to GDP ratio went from 
 
50 
 
31% to 50% in large part due to the generous tax cuts and increased military spending (US 
Government Debt, 2017).  Under President Reagan’s eight years, he ran a budget deficit every 
year averaging -4.125% of GDP (Federal Debt, 2017). During President G.H.W. Bush’s 
presidency, debt to GDP continued to climb from 50%–61% in large part due to the 
continuation of Reagan’s key polices (US Government Debt, 2017).  
Over President Clinton’s two terms, the debt to GDP ratio dropped from 61% to 54% (US 
Government Debt, 2017). For the last three years of his presidency, he even ran budget 
surpluses (Federal Budget, 2017) (Figure 9). Although small, they were the first budget 
surpluses since Richard Nixon’s 1969 budget (Federal Budget, 2017). President G.W. Bush 
would run a modest 1.2% budget surplus in his first and only year in office, which subsequently 
is the last budget surplus the US has achieved (Federal Budget, 2017). Thanks to G.W. Bush’s 
tax cuts, his home loan policies and the Iraq War, the debt to GDP ratio increased from 54% to 
68% (Federal Budget).  
Finally, under President Obama, who inherited the country in the wake of the GFC, the debt to 
GDP exploded from 68% to 106% of GDP the day he left office (US Government Debt, 2017). 
The reason why debt increased as much as it did under President Obama’s term is due to the 
large government stimulus that was implemented in order to restore growth in the aftermath of 
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. For example, putting aside the 
increased unemployment benefits and assistance subsidies that had to be paid out to struggling 
Americans, the 2009 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) alone added $700 billion to the 
deficit (CNBC, 2013). As a result, as Figure 9 shows, large budget deficits, particularly in the 
years just after the GFC, were generated with some years experiencing double digits deficits 
(US Government Debt, 2017). This build-up in sovereign debt in the post GFC era has not been 
without its repercussions and consequences. 
 In the wake of the 2011 debt ceiling crisis, the debt rating agency S&P downgraded the US 
sovereign debt rating for the first time ever, from AAA to AA (S&P Global, 2011). In their 
statement, S&P said, “The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plans 
that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to fall short of what, in our view, would 
be necessary to stabilize the government's medium-term debt dynamics” (S&P Global, 2011, 
Para. 3).  This shock corresponded with a 20% stock market correction (El-Erian, 2016). In the 
years following this, there has been multiple prominent institutions warning about the US fiscal 
health.  
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 Two years later after the 2011 debt ceiling crisis, Congress found itself fighting over the same 
issue. This time, certain functions of the government had to be closed in October 2013 due to 
lack of government funds (El-Erian, 2016). Ultimately, the passing of the Continuing 
Appropriations Act raised the debt ceiling and ended the government shut down but not before 
confidence in America’s ability to manage its debt was negatively impacted (El-Erian, 2016). 
The Chinese government ran newspapers voiced concerns by saying,  
The astonishing failure of the US Congress to put national needs before their 
partisan interests has sparked fears among investors and governments around the 
world that maybe it is time to think about the unthinkable. US politicians can 
discuss, bicker and argue over government spending and economic growth. 
Kicking cans is one thing, but throwing caution to the wind is not a course of action 
worthy of the world’s leading economy (China Daily, 2013, Para. 8).   
More recently, global financial NGOs have voiced concerns over America’s debt situation. A 
June 4th, 2015 IMF report on the US fiscal position concluded, “Public finances in the U.S. 
remain on an unsustainable path. The inability of the Congress and the Executive Branch to 
collectively pass a budget and corresponding appropriations bills, creates a level of fiscal 
uncertainty that is damaging to the U.S. economy” (IMF, 2015, Para. 17).  The Bank of 
International Settlements in a June 2016 report has also warned the US, and the global economy 
as a whole, that they “cannot afford to rely any longer on the debt-fuelled growth model that 
has brought it to the current juncture” (CNBC, 2016, Para. 2).  
To better understand what a US debt to GDP ratio of 106% means, it’s important to compare 
the size in nominal terms in relation to the rest of the world’s economies. As of September 
2017, global sovereign debt levels stand at approximately $65.2 trillion measured in US dollars 
(National Debt Clock, 2017). Therefore the $20 trillion US debt makes up 31% of all sovereign 
debt globally (National Debt Clock, 2017).  For comparison, the next biggest nominal debtor 
is Japan with 14% (National Debt Clock, 2017). So while the US does not have the largest debt 
to GDP ratio, nor is it the riskiest (like Greek debt), due to its size, it is like a bank that is too 
big to fail (King, 2016). As a result, any problems or loss in confidence in US debt will be felt 
globally. 
The last point to make in this subsection of this chapter is to study the breakdown of ownership 
of the $20 trillion. Figure 10 shows that there are four broad groups that own US debt. As of 
December 2016, $5.5 trillion was owned by intergovernmental offices, $2.5 trillion by the 
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Federal Reserve, $6.1 trillion by foreign governments, and $5.5 trillion by private investors 
(Federal Reserve, 2017; US Department of Treasury, 2017). Intergovernmental debt is debt 
that is owned by governmental institutes such as the social security fund. Generally, these 
government agencies are only buyers and not sellers of US debt. As will be covered in detail 
in the Quantitative Easing section in the next chapter, the majority of the $2.5 trillion owned 
by the Fed has been purchased in the post GFC era. While the Fed has indicated they will 
slowly start selling their ownership of US debt, in the post GFC they have been only buyers of 
US debt.  
As Figure 11 shows, of the $6.1 trillion owned by foreign governments, Japan and China are 
by far the largest holders of US debt standing at $1,115.1 billion and $1,059.7 billion, 
respectively. If confidence in the value of dollar starts to deteriorate, foreign governments, most 
notably the Chinese, would likely quickly sell their ownership of US debt. This would 
exasperate the weakening confidence in the US dollar. Therefore foreign governments can 
quickly become net sellers of debt. The final group of ownership is the $5.5 trillion owned by 
private investors. These include private household, pension funds, investment banks, insurance 
companies, etc. Like foreign government ownership, private investors can quickly become net 
sellers of debt if confidence in the US dollar are placed in question. Now that the historical 
build up and the current sovereign debt position have been explored, this chapter will now turn 
towards studying the likely future trajectory of US sovereign debt.    
Future Build-Up of Sovereign Debt Under President Trump 
Looking forward under President Trump, while it is too early to tell definitively which direction 
US debt will head, future sovereign debt under President Trump is likely going to continue to 
increase. While Donald Trump’s 2018 budget is not finalised, as it still has to pass congress 
sometime in the second half of 2017, it is clear that if he gets his way, sizeable cuts to a variety 
of soft policy programmes will be implemented (The United States Whitehouse, 2017). These 
include funding for programmes such as global warming, NOAA, the arts, foreign aid etc (The 
United States Whitehouse, 2017). Together, these proposed reductions in Non-Defence 
Discretionary spending is set to decrease by $54 billion for 2018 (Committee for a Responsible 
Budget, 2017). While these cuts do indeed improve the budget, cuts need to be made from the 
Social Security/unemployment benefits, Medicare and health, and the military as these three 
areas of expenditure make up approximately 75% of the total budget (The United States 
Whitehouse, 2017).  
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With regard to Medicare, Trump’s proposal would see $903 billion saved over a 10-year 
period, which is a sizeable cut (Committee for a Responsible Budget, 2017). Looking at social 
safety nets, they are expected to be cut $272 billion over the next 10 years (Committee for a 
Responsible Budget, 2017). Education reform, particularly with cutting subsidies to student 
loans, will be reduced by $143 billion (Committee for a Responsible Budget, 2017). Finally, 
all other expenditure cuts are expected to save $560 billion over the next 10 years (Committee 
for a Responsible Budget, 2017).  
While the above are sizeable cuts, there are areas of expenditure that President Trump plans to 
increase. Looking at the military budget, President Trump has requested a $52 billion dollar 
increase from last year for a total of $639 billion (The United States Whitehouse, 2017). 
Additionally, $200 billion in increased infrastructure spending has been earmarked (Committee 
for a Responsible Budget, 2017). However, overall net expenditures are expected to decrease 
from this proposed budget (The United States Whitehouse, 2017). While cutting net 
expenditure will help improve the budget, implementing President Trump’s proposed tax cuts 
according to the Budget Congressional Office are expected to cost $5.5 trillion over 10 years 
(Time, 2017).  This obviously will not help the financial debt situation.    
 Overall, according to the Committee for a Responsible Budget (2017, Para. 21), 
 Deficits would fall from $603 billion in 2017 to $440 billion in 2018, rise to $526 
billion in 2019, and ultimately turn into a $16 billion surplus in 2027. As a share 
of GDP, deficits would shrink from 3.1 percent in 2017 to 2.0 percent by 2021 and 
turn into a 0.1 percent surplus by 2027. 
 Essentially, it will take 10 years for a budget surplus to be generated under President Trump’s 
budget proposals. It is important to note the assumptions made for the President’s budget is 
that economic growth will average a very generous 3% for the next 10 years.   
Looking at Figure 12, it shows that since the GFC, annual real economic growth for the US has 
only been around 2% (World Bank, 2017). Assuming 3% continuous growth for the next 10 
years implies that a recession will not occur unless some non-recessionary years have growth 
rates in the 4–6% range. Summed up succinctly, Larry Summers, ex-US Treasury Secretary for 
President Clinton and ex-Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama said,  
A business trying to sell stock on the basis of a document half as hype-filled as the 
Trump budget would be a joke. No reputable investment bank would underwrite 
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their offering. A great mystery here is why the experienced investment bankers in 
senior positions in the Trump administration hold the budget of the US to so much 
lower standards of integrity than they applied in their earlier lives. (Larry Summers, 
2017, Para. 3).  
The Congressional Budget Office, when assuming growth rates would average 1.9% for the 
next 10 years, a far more realistic assumption, found President Trump’s budget plan would lead 
to $3.4 trillion more added to the debt than what the President’s plan forecasts (CNN, 2017). 
As a result, short of Conservative Tea Party Republicans asserting a sizeable amount of 
influence over America’s future budgets, it is likely the total federal debt is going to keep 
increasing under President Trump’s administration. The question is, at what rate?   
Although not sovereign debt, municipal and local state debt has also markedly increased in the 
last two decades (US government Debt, 2017). In recent years there is growing concern that 
some of the states and sovereign territories will have to be bailed out by the federal government 
(CNBC, 2017). This would obviously increase the federal deficit as state debt would effectively 
become sovereign debt. As a result, it’s important to briefly study municipal state and local 
debt. As Figure 13 shows, municipal debt has effectively trippled from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to 
$3.1 trillion in 2017 (US Government Debt, 2017). Although the graph shows it has flatlined 
since 2010, it does not tell the entire story as some states like California and Florida have 
improved their budget position while states like Illinois and Texas have sizeably increased their 
deficit (US Government Debt, 2017). As a result, some states are far worse off than others. 
Specifically, the worst states and sovereign territories that are most likely to default in the near 
term are Illinois and the territory of Puerto Rico (CNBC, 2017). 
In 2017 Moody’s and S&P rating agencies have both downgraded Illinois to a credit rating one 
above junk status (CNBC, 2017). This is in reflection of the slowly progressing, deteriorating 
Illinois deficit that has been very messy and politically divisive (CNBC, 2017). The state 
cannot agree on how to fix the budget as demands to cut teachers’ pensions led to multiple 
strikes over the last couple of years (Washington Post, 2016). For example, calls to cut state 
employees’ salaries led to February 2017 strikes (Reuters, 2017). Making matters worse, the 
state can’t agree on how much Chicago, the state’s largest city, should cut spending compared 
to other smaller cities and towns in the state (Reuters, 2017). In September 2017, at $203 billion 
and counting, it is not clear how the Illinois debt crisis will end (US Government Debt, 2017). 
Many conservative members of Congress have refused to let Illinois be the first state to be 
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bailed out in fear of setting a precedence for other indebted states to follow (The New York 
Times, 2017). However, if basic social services cannot be provided, the Federal Government 
may have to intervene.  
Another important example is Puerto Rico. On April 2017, Congress and President Trump 
decided not to bailout Puerto Rico (The New York Times, 2017). Consequently, Puerto Rico 
in May 2017 filed a $70 billion bankruptcy claim making it the largest municipal bankruptcy 
in US history (Reuters, 2017). In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, in which Puerto Rico was 
devastated, it is even more apparent very little, if any, of the $70 billion will be recovered. As 
a result, many pension funds and Wall Street banks are set to lose sizeable amounts of money 
(The New York Times, 2017). Regardless of the outcome in Illinois and Puerto Rico, there are 
approximately a dozen states that have excessive debt problems, with another dozen or so states 
that have debt levels that are high (CNBC, 2017). As a result, it is important to acknowledge 
that in a future nationwide economic downturn, some of the $3 trillion in state debt may have 
to be converted into sovereign debt (El-Erian, 2016). It’s speculation to try and put a figure on 
what this could be but it is important to be aware of the growing risk in municipal debt.     
The last important aspect to acknowledge when studying the US fiscal position going forward 
is to study the size of the unfunded liabilities of the US. An unfunded liability is where future 
payment obligations are greater than the present value of assets on hand to pay them 
(Investopedia, 2016). The best example of this is the Social Security program. The Social 
Security program receives money annually from working aged citizens and then uses them to 
buy assets, such as bonds, as well as to pay for retired individuals receiving their social security 
cheque (Investopedia, 2016). The problem is that as more people retire and continue to live 
longer, less and less money from a smaller labour force is generated to pay for the increasing 
Social Security handouts (Investopedia, 2016). As a result, this fiscal gap between what is 
expected to be paid out in the future minus what the expected future income will be is the total 
of the unfunded liability (Investopedia, 2016).  
There are many assumptions that must be made when estimating the total value of the unfunded 
liabilities (CNBC, 2016). Just focusing on Social Security, the Social Security Administration 
in 2016 projected that unfunded liabilities will reach $11.4 trillion by 2090 (CNBC, 2016). If 
unchecked, the infinite horizon calculation gives a value of $32.1 trillion, which is a staggering 
figure (CNBC, 2016). Boston University economics professor, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, who also 
served as a senior economist on President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers, places the 
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entire unfunded liabilities of the US using the infinite horizon calculation at a value of $211 
trillion (NPR, 2011). Even if the true value is only $100 trillion, this is never going to be 
serviceable. What this means is that government promises, such as receiving Social Security 
when you retire, over the long-term are not going to be honoured all else being equal (NPR, 
2011). So while unfunded liabilities do not impact the budget directly, if and when these 
unfunded liabilities are reneged, future standards of living will be lower for many middle and 
low-income households. 
In conclusion to this section of the chapter, as Figure 8 and  Figure 9 illustrate, sovereign debt 
build-up since the 1970s has significantly increased, hence why the term debt super cycle has 
become more widely used. As mentioned, total sovereign debt for the US stands at $20 trillion. 
This equates to approximately $210,000 of debt per American citizen (National Debt Clock, 
2017). Based on President Trump’s first nine months in office and studying his proposed 
budget and tax policies, it is likely debt levels are going to continue to increase. With this in 
mind, it is important to study if the growth in US sovereign debt is unique to the US or part of 
a global trend. 
Other Countries 
There are many different metrics to analyse sovereign debt and its perceived riskiness. 
However, as the studying of the sovereign debt for these six nations is a supporting point and 
not a key aspect of this thesis, this section will only focus on a couple of aspects. Firstly, an 
overview of the actual economic debt data will be looked at in order to gain a historical 
perspective and to show what current debt levels are for the six nations today. Following this, 
the sovereign credit rating, along with idiosyncratic factors of the six nations’ debt, will be 
discussed. Finally, an overview of the liquid reserve assets of these six nations will be studied.  
Economic Data 
A June 2017 report by the Institute for International Finance (IIF) found that total global debt 
(including household, government and cooperate) is now 327% of global GDP at US$217 
trillion (Institute for International Finance, 2017). In 2007, the global debt level value was 
US$149 trillion, where it made up 276% of world GDP (Institute for International Finance, 
2017). As this shows, like the US data, global debt levels have increased sizably since the GFC. 
There are many countries with excessive debt levels that could be studied, such as Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Belgium, etc. However, as just mentioned, a brief overview of the 
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six most important countries outlined will be studied simply due to these countries being so 
large economically.  
Firstly, Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows debt levels for all six countries have increased since 
2000 (IMF, 2017). Specifically, over this time period, Japan’s debt to GDP percentage has 
increased 100.2%, United Kingdom 51.6%, Spain 40.6%, France 38.8%, Italy 27.7% and 
Germany 5.9% (IMF, 2017). Except for Germany, these increases in debt are not a positive 
development. Additionally, again apart from Germany, the five other nations continue to see 
debt levels increase (IMF, 2017). While the rate of debt build-up has slowed in recent years, 
with the exception of Germany, it is still moving in the wrong direction for these key countries 
(IMF, 2017).  
Looking at Figure 16, over the last 27 years, particularly between 2008 and 2010 when 
countries were recovering from the GFC, sizeable budget deficits have been run annually by 
these nations (World Bank, 2016). This explains why total debt levels continue to rise as 
governments continue to spend more than they receive in tax revenue. Most of these nations 
post 2012 have undertaken various forms of austerity measures in an attempt to improve their 
overall debt position (Bordo, et al., 2016). While deficits have narrowed in recent years, as 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows, overall debt levels continue to increase (with the exception of 
Germany). As a result, like the US, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Spain and France continue 
to face a situation of debt build-up towards or past historic all-time highs.  
Sovereign Credit Ratings and Idiosyncratic Factors  
A good indication on the perceived riskiness of these six countries’ debt is to study the credit 
ratings on their debt. The three main global rating agencies are Fitch, S&P and Moody’s. The 
current credit ratings for each country from the three agencies is shown in the table below 
(Trading Economics, 2017). Additionally, the table shows how many cuts have been 
undertaken since January 2000. The two countries that have seen the most downgrades are Italy 
and Spain (Trading Economics, 2017). Both countries were a part of the infamous PIIGS 
nations in Europe that were at the centre of the European debt crisis (Bordo, et al. 2016). With 
junk status rating being BB+/ba1, both nations are a two of downgrades away from being in 
this territory (Trading Economics, 2017).  
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With regard to Italy, their economy continues to struggle with high unemployment, to achieve 
solid growth, deal with their banking system that potentially may need even larger bailouts than 
what has already happened, and with crippling high levels of sovereign debt (The New York 
Times, 2017). Fitch’s April 2017 credit rating cut reflected this, while they stated that “Italy’s 
persistent track record of fiscal slippage, back-loading of consolidation, weak economic 
growth, and resulting failure to bring down the very high level of general government debt has 
left it more exposed to potential adverse shocks” (Financial Times, 2017, Para, 4).  Ignoring 
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external adverse shocks, as can be seen in Figure 17, Italy’s banking sector is dealing with 
crippling high levels of bad debt (World Bank, 2017). As a result, this should be watched very 
closely as it has the potential to lead to another debt crisis similar to 2012, which could not 
only bring down Italy, but the wider Eurozone if systemic risk spreads (The New York Times, 
2017).  
Studying Spain’s debt outlook over the last year, rating agencies have acknowledged that their 
debt position is definitely stable and modestly improving thanks to their growing economy 
(Bloomberg, 2017). S&P went as far as to say that they could upgrade Spain’s credit rating 
within two years if their “strong economic performance” continues (Financial Times, 2017). 
Similar praise has also come from the IMF which called Spain’s recent economic performance 
“impressive” (Financial Times, 2017). Yet it’s important to put Spain’s growth in perspective. 
As you can see from Figure 18, it took until 2017 for their economy to recover from the GFC 
(World Bank, 2017). Additionally, they are still struggling with crippling high levels of 
unemployment, standing at 17.8% as of April 2017 (World Bank, 2017). Plus, their banking 
sector, while in better shape than the recent past, is still highly indebted with large levels of 
nonperforming ‘zombie’ loans from their prior property bubble (Bloomberg, 2017). As a result, 
while their economy and overall debt position is improving, their debt is by no means risk free.  
Japan, which has experienced the third most cuts out of the six nations, is experiencing what 
some economists have dubbed three lost decades (El-Erian, 2016). Japan has the highest debt 
to GDP ratio in the world, they have struggled for decades with deflation pressures and have 
had a hard time achieving sustained economic growth rates (El-Erian, 2016). What has kept 
Bond Vigilantes away is the fact that Japan consistently runs very large trade surpluses, has a 
very high level of private savings and has the second largest global reserves (El-Erian, 2016).    
From S&P ratings, an A rated debt, which is what they give Japan, reflects their definition of 
“somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic 
conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet 
its financial commitments on the obligation is still strong” (Standard & Poor, 2017, Para. 6). 
Consequently, while Japanese bonds are by no means risk free, the Japanese government is not 
the riskiest by a long shot despite having the largest debt to GDP ratio globally. 
The United Kingdom and France have only seen modest rating cuts over the last 17 years 
(Trading Economics, 2017). While debt levels are historically high for both countries, the 
rating agencies still believe their debt is safe given them AA/aa2 status (Trading Economics, 
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2017). With regard to the United Kingdom, in recent years they have struggled to achieve 
robust growth which consequently has led to all three major rating agencies threatening to cut 
their sovereign debt rating further (Trading Economics, 2017). Reflecting this, the uncertainty 
with Brexit and the recent British elections, which saw Teresa May’s government lose seats, 
led Moody’s to release the following statement:  
The likelihood of an abrupt and damaging exit with no agreement has increased 
since the referendum. The economy has started to slow, and growth prospects could 
be materially weaker if the UK fails to reach a free trade arrangement with good 
access to the single market. Additionally, continuously higher budget deficits than 
expected and further delays in reversing the rising public debt trend would also be 
negative for the rating (Business Insider, 2017, Para. 4).  
Even if the United Kingdom did have their credit rating cut again, they still would be 
considered relatively safe.  
Looking at France, if Marie Le Pen had won the March 2017 elections, all three agencies 
indicated that they would likely have cut France’s credit rating due to her desire to remove 
France from the EU (CNBC, 2017). However, as pro-business Emmanuel Macron won the 
presidency; all three rating agencies after the election have indicated France’s credit rating is 
stable and not in risk of being downgraded (Bloomberg, 2017). Prior to Emmanuel Macron’s 
election, the reason why France’s debt has become riskier, and hence why all rating agencies 
have twice cut France’s rating in recent years, is because their total sovereign debt continues 
to rise while also failing to implement the required structural changes to make their economy 
more business friendly and productive (Bloomberg, 2017). However, the new government 
promises to cut public expenditure and make the required structural changes to improve the 
overall financial stability of the French economy (Reuters, 2017). As evidence of this intention, 
the Prime Minister, Édouard Philippe, recently said,  
We are dancing on a volcano that is rumbling ever louder. The French are hooked 
on public spending. Like all addictions it doesn't solve any of the problems it is 
meant to ease. And like all addictions it requires will and courage to break the habit. 
(Reuters, 2017, Para. 5).  
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While its very unlikely France will have their credit rating upgraded without sizeable debt 
reduction, it will likely stay stable assuming the French government can improve the business 
environment.  
Finally, Germany, arguably the safest debt to own worldwide, has seen zero rating cuts 
(Trading Economics, 2017). If Germany continues to run budget surpluses like they have done 
in recent years, it is very unlikely their debt ratings will be downgraded. However, the rating 
agencies have indicated in the past that if Germany was to take on a larger role in ensuring the 
debts of other European nations are honoured, then their rating could be downgraded (BBC, 
2011).  The last point to make is that rating agencies have been wrong in the past. For example, 
AIG insurance was rated AA a month before they went bankrupt during the GFC (Huffington 
Post, 2009). As a result, it is significant to note that Black Swan events, an economic event that 
is unforeseen or impossible to predict, can dramatically change the credit worthiness of these 
countries. Therefore it is important to not be overly reliant on what the rating indicates. 
Liquid Reserve Assets 
Another important way to measure the perceived debt risk of these six countries is to study the 
amount of liquid reserve assets these countries own. Having liquid reserve assets allows for 
governments to use them just like a household uses savings (Carbaugh, 2011). Both can use 
their savings to either pay off debt or to purchase goods without having to issue new debt 
(Carbaugh, 2011). As a result, the more liquid reserve assets a government owns, the safer their 
debt is as they are more likely able to meet their debt repayment obligations (Carbaugh, 2011). 
Looking at Figure 19, it is clear that Japan, with over US$1.2 trillion worth of liquid reserves 
as of 2016, has by far more reserves than the other five countries (World Bank, 2016). 
However, as has been discussed, they also, by a large margin, have the most debt compared to 
the other five countries. With the exception of Spain who have reserves valued at $US64 
billion, the other four nations have reserves valued between US$100 billion and US$200 billion 
(World Bank, 2016). While the value of these reserves appears to be sizeable, it’s important to 
compare the size of reserves to the size of the total debt to get a more accurate idea about how 
it helps reduce debt serviceability risk.   
Firstly, it’s important to note that the debt of the six nations has been converted into US dollars 
in order to compare apples with apples. As a result, exchange rate fluctuations can distort the 
true reserve to debt ratio. It should be noted that the ratio still provides a good indicator of how 
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much reserves each country has compared to their debt.  Looking at Figure 20, it shows that on 
the whole the six countries have maintained a similar level of reserves as a percentage of their 
total sovereign debt (FRED, 2017). As of 2016, Japan at 12.36% and Germany at 10.21% have 
the two highest percentages (World Bank, 2016; FRED, 2017). With regard to Japan, this factor 
is a major, if not the most important, reason why Japan’s debt is deemed relatively safe besides 
them having the highest debt to GDP ratio globally (King, 2016). In effect, if Japan wanted to, 
they could pay off 12.36% of their debt outstanding by selling their reserves on hand. For 
Germany, who already has a low debt burden, this percentage only makes their debt that much 
safer.  
Looking at the other four countries, their reserve to debt percentage stands between 5% and 
7.5% for 2016 (World Bank, 2016; FRED, 2017). While the percentage could be worse, the 
countries of Spain and Italy would definitely benefit from having a higher reserve cushion 
(Rickards, 2014). Although the nations of Spain and Italy did not use their reserves to protect 
themselves in the 2012 debt crisis, the market clearly did not believe these countries’ reserves 
on hand were adequate enough as it was (El-Erian, 2016).   
Conclusion  
As has been outlined in this chapter, debt levels in the US, and the other six countries, are at or 
near their all-time highs. Both the Debt-Deflation Theory and the Financial Instability 
Hypothesis outline how excessive debt levels can eventually lead to a debt deflation induced 
economic/financial crisis. As a result, according to both theories, if debt levels continue to rise, 
there is the real risk of a debt deleveraging process transpiring. Additionally, another potential 
impact of these elevated levels of debt is Bond Vigilantes revolting as owners of sovereign debt 
feel the risk of governments not owning their debts has increased. In this case, the outcome 
will be an inflationary environment similar to the late 1970s in the US as was outlined in 
Chapter 1.  Effectively, depending on how governments and central banks respond, excessive 
debt levels will lead to either a deflationary or inflationary environment if the problem of 
excessive indebtedness is not proactively addressed (as will be discussed in Chapter 5).  
With regard to excessive debt levels and its impact on the US dollar acting as the key reserve 
currency, if confidence is lost in the US government’s ability to pay its bills, foreign 
governments, firms and individuals will question the underlining value of the US dollar. As a 
result, if there is uncertainty in the value of the US dollar, there will also be uncertainty in the 
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US dollar’s ability to function as the sole key reserve currency. Therefore, as will be outlined 
in Chapter 5, tough dissections will have to be made in dealing with excessive indebtedness.  
As Complexity Theory outlines, predicting the exact debt levels that will cause a debt deflation 
process or Bond Vigilantes to revolt is pointless as it is impossible to predict; just like it is 
impossible to predict an earthquake will happen on a specific day and time in the future. 
However, as debt levels continue to rise, Complexity Theory outlines it becomes more likely a 
debt crisis will transpire; just like earthquakes become more likely to occur the longer time 
goes on from the last earthquake. Therefore, from an American perspective, it is vital they 
ensure debt in the future remains at manageable levels in the eyes of the market in order to 
ensure the US dollar continues to act as the key reserve currency.    
While studying the total debt levels provides a good indication on the overall debt 
sustainability, it does not provide the entire picture. Specifically, it is also very important to 
study the monetary easing policies that have been implemented post GFC. As will be outlined 
and covered in detail in the next chapter, the unorthodox monetary policies that have been 
implemented have made debt serviceability historically very cheap for both the US and for the 
other six countries studied. By making debt serviceability cheap, confidence in the US 
government’s ability to pay its future debt, and hence confidence in the underlining value of 
the US dollar, is improved. In effect, these unorthodox monetary policies have bought the US 
and the other six countries time in addressing their excessive sovereign indebtedness.  
Additionally, the unorthodox monetary policies that have been implemented have helped 
generate economic growth in the aftermath of the GFC. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, 
economic growth is a crucial factor in ensuring debt levels can remain sustainable. Therefore 
studying the role unorthodox monetary policy has played globally in improving debt 
sustainability is an important factor when looking at the US dollar’s ability to continue to 
function as the key global reserve currency.   
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Chapter 4: Unorthodox Monetary Policies 
Introduction 
In the wake of the GFC, unorthodox monetary policies have been implemented to both 
stimulate economies and to make debt serviceability cheap. From the US perspective, 
generating economic growth and lowering the borrowing cost both help to improve confidence 
in the US dollar’s ability to remain as a store of value and hence its ability to function as the 
key global reserve currency. While the benefits and impact of economic growth on the total 
sovereign debt level will be studied in the next chapter, an explanation on how the unorthodox 
monetary policies implemented stimulate and generate economic growth will be studied in this 
chapter.  
In addition, this chapter will also describe how the unorthodox monetary policies make it 
cheaper for the US, and the other six countries, to borrow and service their existing debt. The 
specific policies implemented in the post GFC era that will be studied include Zero Interest 
Rate Policy (ZIRP), Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP), Quantitative Easing and Moral 
Suasion. Where applicable, the specific details of the policies that have been implemented by 
the four key Central Banks will be discussed. The four key Central Banks are the US Federal 
Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the Bank of 
England (BOE). However, before the monetary policies are discussed, an overview of the cost 
of borrowing for the US and the other six countries in the post GFC era will be studied.  
Cost of Government Borrowing  
Focusing firstly on the cost for the US government to borrow money, the historic yields of the 
1- and 10-year treasury bond will be studied. It is important to study both as there is a difference 
between the cost of short-term and long-term debt. Figure 21 shows that over the last 55 years, 
the yield on the one-year treasury has traded at its all-time low in the post GFC years (FRED, 
2017). Focusing on Figure 22, it shows that between 2009 and 2016, the cost for the 
government to borrow for a 1-year bond was between 0.1% and 0.5% which is effectively zero 
compared to 15% plus percentage that the US government had to pay bondholders in the late 
1970s early 1980s (FRED, 2017). While the yield has increased to just under 1.5% in October 
2017, it is still at a near historical low. As a result, the cost for the US government to borrow 
short-term in the post GFC era has been very low and manageable.  
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With regard to the long-term 10-year bond, like the 1 year, the cost of the US government to 
borrow in the post GFC era is at a historically all-time low. Figure 23 shows that interest rate 
yields on the 10-year bond has steadily declined since the early 1980s from 15% to the all-time 
low of 1.37% in July 2016. As of October 2017, the yield is just under 2.5%. However, 
considering that the US government has been able to borrow for 10 years at rates ranging 
between 1.3% and 4% in the post GFC era, it has been historically very cheap for the US 
government to borrow (Figure 24). Another way to measure the cost of borrowing for the US 
government is to measure the total interest rate expense as a percentage of the total budget.    
As you can see from Figure 25, at 13.2% for 2016, the interest rate expense as a percentage of 
the total budget expenditure is substantially lower than the 20–28% paid during the 1990s (US 
Department of Treasury, 2017, Federal Reserve, 2017). Considering that the total sovereign 
debt level is at its near all-time high as a percentage of GDP, this is a strong indication that 
shows the cost of borrowing is historically very cheap for the US government. As a result, it is 
clear that the cost for the US government to borrow money in the post GFC era is at a historical 
all-time low.   
Looking at the other six countries, like the US, the cost for all six countries to borrow are at 
historic all-time lows for both the short-term 1-year bond and the long-term 10-year bond. 
Figures 26-29 shows this.  There are a couple of important points to mention. Firstly, for Japan 
and Germany, they have been able to borrow at negative rates for their 1-year bonds. While the 
graphs do not show this, this is also true for other maturity lengths up to the 7-year bond. This 
effectively means that these governments charge investors the privilege for them to lend money 
to them which would have been unthinkable pre GFC. This is due to the fear of deflation 
transpiring in the future for these economies.  
The second important point to note is the 2012 spike in Italian and Spanish yields for both their 
1- and 10-year bonds. This is a perfect example of the Bond Vigilante effect. The reason why 
investors lost confidence in the ability for these countries to pay their debts is due to the 
European sovereign debt crisis. While confidence was eventually able to be restored, as will 
be discussed later in this chapter, it is still a very important event to consider. If Bond Vigilantes 
can attack Italian and Spanish debt, they can attack the US sovereign debt or any of the four 
other countries studied in this thesis. As a result, just because the cost for the US and the other 
six countries is at its all-time low, it does not mean it will indefinitely remain low, nor does it 
mean that it cannot rapidly rise. Now that it has been showed that the cost for the US and the 
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other six countries are at their all-time lows in the post GFC era, this chapter will now focus 
on the key unorthodox monetary policies that are responsible for the low government 
borrowing costs.  
Zero Interest Rate Policy   
The control of the prime interest rate, also known as the Official Cash Rate, has been the main 
monetary policy tool for central banks globally, post the Great Depression (King, 2016). When 
an economy enters a recession, or is in risk of deflation, the prime interest rate is lowered, 
which also lowers all other interest rates in the economy (King, 2016). The intention of this is 
to stimulate business investment, consumption spending and export competitiveness through 
the weakening of the currency (King, 2016). Additionally, the cost of government borrowing 
also decreases when prime interest rates are lowered (Investopedia, 2015). When the economy 
is experiencing inflationary pressures, raising the prime interest rate has the opposite effect by 
making the above four channels more expensive, which in turn lowers inflationary pressures 
(Investopedia, 2015). ZIRP is simply when the prime interest rate is lowered to zero percent, 
or very close to it, where it remains for a sustained period of time (Investopedia, 2015).  
A major concern with having interest rates at or near zero is the risk of a liquidity trap (El-
Erian, 2016). If an economy was experiencing deflation and recessionary pressures, the 
monetary policy would be to cut interest rates as described above (El-Erian, 2016). However, 
if interest rates are already at zero percent, then the Central Bank is stuck in a situation where 
they are hamstrung in stimulating the economy through interest rates trap (El-Erian, 2016). 
This subsequently, all else being equal, will lead to a more severe recession than if the economy 
was operating at a higher interest rate. It is this situation that economists call a liquidity trap 
(El-Erian, 2016). It is a potentially dangerous position for an economy to find itself in long-
term and should generally be avoided by central bankers (El-Erian, 2016).   
Prior to the GFC, ZIRP policy for a major industrialised country has only been seen in Japan 
in the wake of their 1989 economic meltdown (Investopedia, 2015). However, since the GFC, 
we have seen many nations that have lowered interest rates to, or very near, zero percent. The 
first and most important nation to adopt ZIRP was the US (Investopedia, 2015). In the wake of 
the GFC, as Figure 30 shows, Ben Bernanke lowered interest rates from a high of 5.25% on 
June 29th, 2006 to 0.25% on December 16th, 2008 (FRED, 2017). Interest rates would remain 
at 0.25% for seven years until Janet Yellen increased it by 25 basis points on December 16th, 
2015 to 0.50% (FRED, 2017).  
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Exactly a year later, the second-rate rise to 0.75% was implemented followed by another 25-
basis point rise on March 15th, 2017 (FRED, 2017). Finally, the last rate hike took place on 
June 14th, 2017 to where it currently stands at 1.25% (FRED, 2017). Market consensus as of 
July 14th, 2017 has priced in one more rate hike by the end of the year at 35% (CNBC, 2017). 
So while interest rates in the US are now above zero, being only at 1.25% a decade after the 
last recession is truly unprecedented (CNBC, 2017). If this was a normal economic recovery, 
interest rates would be expected to be in 5–8% range as has been historically common in post 
Great Depression business cycles (El-Erian, 2016).  
The second biggest block economy, The ECB, has also adopted ZIRP. The ECB has two 
different interest rates offered to institutional banks (ECB, 2017). The first is the Marginal 
Lending Facility rate which is the rate charged to banks if they need to lend overnight from the 
ECB (ECB, 2017). The second is the Deposit Facility rate the ECB charges banks if they park 
funds with the Central Bank overnight (ECB, 2017). As Figure 31 shows, the Marginal Lending 
Facility has decreased from 4.25% in late 2008 to its current low rate of 0.25% (ECB, 2017). 
With regard to the Deposit Facility rate, that has decreased from 3.25% in late 2008 to the -
0.4% where it sits today (ECB, 2017). More on the negative interest rate policy will be 
discussed shortly.   
As mentioned above, the BOJ has had interest rates at or near zero for a very long time (Bank 
of Japan, 2017).  Between 1992 to present, the prime interest rate in Japan have fluctuated 
between 2% and 0.1% (Figure 32) (Bank of Japan, 2017). A discussion on the short term 
overnight lending rate will be discussed shortly in the NIRP section. As for the BOE, they 
lowered interest rates from 5.75% at the end of 2007 to 0.5% after the GFC (Figure 33). In the 
aftermath of the June 2016 Brexit vote, the BOE lowered interest rates further to where they 
currently stand at 0.25%.  
What’s important to note is these four central banks are responsible for 55% of the global 
economy (IMF, 2016). Having this large of a percentage of the global economy operating with 
ZIRP, or near ZIRP, in the post GFC era is unprecedented and is definitely not the norm in the 
post Great Depression era (King, 2016). Additionally, it’s also important to note that there are 
other advanced economies that are also operating with ZIRP. The countries of Canada, 
Demark, Czech Republic, Israel, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland all currently have interest 
rates at 0.5% or lower (Global Rates, 2017). Finally, the last point to note is that this policy has 
been sustainable due to a persistent lack of inflation globally.  
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Looking back to the Fisher equation discussed in Chapter 2, negative real interest rates for 
governments help erode the value of their debt repayments.  Subsequently, these low nominal 
prime interest rates, which have in turn lowered sovereign bond yields as discussed earlier, are 
helping to create a negative real interest environment (King, 2016; Investing, 2017). In saying 
this, the last variable in the Fisher equation, inflation, is making achieving negative interest 
rates harder for central banks to achieve (King, 2016). As you can see from Figure 34, inflation 
rates post GFC for the US, United Kingdom, Japan and the EU have been stubbornly low from 
the Central Bank’s perspective (World Bank, 2017). Therefore while zero interest rate polices 
have helped create a negative interest rate environment, very low levels of inflation post GFC 
have minimised ZIRP’s effectiveness from the point of view of sovereign debt relief.  
Negative Interest Rate Policy  
Due to the persistent deflationary pressure in the global economy since the GFC, some nations’ 
central banks in the last couple of years have experimented with negative nominal interest rates 
(King, 2016). This is an entirely new policy that has never been implemented in the modern 
era of banking (King, 2016). Normally, commercial banks that hold excess deposits with the 
Central Bank are paid a small interest payment (Skarica, 2014). With negative interest rates, 
the central banks are charging normal retail banks for having surplus deposits with the Central 
Bank (Skarica, 2014). This is done to try and force banks to lend money to households and 
businesses, which, in theory, leads to both inflation and economic growth (El-Erian, 2016). 
Additionally, NIRP, like ZIRP, lowers bond yields which makes it cheaper for governments to 
continue to borrow as well as to service existing debt that is rolled over.  
The first nation to experiment with negative interest rates, albeit being quasi in nature, was 
Switzerland in the 1970s in order to counter its appreciating currency (El-Erian, 2016). While 
it did not stay negative forever, it was the first country to experiment with negative interest 
rates (El-Erian, 2016). In the post GFC era, the truly first negative interest rate to be 
implemented was Sweden in 2009, followed by Demark in 2012 and Switzerland in December 
2014 (King, 2016). All three countries were, and are still, perceived by investors as safe haven 
currencies, which made their currencies too strong from their perspective (King, 2016). 
Consequently, adopting negative interest rates was a way to deter foreign investors from buying 
assets dominated in their currencies (King, 2016).  
However, the first major Central Bank to implement negative interest rate policy was the ECB. 
As you can see from Figure 31, on June 11th, 2014 the ECB cut the Deposit Facility rate from 
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0% to -0.1% (ECB, 2017). Interest rates would be cut three more times each by 0.1% on 
September 10th, 2014; December 9th, 2015; and March 16th, 2016; to where it stands today at -
0.4% (ECB, 2017). So as of time of writing, the ECB charges European banks 0.4% on all 
excess reserves that are parked with the ECB (ECB, 2017). While most European banks do not 
charge retail customers a negative interest rate on their deposits, there are some exceptions. All 
within the month of August 2016, the Bank of Ireland, RBS and Raiffeisenbank Gmund am 
Tegernsee all started charging interest on depositors with over €100,000 deposited in their 
banks (Financial Times, 2016). As of time of writing, the ECB has not announced when they 
will raise interest rates (CNBC, 2017). However, both the German’s and the BIS are urging the 
ECB to start normalising rates sooner rather than later (CNBC, 2017). 
The last major Central Bank to implement NIRP is Japan who, in January 2016, lowered their 
prime interest rate from 0% to -0.1% (Figure 32) (Bank of Japan, 2017). The short term 
overnight lending rate is charged on excessive reserves commercial banks have with the BOJ. 
By charging banks to park their money with BOJ, the banks have an incentive to lend the 
money to the wider economy (King, 2016). As of October 2017, the interest rate of -0.1% is 
still in place (Bank of Japan, 2017). The latest statements from the BOJ is that the interest rate 
of -0.1% is stable (CNBC, 2017). However, they will not rule out further cuts into negative 
territory nor will they indicate when they are likely to increase interest rates (CNBC, 2017).  
As with ZIRP, NIRP can also help central banks achieve a negative real interest environment, 
which in turn helps with the financial debt position of governments as the Fisher equation 
outlines. If a persistent deflationary environment transpires in the future in the key economies 
studied, due to high levels of debt studied in Chapter 3, it is very possible the four key Central 
Banks will implement NIRP into far lower negative rates than what has been implemented so 
far by the ECB and BOJ. For the US specifically, this would be legally permitted under section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 1913 in which the Fed is allowed to act in any way it sees fit 
during “unusual and exigent circumstances” (Jacobs & King, 2016). 
Quantitative Easing  
Quantitative Easing (QE) is a policy in which the Central Bank purchases either government 
securities, non-government securities, or a combination of both, with the intention of lowering 
interest rates through increasing the money supply; akin to printing money (El-Erian, 2016). In 
effect, QE is the Central Bank providing artificial demand for securities with the intention of 
manipulating the prices of the underlining securities (El-Erian, 2016). More will be discussed 
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on the specifics of QE policies that have been implemented globally by the four key central 
banks. Furthermore, this section will conclude by exploring the potential future unintended 
consequences of QE policies.  But before that, the rationale for purchasing government bonds, 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and other types of financial assets will be discussed.  
Quantitative Easing Economic Impact   
The most common security purchased under QE policies has been sovereign bonds (King, 
2016). Bond interest rates are inversely related to the underlining value of the bond (King, 
2016). So as the Central Bank purchases more bonds, the value increases which subsequently 
lowers the interest rate yield (King, 2016). This intern lowers the borrowing costs of 
governments. The purchase of sovereign debt with QE money is monetisation, meaning the 
government can issue new debt from newly created money without having to find a market 
buyer to purchase the newly created debt (King, 2016). Therefore, if there was a run on bonds 
thanks to bond vigilantes, the Central Bank can be the buyer of last resort (King, 2016). Overall, 
there are four key ways in which the purchase of sovereign debt with QE money stimulates the 
economy.   
Firstly, by lowering the coupon payment government bonds pay, the appeal for investors to 
purchase bonds decreases (Bank of England, 2015). This, in turn, incentivises investors to 
purchase other riskier assets, such as stocks, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), MBS, etc 
(El-Erian, 2016). This helps prop up these other asset classes which experienced sharp losses 
during the GFC (El-Erian, 2016). Proponents of QE argued that an increase in the value of 
these financial assets will lead to the wealth effect (King, 2016). This occurs when an individual 
experiences an increase in the value of their assets owned. Thus, as they become richer on 
paper, they will go out and increase consumption spending throughout the economy which in 
doing so stimulates growth (King, 2016).  
Secondly, by artificially lowering the government’s borrowing rates, the ability for 
governments to run large budget deficits to mitigate the GFC is enhanced (Bank of England, 
2015). Discussed in the previous section, the massive debt build-up through the large budget 
deficits that governments ran in the years after the GFC has only been serviceable due to this 
ultra-low interest rate environment (Mattie, 2016).  
Thirdly, as was described in the ZIRP and NIRP sections, lowering the nominal rate for 
government bonds helps foster negative real borrowing interest rates for governments, as the 
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Fisher equation explains (Investing, 2017). Finally, although the Central Bank members will 
not specifically state it publicly, QE has the added benefit of weakening the home currency 
(Mattie, 2016). The benefit from having a weaker currency is that it increases export 
competitiveness which in turn stimulates economic growth (Mattie, 2016).  
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), a financial asset that is a type of MBS, were one of 
the key assets classes responsible for the GFC (Mattie, 2016). A CDO is a collection of 
mortgages that are combined which offer the owner’s frequent payments, like a dividend 
payment, through the rent collected on the mortgages owned (Mattie, 2016). The benefit behind 
these securities is that it offers diversification by offering the owners access to a large pool of 
rent revenues from multiple different mortgages (Mattie, 2016). However, as was discussed, 
there was systematic risk associated with MBS, which ultimately made many of them either 
completely worthless or worth a fraction of what they originally were worth when the 
American housing bubble imploded; i.e. a large percentage of these CDO’s were toxic assets 
(Mattie, 2016). Some of the central banks purchased these MBS at full price for two reasons.  
Firstly, by purchasing these MBS off the banks, they were able to in effect bail them out 
(Gilder, 2016). Some banks, such as Merrill Lynch, had purchased so many, they were 
effectively bankrupt due to the write off in value of these MBS assets (Gilder, 2016). By 
purchasing these toxic assets from the banks, their balance sheets were able to be improved 
slowly overtime (Gilder, 2016). Secondly, by purchasing these MBS from the banks 
themselves, they received a huge injection of cash which they could either use to purchase and 
help prop up other asset classes, such as stocks, or could loan these funds out to businesses and 
households in order to help stimulate the real economy (Gilder, 2016).  
Finally, there have been a variety of other financial asset classes that have been purchased by 
the four key central banks with their QE polices. These included Electronic Traded Funds 
(ETFs), Stocks, Real Estate Investment Funds (REIFs), cooperate bonds, commercial paper 
and normal bank loans (Mattie, 2016). These other classes of assets as a percentage of total QE 
spent far less than bonds and MBS (Mattie, 2016). As a result, the rationale of the purchasing 
of each asset class will not be covered.  In saying this, the purchase of these other financial 
assets has been largely used to support key segments of the financial markets as well as for the 
purpose of generating the wealth effect for other owners of these financial assets (Mattie, 
2016).   
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The last important point to note is that QE polices have helped prevent deflation from occurring 
within the seven key economies studied. As mentioned in Chapter 2, deflation makes the real 
value of debt greater (El-Erian, 2016). Additionally, a debt deflation trap, highlighted in Irving 
Fisher’s Debt Deflation Theory leads to lower economic growth due to delayed consumption 
spending (Investopedia, 2017). As a result, central banks have been desperate to avoid 
deflation. More on this point will be discussed in the last subsection of this section of the 
chapter.    
United States  
Although the Japanese BOJ was the first central bank to experiment with QE, as will be 
discussed shortly, the US Fed was the first post GFC nation to experiment with this 
unconventional policy (Gilder, 2016). On November 25th, 2008, just two months after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the head of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, announced the Fed would be 
purchasing $600 billion worth of MBS, which, on the whole, were toxic subprime mortgages 
from the various banks in bad financial health (The Balance, 2016). In addition to this $600 
billion in MBS, the Fed announced it would be purchasing $100 billion in other debt securities 
(The Balance, 2016). The Fed also announced they would guarantee the debt of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (Gilder, 2016). To give a perspective on the size of these purchases, the 
balance sheet of the Fed before this announcement was approximately $850 billion as can be 
seen in Figure 35 (Federal Reserve, 2016). This policy, known as QE1, almost doubled the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet; or expressed differently, was worth 4.8% of GDP (Mattie, 
2016).  
Despite this $700 billion in purchases, as well as lowering interest rates to zero as discussed, 
the economy and the financial markets were still imploding (Gilder, 2016). This is when the 
Fed increased their QE1 operations by announcing on March 9th, 2009 that they would buy an 
additional $750 billion more in MBS, $100 billion in Fannie and Freddie debt, and $300 billion 
of longer-term treasuries over the next six months (The Balance, 2016). The announcement of 
this policy was sufficient to restore market confidence as this same day coincided with the 
bottoming of the US stock market (Gilder, 2016).  
While QE1 helped start the economic recovery, it was not enough.  The second round of QE, 
known as QE2, was implemented in November 2010 as you can see from Figure 35 (Federal 
Reserve, 2017). This transpired in the backdrop of fear over a double dip recession where the 
US economy was on the cusp of experiencing deflation and a further decline in GDP (Mattie, 
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2016). This new round involved the purchasing of $600 billion in long-term treasuries over an 
8-month period (The Balance, 2016). Additionally, $250–$300 billion of MBS that were 
maturing on their balance sheet were reinvested back into MBS (The Balance, 2016). With the 
$600 billion purchased being only US debt with QE2, this policy was focused on stimulating 
the broader economy more so than the property market (The Balance, 2016). The markets did 
rally as a result of this policy announcement as would be expected (Gilder, 2016). However, it 
was relatively short-lived. With the August 2011 S&P US credit downgrade, markets quickly 
went into a bear market correction with a 20% plus downside movement (Gilder, 2016). To 
combat this stock market downturn, more stimulus was implemented. This involved the 
implementation of operation twist, discussed later in this chapter.  
The last major QE operation from the Fed was announced on September 13th, 2012 which was 
subsequently known as QE3 (The Balance, 2016). This policy was different from the prior two 
with there not being an end date (Gilder, 2016). The policy called for $85 billion in sovereign 
bonds to be purchased monthly indefinitely (The Balance, 2016). This announcement was a 
positive surprise to markets and subsequently resulted in 2013 being one of the strongest years 
for the US stock market in history (Forbes, 2015). The beginning of the monthly bond value 
tapering started in December 2013 and finally ended in October 2014 (Forbes, 2015).  
Crucially, after this point in time, while the Fed was not expanding their balance sheet from 
this point on, they were rolling over their maturing bonds by purchasing new bonds; effectively 
keeping their balance sheet constant at $4.5 trillion as can be seen in Figure 35 (Mattie, 2016).  
During a February 2017 Senate Open Banking Committee testimony, Janet Yellen discussed 
how the possible unwinding of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet must be “gradual”, 
“natural” and there must be a “communication plan” (CNBC, 2017), although specifics of what 
the policy would look like were not forthcoming at the time. After the June 2017 FOMC 
meeting some clearer insight into how it would look was discussed. In the statement, the Fed 
wrote,  
For payments of principal that the Fed receives from maturing Treasury securities, 
the Committee anticipates that the cap will be $6 billion per month initially and will 
increase in steps of $6 billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches 
$30 billion per month. (Federal Reserve, 2017, Para. 7). 
 With respect to the MBS, the Fed laid out a similar approach where it will start tapering $4 
billion a month until it reaches $20 billion monthly (Federal Reserve, 2017). 
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However, this is not the official policy, which is expected to be announced during the 
September 2017 FOMC meeting. A starting date towards the end of 2017 or early 2018 is 
expected to be announced (CNBC, 2017). It’s important to note that during the June FOMC 
meeting, the Fed officials felt the long-term balance of the balance sheet will be “appreciably 
below that seen in recent years but larger than before the financial crisis” (BBC, 2017). So it is 
hard to know what the final balance sheet value will be long-term. What needs to be noted is 
that this policy could have serious unintended consequences (El-Erian, 2016). As the Fed 
becomes a net seller of bonds and MBS, they will have to find more buyers, both foreign and 
domestic, to keep yields on these securities from rising out of control. Particularly if the Fed 
simultaneously continues to normalise interest rates (El-Erian, 2016). If yields do markedly 
rise, as they did for Italy and Spain during the European debt crisis, the US will find itself in 
serious economic trouble simply for the fact the debt servicing expense will rapidly rise due to 
the large base of sovereign debt (Mattie, 2016). Time will tell how successfully long-term the 
Fed will be able to unwind their balance sheet.   
United Kingdom  
In the month of March 2009, the same month the Fed increased their QE1 policy, the BOE 
announced that they too would be implementing a QE policy (The Guardian, 2009). For the 
BOE this would involve purchasing an initial £175 billion with the vast majority of it being 
British Government bonds and a small percentage being high quality British cooperate bonds 
(The Guardian, 2009). These £175 billion were purchased by the end of October 2009 (The 
Guardian, 2009). At the November 2009 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, an 
additional £25 billion in assets were purchased (The Telegraph, 2009). Over time, at the 
December 2010, October 2011, February 2012 and July 2012 MPC meetings, additional assets 
valued at £50 billion, £75 billion, £50 billion and £50 billion were announced to be purchased, 
respectively, all of which went towards the purchase of British bonds (Financial Times, 2011; 
BOE, 2016). By this point in the BOE QE programme, a total of £375 billion worth of assets 
had been purchased (BOE, 2016). Again, the vast majority had been British government bonds 
(BOE, 2016). The £375 billion in total assets was to be continuously rolled over whenever they 
maturated, which effectively kept the BOE’s balance sheet total assets owned constant (Bank 
of England, 2016). 
The £375 billion balance would remain constant for over four years (BOE, 2016).  Then, after 
the June Brexit vote, when there was real concern the British economy may slide, an additional 
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£60 billion of British bonds and £10 billion of high quality cooperate bonds respectively were 
purchased during the August MPC meeting (BOE, 2016). Additionally, at this meeting, the 
BOE announced a policy innovation with the creation of the Term Funding Scheme (TFS) 
(Financial Times, 2016). With the creation of £100 billion in new funds, the BOE effectively 
gives commercial banks free money on loan on the condition that they use the money to make 
loans to households and small firms that is at a cheaper rate than the normal market rate 
(Financial Times, 2016).  
The idea behind this policy is that it can stimulate the real economy by making it cheaper for 
households and firms to borrow (Financial Times, 2016). An additional benefit of this policy 
is that banks can’t use the QE money to purchase stocks and other financial assets as has been 
common with prior QE policies (Financial Times, 2016). As of time of writing, although the 
BOE is considering hiking rates, the BOE has not indicated or ruled out whether they will be 
implementing future QE policies (Bloomberg, 2017). Additionally, with economic uncertainty 
hanging over the British economy as a result of ongoing Brexit negotiations, it is unlikely the 
BOE will announce a balance sheet write down like the Fed has announced unless the economy 
is growing robustly (Bloomberg, 2017).  
Japan  
As was mentioned earlier, Japan was the first country in the world to experiment with QE 
policies. Due to what was already a lost decade thanks to the 1989 economic crisis, the BOJ, 
in March 2001, implemented a QE policy in order to stimulate the economy. This involved 
tripling the monthly limit of government purchases of sovereign debt from ¥400 billion to ¥1.2 
trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2006). Also, over a 4-year period they 
increased commercial banks’ current account balance with the BOJ from ¥5 trillion to ¥35 
trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2006). Overall, it is not clear how successful 
this policy was as Japan continued to suffer deflationary pressures (Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, 2006). Additionally, the increase in government bonds was on a far smaller 
scale compared to future QE policies from the BOJ.  
Japan’s next QE policy was announced in October 2010, which involved a relatively small ¥5 
trillion worth of sovereign debt buying (Reuters, 2010). A year later another ¥5 trillion was 
purchased (BBC, 2011). These two one-off asset purchases had a limited impact on inflation 
and growth. As Figure 36 shows, the next QE policies implemented were significantly larger 
than the prior QE policies to date. After the announcement of Abenomics in December 2012, 
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the BOJ started their latest QE policy on April 4th, 2013 (Reuters, 2013; BOJ, 2017). This 
policy doubled the balance sheet from ¥135tn to ¥270tn within a 2-year period (Reuters, 2013). 
On a monthly basis, this is worth approximately US$70 billion (Reuters, 2013). Compared to 
the US QE3 policy of $85 billion monthly, Japanese QE policy was massive as a percentage of 
their economy, considering that Japan’s economy is approximately a third the size of the US 
(Reuters, 2013).  
As part of the announcement, the head of the BOJ, Haruhiko Kuroda said, “This is an 
unprecedented degree of monetary easing. We took all available steps we can think of. I'm 
confident that all necessary measures to achieve 2 percent inflation in two years were taken 
today” (Reuters, 2013, Para. 3).  With this policy coming to an end, the BOJ shocked the 
markets on October 31st, 2014 with the announcement that they would expand their QE policy 
by purchasing approximately ¥80tn annually with no end date (CNN, 2014). Additionally, the 
BOJ announced that they would be annually purchasing ¥6tn worth of ETFs, ¥90bn REITs, 
¥2.2tn commercial papers and ¥3.2tn worth of corporate bonds indefinitely (The Diplomat, 
2016).   
With regard to winding down the QE policy, Kuroda, on March 2017, for the first time publicly 
acknowledged that eventually the open-ended QE policy will end and that a wind down of the 
balance sheet will be on the cards (Reuters, 2017). He stated, “We have a lot of measures at 
our disposal, so I am sure we can take the most appropriate policy steps while maintaining 
market stability, which would include reducing the size of our balance sheet” (Reuters, 2017, 
Para. 5). However, the minutes from the latest BOJ meeting suggest board members are 
concerned about winding down the QE policy as inflation is still well short of the 2% target 
(CNBC, 2017).  
The BOJ is quickly putting themselves in a corner. As of time of writing, the BOJ owns 37.4% 
of all Japanese sovereign debt outstanding (Bank of Japan, 2017). It is likely markets will 
eventually be spooked if the BOJ ends up owning too much of the sovereign debt (El-Erian, 
2016). It could be when the BOJ reaches a symbolic 50% or it could be 70%—only the market 
knows.  However, if they ease up on QE they may face deflation, which they are desperate to 
avoid (Rickards, 2016). What is certain is that eventually there will have to be a policy change 
as this path cannot continue indefinitely (El-Erian, 2016). Out of the four central banks 
discussed in this chapter, the BOJ has experimented with QE policies the most and therefore 
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subsequently is likely to be the first to face unintended consequences of these policies if they 
come to par (El-Erian, 2016).  
Eurozone  
The ECB started experimenting with quasi-QE policies during the European sovereign debt 
crisis between 2010 and 2012. This was done through the creation of programmes such as the 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). The 
SMP was set up in May 2010 in response to Greece succumbing to Bond Vigilantes 
(Commonwealth Bank, 2012). Its intention was to sterilise the money supply of European 
countries by buying and selling the sovereign bonds as needed to keep liquidity stable (ECB, 
2010). For example, if investors sold Greek bonds the ECB would buy Greek bonds and vice 
versa. In total, over its two-and-a-half-year operation, it purchased €212.1bn of sovereign 
bonds (Commonwealth Bank, 2012). This policy was non-transparent, keeping market 
participants in the dark as to what countries’ bonds they were buying or how much they were 
buying or selling on a monthly basis (Commonwealth Bank, 2012).  
Two years later on August 2nd, 2012, when it was apparent Spain and Italy were on the verge 
of defaulting thanks to the Bond Vigilantes, the ECB replaced the SMP with the OMT (ECB, 
2012). The OMT called for the purchase of sovereign bonds aimed “at safeguarding an 
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy" (ECB, 
2012).  This intentionally ambiguous statement made it unclear at what level of risk and market 
uncertainty the ECB would intervene in the market. The real success of this policy is that the 
OMT never purchased a single bond as the credible threat that they would do so, along with 
Mario’s Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ speech (as will be discussed in the next section), was 
enough to restore confidence in European bond markets (ECB, 2013). While the SMP and 
OMT were quasi-QE policies, actual QE policies were to come.  
As Figure 37 shows, on January 21st, 2015, Mario Draghi announced €1.1trillion would be 
purchased between February 2015 and September 2016 in €60 billion monthly purchases 
(CNBC, 2015; ECB, 2017). These purchases were only of government debt (Bruegel, 2016). 
Germany was, and continues to be, in express opposition to QE policies, as Germany believes 
in sound money polices and feels QE is akin to bailing out countries (Bruegel, 2016). However, 
the Germans were compensated by ensuring there is minimum risk sharing as €44 billion of 
the €60 billion monthly purchases was to be divided proportionally based on the size of each 
eurozone country (Bruegel, 2016); i.e. Germany being the largest eurozone country, would 
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have the biggest percentage of the €44 billion being used to purchase German bonds. Also, 
there were eligibility criteria that was placed on the purchasing of sovereign debt (Bruegel, 
2016). In addition to the bonds having a yield above the deposit rate, the ECB was not allowed 
to own 25% of a single-issue limit nor could they own 33% of an issuer limit on Eurosystem 
holdings (Bruegel, 2016). This was put in place to minimise the ECB’s ownership, and 
therefore control of a single country’s bonds (Bruegel, 2016).  
With inflation still subdued, on December 3rd, 2015, the policy was expanded by an additional 
six months until March 2017 (CNBC, 2015). As part of this announcement, Mario Draghi said 
QE policies would continue “until we see a sustained convergence towards our objective of a 
rate of inflation which is below but close to 2 percent” (Bruegel, 2016). Additionally, as part 
of the policy expansion, regional and local government bonds were added to the list of assets 
that could be purchased (CNBC, 2015). During the March 2016 ECB meeting, it was deemed 
that inflation was still too low. Subsequently, the monthly bond purchases were increased from 
€60 billion to €80 billion (Financial Times, 2017). Starting in June 2016, the ECB announced 
that they would start purchasing cooperate bonds with the newly created QE money (Financial 
Times, 2017). As of June 2017, only €75 billion of the total €1.8 trillion of QE money had been 
used to purchase cooperate bonds (Financial Times, 2017).  
At the December 2016 ECB meeting, the ECB surprised markets by saying they will cut 
monthly purchases from €80 billion back to its original €60 billion a month (Financial Times, 
2016). Mario Draghi insisted this was not a tapering move and said, “This is the first small step 
towards the exit, but the exit will not be rushed” (Bloomberg, 2017, Para. 3). While the rate of 
monthly asset purchases decreased, the ECB increased the policy for an additional nine months 
until the end of 2017 (Financial Times, 2016). As of October 2017, the latest official stance 
from the ECB on their QE policy is that, “if the outlook becomes less favourable, or if financial 
conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment in the 
path of inflation, the Governing Council stands ready to increase the program in terms of size 
and/or duration” (CNBC, 2017, Para. 3). Market consensus is split with some market 
commentators guessing the ECB will announce a tapering plan while others, such as the French 
Bank Societe Generale, believe QE will be extended well into 2019 (CNBC, 2017). As a result, 
the jury is out as to how many trillion euros the ECB’s QE polices will ultimately be.   
Potential Unintended Consequences of Quantitative Easing Policies 
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What should be evident is that the QE policies that have been implemented by these four central 
banks have been very large in scale. As evidence of this, looking at Figure 38, the four central 
banks’ balance sheets as a percentage of GDP is far greater in 2017 than it was before the GFC 
(FRED, 2017). Consequently, central banks and their actions now play a greater role in the 
financial stability and overall economic health of the global economy (El-Erian, 2016). The 
last important aspect that needs to be addressed is to consider why inflation has been non-
existent in the post GFC era despite the size and scope of these money printing policies.  
Recapping the quantitative theory of money, assuming the velocity of money is constant, an 
increase in the money supply leads to an increase in inflation and growth. In reality, both 
inflation and economic growth in the seven key countries has been on the whole lower than 2% 
in the aftermath of the GFC (World Bank, 2017). Specifically, looking at the US, Figure 39 
shows that the monetary base has increased from around $900 billion in 2008 to around $4 
trillion today thanks to the QE policy 1 (FRED, 2017). The broader M2 measurement of money 
shows an increase from around $7.5 trillion to $13.5 trillion over the same time period (Figure 
40) (FRED, 2017).  
The reason why this very large increase in the money supply has not been inflationary is due 
to the substantial fall in the velocity of money. Again, looking at the US, the velocity of money 
for both the M1 and M2 money supply has decreased substantially (Figure 41 and Figure 42) 
(FRED, 2017). With regard to the other three key central banks, they too have all seen their 
velocity of money for their currency decrease substantially over the last few years, despite the 
large increases in the money supply thanks to the QE policies (El-Erian, 2016).     
A big reason for the decrease in the velocity of money is that the QE money that was handed 
out to the commercial banks has largely been used to repair their balance sheets in the aftermath 
of the GFC (El-Erian, 2016). Additionally, a sizeable percentage of this QE money has been 
invested in financial assets, such as stocks and bonds, instead of being used to make loans for 
households and small and medium businesses (El-Erian, 2016). This QE money being tied up 
in financial assets generally does not change hands nearly as often as it would in the hands of 
households and small to medium businesses, who generally have a high marginal propensity 
to consume (El-Erian, 2016). As a result, the velocity of money for the four key currencies has 
decreased.  
However, in the future, due to the Bond Vigilantes phenomenon, if confidence is lost in the US 
ability to pay its debt, or for the other three currencies and their governments, the velocity of 
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money could start to increase at a relatively rapid rate (El-Erian, 2016). The reason why it could 
be rapid is due to the self-reinforcing cycle of high inflation incentivising increased rates of 
consumer spending/selling of financial assets dominated by USDs (El-Erian, 2016). This, by 
definition, is an increase in the velocity of money. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the money 
printing the US did in the 1960s as part of the guns and butter policies of Lynden B Johnson 
did not lead to high inflation until the mid-1970s (Jordan, 2015). Therefore just because the 
scale of money printing that has been implemented through these QE policies has not resulted 
in high inflation as of yet, it does not mean it will not transpire in the future due to a time delay 
(El-Erian, 2016). More on this point will be discussed in Chapter 5, as it has very important 
implications for the future of the US dollar. 
Moral Suasion (Foreign Guidance)  
Moral suasion is an economic/political term for the ability of politicians and central bankers to 
use persuasion to, but not force, the market to act in a way the governments or central bankers 
want them to (Jacobs & King, 2016). With regard to central banking and monetary policy, 
moral suasion, also known as foreign guidance in finance terms, has become a far more 
important tool used by central bankers in the post GFC era (El-Erian, 2016). While moral 
suasion does not directly lead to economic growth or reduced borrowing costs for governments, 
it can indirectly influence both through instilling confidence into market participants. Moral 
suasion can be conducted through inflation rate targeting, dot plot graphs, and through market 
commentary.  
Inflation Rate Targeting  
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, on the whole, central bankers were quiet in the 
sense that markets did not pay attention to their words or guidance anywhere near to the degree 
they do today (El-Erian, 2016). In fact, regular announcements from central banks on the whole 
were not existent and commonly only took place when actual changes to monetary policies 
were implemented (El-Erian, 2016). Generally speaking, central bankers had a very high 
degree of autonomy; with a strong degree of non-transparency in the sense that it was not 
always clear as to the rationale and reasoning for changes in monetary policy (El-Erian, 2016). 
However, over time this has changed and particularly in the post GFC era.  
Before 1989, no central bank globally outlined their effective targeted inflation rate (El-Erian, 
2016). The first country to do so was New Zealand with the signing of the Reserve Bank of 
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New Zealand Act 1989, better known as the Policy Target Agreement (El-Erian, 2016). Now 
virtually every major central bank globally outlines and communicates to the market a range 
of inflation that they are comfortable with before taking monetary policy action (El-Erian, 
2016). With regard to the four most important central banks globally, the BOE was the first of 
the four to implement an inflation target of 2.5% in 1998 (Bank of England, 2017). This rate 
was later decreased to 2% in 2003 (Bank of England, 2017).   
The ECB since its inception in 1998 also implemented an inflation target rate (ECB2017). 
Instead of aiming for 2% inflation, their mandate originally was to keep inflation under 2%. 
However, this changed in 2003 to a mandate of keeping inflation around 2% and not necessarily 
under 2% (ECB, 2017).  In the post GFC era, where deflation has been a real concern globally, 
the Fed finally implemented a 2% or greater inflation target in January 2012 (Federal Reserve, 
2015). A year later, the BOJ in January 2013 also set a target of 2% inflation or greater (Bank 
of Japan, 2013).   
Dot Plot 
The US Federal Reserve, under Ben Bernanke, created the Fed dot plot in January 2012 as a 
new way in which the Fed is able to jawbone the market (El-Erian, 2016). After each Federal 
Open Market Committee meeting, the 16 Fed board members give two forecasts, one at the end 
of the calendar year, and a long-term forecast on where they expect the prime interest rate will 
be in three years (Jacobs & King, 2016). These 16 individual forecasts are then graphed on a 
dot plot in which the degree of agreement or disagreement on future interest rates can be seen 
based on the spread of the 16 dots (Jacobs & King, 2016). This insight into where the Fed board 
members see future interest rates is a very strong telegraph tool (El-Erian, 2016). Financial 
markets watch the Fed dot plot closely and act on the results accordingly.  
If the Fed wants higher interest rates but knows the economy is likely too weak to raise interest 
rates, telegraphing that the Fed is likely to raise interest rates, even if they do not privately think 
it is feasible, is a strong tool in coercing the market to meet their objective (Jacobs & King, 
2016). As a result, this new telegraphing tool is increasingly playing an important role in 
stimulating financial markets to meet the Federal Reserve’s objectives. The other three main 
central banks (BOJ, ECB, BOE) currently do not use the dot plot as a tool of foreign guidance 
although the BOJ members in 2017 discussed the possibility of implementing such a tool 
(Bloomberg, 2017).  
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Market Commentary 
With the rise of the internet, social media and financial TV programmes, the media has, over 
time, increased their coverage of central bankers’ actions and words (Jacobs & King, 2016). In 
addition to widely circulated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes being 
distributed, press conferences started to become a regular occurrence (Jacobs & King, 2016). 
From 2011, Ben Bernanke started doing press conferences once every two months in which he 
would explain the decisions and rationale of what the Central Bank was thinking (Jacobs & 
King, 2016). Ben Bernanke’s predecessor, Janet Yellen, as well as the heads of the major 
central bankers of the ECB, BOJ and BOE, have started and continued to do the same (Jacobs 
& King, 2016). The words from the FOMC minutes, as well as the spoken words from the 
central bankers themselves are now so scrutinised, investment banks have created computer 
algorithms that interpret these words and make investment decisions in microseconds in order 
to get ahead of the markets (Jacobs & King, 2016). This shows to what level and impact central 
bankers’ words have in today’s world. 
While there are many examples of central banker technocrats’ words having enormous impact 
on markets, there are three that are highly notable and influential for the global economy that 
will be briefly discussed. These include Mario Drago’s (of the ECB) ‘Whatever it takes’ 
speech; Ben Bernanke’s ‘Taper Tantrum’ speech; and the words of Thomas Jordan, the head 
of the Swiss National Bank (SNB), used in the months prior to the time the Swiss broke their 
Euro Peg.  
In mid-2012, the eurozone debt crisis was at its peak intensity. At this time, Italy and Spain, 
the third and fourth largest eurozone countries respectively, were paying long-term interest 
rates north of 5%, shown in Figure 27 and Figure 29 (Rickards, 2016; Investing, 2017). In 
short, there was a serious possibility of a full on sovereign debt crisis leading to the breakup of 
the 19-member monetary union (Rickards, 2016). Desperate to prevent this outcome under his 
watch as President of the ECB, Mario Dragio on July 26th, 2012 announced, “Within our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will 
be enough” (ECB, 2012). These strong words worked and were sufficient to keep the euro 
intact (for now) as sovereign debt yields in the peripheral nations markedly decreased while 
stock markets globally rallied over the following months (Rickards, 2016).  
The second example came when Ben Bernanke, on May 22nd, 2013, indicated that the Fed was 
considering reducing the amount of monthly QE3 asset purchases (Financial Times, 2013). The 
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specific words he used were, “If we see continued improvement and we have confidence that 
is going to be sustained, then in the next few meetings, we could take a step down in our pace 
of purchases” (Financial Times, 2013, Para. 2). Five large emerging market economies, later 
known as the fragile five, had become too reliant on undependable foreign investment to 
finance their future growth (BBC, 2013). These five countries, comprising India, Indonesia, 
Turkey, South Africa and Brazil, subsequently faced strong capital outflows and therefore 
painful currency depreciations (BBC, 2013). This market event provides a perfect example 
showing that, unlike the first example, words can have negative implications for certain 
economies.   
The last notable example of moral persuasion comes from the official statements and words of 
the head of the SNB, who broke the Euro peg. In December 2014, Thomas Jordan was quoted 
saying, “The franc is still highly valued. Enforcing the minimum exchange rate of 1.20 per 
euro is absolutely central to ensure adequate monetary conditions in Switzerland and the SNB 
stands ready to enforce it by buying unlimited foreign currency” (The Economist, 2015, Para. 
6). In the week before the January 15th, 2015 event, Thomas Jordan described the peg as 
“absolutely central”, while the vice-chairman Jean-Pierre Danthine said 48 hours prior to 
scraping the peg that it would remain the “cornerstone” of SNB policy (Reuters, 2015). 
This policy was ultimately not sustainable, as one-sided market buying pressure rapidly 
depleted the SNB’s foreign reserves as they were forced to be net sellers of francs in order to 
maintain the currency peg at 1.20 franc to the euro (Reuters, 2015).  Not wanting to sell all of 
their Swiss franc reserves, the SNB did a complete U-turn on policy and allowed the peg to be 
broken (Reuters, 2015). This move, a true black swan moment, shocked markets globally. In 
addition to currency impacts globally, this shock was particularly hard for the Swiss equity 
markets and their corresponding export orientated companies (The Guardian, 2015). The CEO 
of Swiss watch maker Swatch summed up the implications well for many Swiss economic 
powerhouses when he said in response to the SNB decision, “Today's SNB action is a tsunami; 
for the export industry and for tourism, and finally for the entire country” (The Guardian, 2015, 
Para 6).  
What this shows is that central bankers are perfectly willing and/or capable of lying in an 
attempt to cause favourable market movements in order to meet their objective. In the 
immediate aftermath of the decision, Thomas Jordan was quoted saying, “If you decide to exit 
such a policy, you have to take the markets by surprise” (Reuters, 2015). This has very 
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important implications for the wider market in which the credibility and trustworthiness of 
central banker’s actions are put into question. In the words of the chief economist at Swiss bank 
Sarasin, “In my opinion, this damages confidence in the Swiss National Bank that has always 
been saying it can keep up the minimum exchange rate. I see big risks in this” (Reuters, 2015, 
Para 4).  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there has been a wide range of unorthodox monetary policies that 
have been implemented globally in the wake of the GFC. To recap, these have included ZIRP, 
NIRP, and Quantitative Easing and Moral Suasion. On the whole, these unorthodox monetary 
policies have helped the US, and other developed nations, recover from the GFC through 
generating economic growth. As will be discussed in the next chapter, economic growth is vital 
in ensuring total debt levels remain serviceable.  
Additionally, these unorthodox monetary policies have also made borrowing costs, and hence 
debt serviceability, cheaper for the governments studied. In effect, these monetary policies have 
bought governments time in addressing the growing debt problem outlined in Chapter 3. 
However, there are limits to the effectiveness of unorthodox monetary policy. Moreover, there 
could also be unintended consequences of implementing additional unorthodox monetary 
policy in the future, particularly if it is even larger in size and scope than what has already been 
implemented in the post GFC era. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the continuation of 
large scale unorthodox monetary policies could lead to uncomfortably high levels of inflation. 
As a result, unless governments are willing to accept high levels of inflation, monetary policy 
cannot indefinitely be used to address the growing sovereign debt levels.  
The next chapter will combine the key findings that have so far been discussed from Chapters 
1 to 4. Specifically, as referred to in Chapter 2, the four options outlined in the Debt Super 
Cycle Theory will be studied closely. For each of the four options governments can choose to 
address excessive indebtedness, a detailed discussion on its merits and pitfalls will be 
discussed. Additionally, how each option will impact the US dollar’s role as the key global 
reserve currency will be discussed. Two of the options, namely growing out of the debt and 
inflating away the debt, are intertwined to the unorthodox monetary policies that have been 
covered in the chapter. Therefore, when discussing these two options in the next chapter, it is 
important to understand the impacts unorthodox monetary policies have had on sovereign debt 
levels. 
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 Chapter 5: Responding to Excessive Indebtedness  
This chapter will marry the economic theories and concepts outlined in Chapter 2 with the 
findings from Chapters 3 and 4. Firstly, this chapter will discuss why there will be another debt 
induced recession/crisis and why fiscal and monetary policy to mitigate its impact are limited 
will be discussed. Following this, each of the four main options governments face when trying 
to service debt, as outlined in the Debt Super Cycle Theory, will be studied. To recap, these 
include the growth path, the austerity path, defaulting on debt and inflating the debt away. As 
part of the analysis, only the US will be studied. However, broad implications outlined from 
studying the US debt position are applicable to the other six countries studied. Finally, this 
chapter will conclude with a discussion on how the US dollar’s status as the global reserve 
currency will be impacted based on the four different possible paths the US chooses to service 
their debt.  
Future Financial Crises in a Globally Interconnected World Economy   
It’s important to make the point that there will be another global recession/financial crisis. The 
seminal work of Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff on financial crises 
confirms this (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). In addition to a variety of academic journals 
published on the subject, their book “This time is Different”: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly outlines every known debt crisis in history. Since the 1638 Tulip Bubble, regarded as the 
first modern financial crash, the phrase “this time is different” has always been proven wrong 
when predicting there will be no future debt induced financial crisis and/or recession (Reinhart 
& Rogoff, 2011). Using thousands of sovereigns, cooperate and household debt crises as a 
dataset, it becomes clear, from a historical perspective, that financial crises and recessions are 
inherently in capitalism (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). Unless this time is truly different, unlike 
the prior thousands of examples, another global recession/financial crisis will transpire 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011).  
Drawing a theoretical principle from Complexity Theory, we can conclude that (like an 
earthquake) it’s a matter of when and not if another financial/economic crisis transpires. In the 
case of the financial markets, the growing instability is the size of the debt. Complexity Theory 
states that as debt levels become larger, the systems become less stable (Rickards, 2016). As 
outlined in Chapter 3, the debt level globally is at its all-time high, which should be a real cause 
for concern. However, while the financial system may be unstable, as the theory states, you 
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cannot predict which specific event will turn the financial markets from a point of stability to 
chaos, just like you can’t predict the snowflake that starts the avalanche (Rickards, 2016).     
The ‘snowflake’ could be a collapse of a bank, a sovereign default, a global trade war, the 
election of a global populist leader, a major terrorist or cyber-attack, a war on the Korean 
peninsula, etc. (Rickards, 2016). Additionally, it could be a politician or central banker’s words 
that trigger a crisis, such as Richard Nixon’s words about the closing of the gold window or 
Ben Bernanke’s words regarding tapering (Rickards, 2016). In addition to Complexity Theory, 
the financial concept black swan events attest to this problem of not being able to predict the 
unpredictable (Taleb, 2010). Hyman Minsky, and his concept of the Minsky Moment, also 
illustrates the point that markets can go from stable to instable in a flash (Wray, 2015).  As a 
result, forecasting to the day, month or even the year that the debt burden becomes destabilising 
is a fool’s guess (Rickards, 2016). What is important is to recognise that the current level of 
debt is unsustainable and will eventually lead to a day of reckoning if measures are not taken 
today to deleverage and reduce the instability of the debt levels (Rickards, 2016).   
Many prominent and influential individuals in recent times have expressed concerns about a 
future crisis. In July 2017 the IMF’s Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, was quoted saying, 
“I wouldn't rule out another financial crisis. Where it will come from, what form it takes, how 
international and broad-based it will be is to be seen, and typically the crisis never comes from 
where we expect it” (CNBC, 2017, Para. 2) Claudio Borio, the Chief Economist of the Bank 
of International Settlements, an institute that effectively is the central banks of central banks, 
in June 2017 warned,  
The current ageing and unstable cycle could finish in much the same explosive 
way, contrary to the widespread belief that it was a once-in-a-century event caused 
by speculators. The end may come to resemble more closely a financial boom gone 
wrong, just as the latest recession showed, with a vengeance (The Telegraph, 2017, 
Para. 2).  
In June 2017 the head of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, warned, “Banks are forgetting 
the lessons of the financial crisis, increasing the risk of reckless lending which could land them, 
and the wider economy, in trouble later” (The Telegraph, 2017, Para. 4). Finally, famed 
investor Warren Buffet, who is generally regarded as being a long-term bullish investor, in 
recent years and on multiple occasions has called derivatives a financial tool that can be used 
to increase leverage, “a potential time bomb” and a “weapon of mass destruction” for banks’ 
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balance sheets (Bloomberg, 2016). Echoing this concern, in his 2017 annual shareholder letter 
Buffet wrote, “The years ahead will occasionally deliver major market declines – even panics 
– that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell you when these traumas will occur – not 
me, not Charlie, not economists, not the media” (CNBC, 2017, Para. 5).   
Another important aspect to consider is the degree of interconnectedness in today’s global 
economy. As the world saw during the 2008 GFC crisis, the crisis that started in the US quickly 
unfolded worldwide with most countries’ stock markets imploding (Eichengreen, 2012). Even 
some of the best run economies that had no connection with subprime leading, such as New 
Zealand or Norway, found their stock markets crashing simply due to the global phenomenon 
that was the GFC (King, 2016). Looking at long run global exports as a percentage of the global 
economy, it is apparent that a big degree of the increased global interconnectedness is due to 
increased trade (Bulkot, 2013). Additionally, with the rise of the internet, and hence the ability 
to buy and sell global assets nearly instantaneously, it is unsurprising the financial world is as 
interconnected as it is (Bulkot, 2013).  
Looking forward, the next major black swan event is very likely going to be felt globally. The 
US debt sovereign downgrade, the European sovereign debt crisis and the more recent 2015 
China stock market crash are all evidence that markets globally can lose sizeable amounts of 
value in a short amount of time despite the problems not originating locally. As a result, the 
saying, ‘when the US (or China or Europe) sneezes, the rest of the world gets a cold’, will be 
relevant in the years ahead.   
This increased global interconnectedness is the key reason it was so important to study the debt 
and monetary policy situation of the other six countries in Chapters 3 and 4. While this thesis 
has been predominately focused on the US, a crisis in any one of the other six economies could 
easily trigger a crisis in the US, or more accurately, speed up the unfolding of an inevitable 
crisis in the US (El-Erian, 2016). Additionally, it was important to show that debt and 
unconventional monetary policy was a global monetary phenomenon and not just relevant to 
the US. Therefore, for example, a run on the Japanese yen, thanks to lost confidence in their 
government’s ability to pay their debt, could quickly lead to lost confidence in the US dollar’s 
value. As a result, while there may be some safe havens such as the Australian dollar, the 
Norwegian krone, Swiss franc etc., it’s not clear at all whether any of the four key global 
currencies will act as a safe haven currency if a full-on debt crisis and a crisis in confidence in 
fiat currencies engulfs the developed world.  
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Finally, it is important to acknowledge that of the 33 recessions the US has experienced since 
1854, the US is currently experiencing its third longest period without experiencing a recession 
(CNBC, 2017). To break the record, the US has to be recession free past June 2019 (CNBC, 
2017). However, the longer times goes on, greater are the chances of a recession occurring 
sooner rather than later (Keaney, 2017). What is also of worry, as will be discussed in-depth 
shortly, is the ability of the US, and other major economies, to deal with the recession/crisis 
‘successfully’ through fiscal and monetary policy.  
Responding to the Next Crisis  
When the global economy faces another financial/economic crisis, it is unclear whether large 
Keynesian style government expenditures can be successfully implemented (Sharma, 2011). 
This will particularly be the case if the financial/economic crisis is debt induced. When there 
is a crisis in confidence in debt, it is hard to impossible to find new buyers willing to purchase 
debt at a reasonable interest rate (Skarica, 2014). For example, at one point during the Greek 
crisis in 2010, interest rates north of 10% for the 10-year bond were still not high enough to 
persuade investors to buy their debt (CNN, 2010).  As a result, if governments try to spend 
large amounts during a debt crisis it will have to be purchased through newly created QE money 
in order to monetise the debt (Skarica, 2014). While possible, it will be highly inflationary 
(Skarica, 2014). As the economist Peter Schiff describes, giving someone who is drunk more 
alcohol makes the problem worse (CNBC, 2017).  
Monetary policy, discussed in Chapter 4, has been extensively used in unorthodox and new 
ways in the post GFC era. On the whole, these policies can be considered as being broadly 
successful if measured in terms of its ability to generate economic growth as well as its ability 
to lower borrowing costs for governments. Going forward, the four key central banks could 
continue to implement more and larger monetary policies. However, monetary policy has a 
diminishing impact the more it is implemented (Skarica, 2014). Or in other words, monetary 
policies have to be more ambitious to achieve the same result as earlier policies. For example, 
cutting interest rates from 1% to 0% is going to have less of a stimulus impact than cutting 
rates from 7% to 6%. This is because most households and businesses would have already 
borrowed at 1%. Whereas a 1% cut when interest rates are high makes a big difference as to 
whether to buy a home or invest in new capital equipment etc. Additionally, QE policies also 
have diminishing returns with regard to stimulating economic growth (King, 2016). Looking 
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at the Federal Reserve’s QE policies in relation to lowering bond yields, QE3 was less effective 
than QE2, which was less effective than QE1 (King, 2016).  
As a result, as the world economy is in a quasi-liquidity trap, interest rates will have to be cut 
deep into negative territory to have a similar stimulus impact as the interest rate cuts made 
during the GFC (King, 2016). Additionally, QE policies alone may not be enough. Helicopter 
money very well may be implemented in the face of a future downturn. However, while 
inflation has been elusive in the post GFC era, there is the risk that even larger future monetary 
policies may be highly inflationary (Skarica, 2014). This point, which was discussed in the QE 
section of Chapter 4, is very important and needs to be restressed. As the quantitative theory 
of money explains, a rapid rise in the velocity of money through lost confidence in a currency’s 
value would be highly inflationary thanks to the increased monetary base due to the QE policies 
implemented post GFC. Therefore central banks will have to be aware of the potential 
unintended consequences of even large monetary policies being implemented.  
The last important point to make is that the next economic downturn could very well be 
unrelated to debt problems. As mentioned earlier, the ‘snowflake’ or black swan event could 
be a war, a global pandemic, etc. Thus, there is the possibility that governments will be able to 
respond to the crisis through fiscal expenditures and monetary easing policies like they did 
during the GFC. Expressed differently, financial markets may allow the US to have debt levels 
at $30 trillion, meaning they could still borrow large amounts to help mitigate the next crisis. 
However, the larger the debt level, the more likely a debt crisis. Therefore if it’s not the next 
economic downturn it could be the following crisis if debt levels continue to rise. As a result, 
regardless as to when the next debt crisis is, one day the US is going to face four paths to deal 
with its large debt level if the current trend of debt increase is not corrected.  
Debt Super Cycle Theory  
The four paths will be discussed in the following order. Growth path, austerity path, inflate 
away the debt and default on the debt. 
Growth Path  
As was discussed in Chapter 4, unorthodox monetary policy has been extensively used in order 
to generate economic growth in the aftermath of the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression. Growth is vital for debt serviceability. Looking at the debt to GDP ratio, if 
economic growth rates are greater than the growth of debt, the debt to GDP ratio declines even 
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if the overall level of debt continues to increase. Additionally, if economic growth rates are 
declining or even negative, debt to GDP ratios can rise even if debt levels remain constant. 
Therefore it is vital that economies continue to grow to ensure their debt levels remain 
serviceable.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two ways in which an economy can grow. It can increase 
its population or increase its productivity per worker (El-Erian, 2016). Looking at the key 
countries that have been studied, on the whole, population growth is stubbornly low (United 
Nations, 2017). Fortunately for the US, when compared to the other six countries, it has the 
best long-term future population projections as can be seen in Figure 43 and Figure 44 (United 
Nations, 2017). This is in large part reflected in the fact that the US continues to be seen as a 
land of opportunity and, subsequently, a great place to immigrate to (The Wall Street Journal, 
2016). Plus, as Figure 45 shows, of the seven countries studied, the US as of 2015 has the 
lowest median age, at 38 years (UN Data, 2017).      
So, while the US long-term may be demographically secure from a population perspective, 
over the short- to medium-term it is not clear whether population growth will be strong.  
According to the Census Bureau, at an annual increase of 0.7%, 2016 was the slowest increase 
in population growth for the US since 1937 (The Wall Street Journal, 2016). The key 
contributor to this, according to the report, was an aging society who continue to have less and 
less kids (The Wall Street Journal, 2016). With regard to immigration, immigration numbers 
are just above historical average which is a positive (The New York Times, 2017). However, 
while unlikely to make a large negative dent to population growth, President Trump’s anti-
immigrant stance will, at a minimum, not encourage population growth (The New York Times, 
2017).  
For comparison to the US, Japan, Italy and Germany all have rapidly aging populations as can 
be seen in Figure 45 (United Nations, 2017). Without essential structural changes, such as 
encouraging more births and/or encouraging immigration, these populations are expected to 
decline (United Nations, 2017). The 2050 population forecast, outlined by the latest UN report, 
has a base case of Japan’s population decreasing from its current 126 million population to 
107.4 million (United Nations, 2017). Japan’s population growth, which has been largely flat 
for the last three decades, is a key factor in explaining their 28 years of flat to subdued growth 
(The Washington Post, 2016). Going forward, the rapidly decreasing Japanese population is 
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going to be one of the economic problems, if not the biggest, facing Japan in the long-term 
(The Washington Post, 2016).  
For Italy, the same report shows a base case decrease in population from its current 60 million 
to 56.5 million, while Germany, with its 83.6 million population, is expected to decline to 74.5 
million by 2050 (United Nations, 2017). As Angela Merkle’s controversial refugee 
immigration policy for Germany shows, these forecasts need to be considered carefully as 
policies can change future projections (The Atlantic, 2016). In saying this, collectively, with 
the exception of the US, long-term population growth for these seven countries is likely to be 
minimal, and in the case of Japan, very likely to decline (United Nations, 2017). This is good 
news for the US over the long-term with regard to their ability to continue to economically 
grow.  
With large increases in population growth unlikely in the short to medium term, economic 
growth is going to have to come from greater increases in worker productivity. It is increasingly 
clear President Trump is becoming an ineffective leader in terms of passing key legislation.  In 
the first eight months of his presidency, with the failure of repealing and replacing Obamacare, 
his administration has not passed a single major legislative law (CNN, 2017). As for when the 
House and Senate will draft and pass a tax reform and infrastructure bill, two key legislative 
pieces which would help improve productivity, it is in question and likely at the earliest will 
not reach the floor until late 2017 or early 2018 (CNN, 2017). This is due to the fact that the 
House and Senate are going to be occupied with more pressing concerns during the second half 
of 2017 (The New York Times, 2017).  These include the ongoing Russian investigations, the 
passing of the 2018 budget, raising the debt ceiling past December and dealing with the funding 
for the recovery from Hurricane Harvey and Irma (The New York Times, 2017).  
Additionally, with President Trump distracted by the ongoing Russian investigations, North 
Korean provocations, his continuing fight with key Republican leaders, such as Senate majority 
leader Bob Corker, Mitch McConnell, John McCain, Jeff Flake etc., and now having to deal 
with the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, Irma and Maria, it’s not clear how much time and 
energy President Trump will have to implement his key legislative agenda, at least for the next 
four to six months (The New York Times, 2017). Furthermore, with American politics 
currently being incredibly divisive and for the fact that the Republican Senate has a very narrow 
52 seat majority, the ability for the Senate to pass a purely partisan bill is tight. This was seen 
with the recent health care bill failure (United States Senate, 2017). So with a distracted 
 
92 
 
President and a congress that is politically divided, passing key legislation that will improve 
productivity is going to be difficult in the years ahead.  
The one promising legislative law that likely will be passed at some stage will be an 
infrastructure bill, as there is broad bi-partisan agreement that America must invest in more 
infrastructure (CNN, 2017). This is because, according to the American Society of Civil 
Engineers (2017), the US infrastructure grade is D+.  An infrastructure bill needed to just get 
the US a B- grade would create millions of jobs and would over time greatly improve the 
productivity of transportation by lowering costs (CNN, 2017). Also, improved transportation 
would increase everyday citizens’ productivity potential by reducing the number of hours they 
spend stuck in traffic annually (Bloomberg, 2017).  
In addition to transportation, other very important infrastructure components, such as 
improving the power grid, airports, drinking water, etc., will lead to greater levels of 
productivity for the US economy (Bloomberg, 2017).  President Trump has called for a trillion-
dollar infrastructure bill (CNN, 2017). In reality, an infrastructure bill that has a chance of 
getting through both houses of congress will be in the hundreds of billions (Bloomberg, 2017). 
Regardless, ignoring the fact that an infrastructure bill will lead to increased levels of sovereign 
debt, it is long overdue and would help the US economy achieve long-term productivity gains 
(Kristijan, et al., 2016).   
One key notable area of productivity potential that the Trump administration appears to be 
sabotaging is education. Although congressional approval is required, President Trump’s 
proposed 2018 budget calls for a $9.2 billion, or 13.5% cut in the education department’s 
budget (The Washington Post, 2017). Additionally, President Trump’s budget proposal 
included cutting student debt interest subsidies, which is only going to make higher education 
more expensive and out of reach for the poor and lower middle-classes (CNBC, 2017). In an 
increasingly competitive world that requires higher education to be successful, particularly in 
the science, technology, engineer and mathematic (STEM) subjects, cutting the education 
budget is arguably incredibly short-sighted and will not improve workers’ productivity over 
the long-term (ROSS, 2016).   
The future economy is going to be centred around industries such as artificial intelligence, 
robotics, nano-technology, coding etc. (Ross, 2016; Keely, 2017). Therefore having an 
educated population with the necessary skills required to be successful in these future industries 
is imperative in order to be successful and productive over the long-term (Ross, 2016; Keely, 
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2017). Cutting the education budget is going to be counterproductive to achieving long-term 
productivity gains. While short- to medium-term productivity may not be impacted, without 
question long-term worker productivity will be if education investments in the American 
population are not made (Ross, 2016).   
Lastly, when looking at productivity, it is also important to consider the new innovations and 
inventions that are being created instead of only policies. These include driverless cars, 
artificial intelligence, robotics, 3-D printing, cheaper renewable energy, new advanced 
materials, nano-technology, bio-technology, etc. (Ross, 2016; Keely, 2017). All of these fields, 
over the long run, have great promise in increasing workers’ productivity (Ross, 2016; Keely, 
2017). Many prominent individuals and thinkers, such as Ray Kurzweil, Alec Ross and Kevin 
Kelly, feel we are at the cusp of the fourth industrial revolution (Ross, 2016; Keely, 2017). The 
problem is the majority of these technologies are still in their very early stages of potential 
usefulness, similar to where the internet was in the late 1990s (Keely, 2017).   
Therefore the massive gains in productivity that need to occur within the next 5–10 years to 
avoid a debt crisis are likely, instead, to be realised in the next 10–20 years, which will likely 
be too late to avoid a debt crisis (Keely, 2017). Furthermore, many prominent individuals feel 
that the disruptiveness of these new technologies will lead to mass joblessness in the medium-
term as it will take considerable time for truck drivers, manufacturing workers, agricultural 
workers etc. to retrain themselves for new industries (Ross, 2016). Therefore the argument is 
that as there will be large temporary unemployment, productivity per worker will be subdued 
until the majority of the workforce has been retrained with the necessary skills to be productive 
in the new future economy (Ross, 2016). While this may be a grim short- to medium-term 
outlook, the good news is that in the long-term the future recovery from a debt crisis should be 
very bright in which standards of living will be far greater than they are today globally (Ross, 
2016; Keely, 2017). However, the issue of excessive indebtedness will first have to be 
addressed by all the key countries.  
If the growth path is to be obtainable, realistically the US needs to grow at a rate of 3–4% for 
the next 10 years while also running budget surpluses over this time. At the minimum, 
assuming growth rates in the 3–4% range, budget deficits at 1–2% maximum can be run, as 
although the total debt will continue to increase, the debt to GDP ratio will decrease as the rate 
of growth is greater than the growth of debt. As shown in Figure 12, growth rates in the US in 
the last 10 years after the GFC have been averaging 2% (World Bank, 2017). More recently, 
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the latest growth rate for the second quarter of 2017 was 3%, which is positive (CNBC, 2017). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is very improbable an average growth rate of 3% for the 
next 10 years can be achieved as President Trump’s budget assumes. Especially as large 
productivity improving legislation has time delays and therefore is likely to be elusive over the 
medium term.   
Finally, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the unorthodox monetary policies that have been 
implemented in the post GFC era have on the whole been successful in generating economic 
growth in the aftermath of the worst economic downturn in 80 years. However, as was 
discussed in the last section, monetary policy decreases in effectiveness the more it is 
implemented. As a result, it is extremely unlikely even larger and bolder monetary policy will 
generate real economic output. Put differently, now 10 years after the GFC, the access and cost 
of obtaining a mortgage or business loan is having negatable impact on potential future 
economic growth.  
As the highly respected political scientists, and head of the American Council of Foreign 
Affair’s Richard Haass explains, the debt situation, like global warming, is a slow-motion crisis 
that lacks the urgency to address the problem until it ultimately is too late (Haass, 2017). As 
just discussed, there does not seem to be the political will, and/or the ability of the US to obtain 
high levels of GDP growth for a substantial period of time in the near to medium term. 
Therefore it is unrealistic and very unlikely that the US will be able to grow their way out of 
their current debt position. As a result, one of the other three options with dealing with debt 
servicing will likely have to be used.  
Austerity Path  
As discussed in Chapter 2, austerity is simply cutting back public expenditure or raising taxes 
in order to balance the budget (Bergsten, 2009). If done aggressively, it entails running budget 
surpluses to pay down the principle debt which has not been achieved since 2000 (US 
Government debt, 2017). The US government can willingly choose to go down this path if the 
fiscally conservative republicans in the freedom caucus can dictate future budgets (King, 
2016). As the 2013 government shutdown showed, the freedom caucus can have major 
influence (The Atlantic, 2013). While a future government shutdown cannot be ruled out, more 
likely than not it will be short-term, as self-inflicted austerity is not politically popular as voters 
do not like taxes being raised, Social Security cut, unemployment benefits slashed, etc. (King, 
2016).  
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More likely, what will force governments to go down this path is when the bond markets force 
governments to do so thanks to the Bond Vigilantes (El-Erian, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 
4, a large reason why debt has been serviceable is due to ZIRP, NIRP and QE policies. This 
has ultimately led to one of the strongest global bond market rallies in history with global yields 
at the lowest they have ever been for most countries, making it incredibly cheap for 
governments to borrow (Kristijan et al., 2016). However, if prime interest rates rise, as they are 
slowly starting to in the US, there is the real risk that the interest payment expense will 
significantly increase (The Telegraph, 2017).  
Rapidly rising interest rates are by no means a threat voiced by permafrost bearish market 
commentators.  Alan Greenspan, ex head of the Federal Reserve, in an August 2017 interview 
is quoted saying,  
By any measure, real long-term interest rates are much too low and therefore 
unsustainable. When they move higher they are likely to move reasonably fast. We 
are experiencing a bubble, not in stock prices but in bond prices. This is not 
discounted in the marketplace (Bloomberg, 2017, Para. 2). 
 Alan Greenspan went on to explain that,  
The real problem is that when the bond-market bubble collapses, long-term interest 
rates will rise. We are moving into a different phase of the economy — to a 
stagflation not seen since the 1970s. That is not good for asset prices (Bloomberg, 
2017, Para. 4).  
In 2016 while refraining from giving a timeline, famed bond investor Bill Gross tweeted, 
“Global yields lowest in 500 years of recorded history … This is a supernova that will explode 
one day” (Financial Times, 2016, Para. 1). Renowned economist Nouriel Roubini, who is 
widely credited in predicting the 2008 GFC in great detail, has warned the problem is a 
“liquidity time bomb” (CNBC, 2015). Finally, the global economic advisory group, The 
Lindsey Group, who are known for being a non-subjective entity, in a 2016 report said when 
referring to the global bond market, “We’re in an epic bubble of colossal proportions” (CNBC, 
2016). Dozens of similar warnings can be found by other prominent individuals and groups.  
The main point being that rapidly rising interest rates, thanks to Bond Vigilantes, should not 
be treated as a one in a hundred-year event, particularly due to the very large sovereign debt 
base (Mitry et al., 2012). What is not clear is whether the Bond Vigilantes will warn 
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governments like they did with Bill Clinton in 1994 or whether they will outright punish them 
like they did Spain and Italy in recent years. In saying this, either way governments will have 
to make tough choices about how to get their fiscal budget in order, assuming they do not want 
to default or inflate their way out of debt.  
Rapidly rising interest rates will finally prevent governments from kicking the can down the 
road, as they have been doing for decades, and force them to make tough budgetary decisions. 
Looking at the US, this will require either significant tax increases, deep budget cuts, the selling 
of assets, and/or a combination of the three. All three options in different ways are painful. 
Realistically, to restore confidence in the bond market and hence ensure debt interest rates stay 
low and manageable, sustained budget surplus in the 1–4% range will be needed over the 
medium- to long-term (El-Erian, 2016).   
Discussed in Chapter 3, on the expenditure side, this will mean budget cuts will have to be 
made to the three biggest expenses. These are healthcare, social security/welfare and military 
expenditure which collectively make up approximately 75% of the entire budget (National 
Priorities, 2016). Cuts to any of these areas will be politically unpopular no matter how they 
find ways to cut expenditure. If they decided to cut food stamps, or at least reduce the amount 
of food it provides to 41,310,785 million Americans as of June 2017, they will be left worse 
off (USDA, 2017). If they decided to reduce the social security cheque, that is going to hurt the 
66.56 million Americans as of June 2017 who receive funds from this programme, many of 
who live pay cheque to pay cheque (Social Security, 2017).  
If Congress repeals Obamacare and chooses not to replace it, according to the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), 32 million people by 2026 will lose healthcare insurance (CNBC, 2017).  
As far as the saving repealing Obamacare would save the taxpayer, this would only amount to 
$473 billion over a 10-year period. While this helps, it is small considering the total deficit is 
$20 trillion (CNBC, 2017). Finally, possibly deep cuts to the military could be found. However, 
to what extent could military cuts be achieved before national security, in the eyes of the 
American hawks, is compromised and thus they reject proposed cuts (Haass, 2017). As can be 
seen, there are no cost-free choices.  
Looking at the tax side, there are a variety of ways in which increases in tax revenue could be 
found. For a start, there are nearly 200 tax loopholes, subsidies and deductions that 
predominantly the rich take advantage of (Pew Research, 2016). Closing loopholes and 
reducing the amount of deductions and subsidies offered would provide a great increase in tax 
 
97 
 
revenue. While some deductibles arguably should remain, such as child care subsidies, a large 
number, such as negative gearing tax deductions, should be reviewed (Pew Research, 2016). 
According to the US Treasury, these tax breaks amount to over $1.3 trillion annually (Pew 
Research, 2016).  
Very rich individuals like Warren Buffett have strongly criticised these tax breaks. In a 2011 
opinion piece, Warren Buffett said, 
 Last year my federal tax bill — the income tax I paid, as well as payroll taxes paid 
by me and on my behalf — was $6,938,744. That sounds like a lot of money. But 
what I paid was only 17.4 percent of my taxable income — and that’s actually a 
lower percentage than was paid by any of the other 20 people in our office. Their 
tax burdens ranged from 33 percent to 41 percent and averaged 36 percent. (The 
New York Times, 2011, Para. 4).  
As a result, if and when the government is backed against the wall, there is potentially a sizeable 
amount of tax that could be generated from the top 0.1% of Americans (El-Eiran, 2016). Likely, 
this option will be far more politically obtainable than targeting the majority of Americans with 
tax increases.  
One area where the American taxpayers were open to being taxed more is a fuel tax 
(Bloomberg, 2017). According to a 2017 Bloomberg survey, 55% of Americans were open to 
a fuel tax as long as the tax was to be solely allocated towards infrastructure expenditure 
(Bloomberg, 2017). At 18.4 cents a gallon for gasoline and 24.4 cents for a gallon of diesel, 
increasing the fuel tax makes a lot of sense and hopefully also dollars, particularly as fuel prices 
are historically low and the fuel tax was last reviewed in 1993 (Bloomberg, 2017). While 
raising the fuel tax is not a magic bullet, it could greatly help pay for badly needed infrastructure 
expenditure (Bloomberg, 2017). Other similar excise taxes on items such as alcohol, cigarettes, 
CO2 emissions etc. could also be potentially reviewed (Bloomberg, 2017).   
Another major area of tax that has to be addressed is the cooperation tax. As of late 2016, there 
was over $2.5 trillion in untaxed income parked overseas (CNBC, 2016). Donald Trump has 
talked about a onetime reduced tax rate if corporations repatriate foreign income which could 
be smart policy to increase tax revenue (CNBC, 2016). Going forward, ways to discourage 
companies in the first place from this practice need to be addressed (CNBC, 2016). Looking at 
individual income tax, while it is relatively high for OECD nations, introducing a millionaire 
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tax at say 50% or higher could be looked at. Steve Bannon, one of Donald Trump’s ex-closest 
advisors, had proposed a 44% tax rate on high income individuals earning $5 million 
(Bloomberg, 2017). However, as of time of writing it does not appear that the Trump 
Administration will follow through with this idea. 
Unlike most OECD countries, the US does not have a federal goods and service tax (GST) (El-
Erian, 2016). Again, this is something that should be considered when the need to increase tax 
revenue becomes apparent. Overall, like expenditure cuts, there is no free lunch. However, 
considering the income inequality in America is the worst in the OECD, going after the ultra-
wealthy may be a socially optimum way to address the debt crisis (El-Erian, 2016). Illustrating 
this point clearly, the four wealthiest American families, as of 2017, are worth more than the 
bottom 40% of American citizens (Huffington Post, 2017). As a result, targeting individuals 
like this seems to be the logical path going forward.  
The last important path of austerity that can be explored is the selling of federal assets. If there 
is a magic bullet for the US debt situation it is that they own a vast array of assets. A 2013 
report found the federal government owns over 900,000 buildings (Institute for Energy 
Research, 2013). These buildings are used for housing government departments such as the 
FBI, NASA, IRS, EPA, etc. (Institute for Energy Research, 2013). A 2009 federal agency study 
found 45,190 federal buildings were being underutilised (Institute for Energy Research, 2013). 
While it is hard to know where this number stands in 2017, as it was a one-off study, no doubt 
there would be tens of thousands of federal buildings that could be sold to generate revenue 
today.  
Looking at land ownership, as of 2013, the Federal government owns 755 million acres of 
onshore subsurface mineral estate and 1.76 billion acres of offshore lands for mineral estate 
(Institute for Energy Research, 2013). Excluding the environmental concerns, selling mineral 
rich federal land to oil and mining companies on a large scale would generate a sizable amount 
of revenue. The latest report by the Energy Information Administration (2016) estimates the 
US proven oil and natural gas reserves stand at 35.2 billion barrels, 324.3 billion cubic feet, 
respectively. Even with oil prices in the $40–60 range and natural gas trading around $3–4 
dollars per one thousand cubic foot, this amount of proven reserves is worth trillions of dollars. 
Therefore if the federal government was willing to sell land where there is proven oil and gas 
reserves, potentially this could help reduce the government’s debt burden. 
 
99 
 
To conclude this subsection, it is important to stress that tough austerity measures by definition 
are painful. The best country that could be used as a case study of the impact of austerity is 
Greece. In the last seven years, standards of living have decreased by 26% as measured by 
GDP per capita (World Bank, 2017). Unemployment at its peak was 28% and has only 
modestly improved to the current level of 23% (World Bank, 2017). Greek pensions have been 
cut 15–20% (Reuters, 2017). Average government salaries have decreased 14.6% between 
2010 and 2015 (Eurofound, 2016). Disappointing for Greece is that due to their GDP 
decreasing to the extent that it has, despite paying off a sizable amount of debt, their debt to 
GDP ratio has actually increased from 170% in 2010 to 179% in 2017. This is true economic 
hell (World Bank, 2017). While the economic pain Greece has experienced is extreme, it cannot 
be ruled out that the US and some of the six countries studied may one day similarly find 
themselves in this situation. Even experiencing half of the economic pain Greece has 
experienced would be dire. Subsequently, the problem of excessive debt should not be taken 
lightly by elected leaders.  
Inflate Away the Debt 
The US, under two different market scenarios, can voluntarily choose to inflate the debt away.  
Firstly, if the Bond Vigilantes revolt by pushing up the cost of borrowing, as was described in 
the last section, inflation will rise (King, 2016). The choice the government and the Fed need 
to make in this scenario is whether to put the economy into a recession/depression by raising 
prime interest rates and implementing austerity, or whether to allow inflation to rise due to a 
self-reinforcing feedback loop (El-Erian, 2016). As was discussed in Chapter 4, this will be 
due to the rise in velocity of money as holders of fiat money become concerned the future value 
will be noticeably less. Additionally, inflation rates will likely accelerate higher if the 
government/Fed decide/need to monetise newly created debt with QE money (King, 2016). 
The common analogy is that once the inflation genie is out of the bottle, it is very hard to put 
it back in (Skarica, 2014). Therefore this path can easily be disorderly, and subsequently very 
hard to manage, as inflation rates quickly spiral to uncomfortably high rates bordering on 
hyperinflationary (Skarica, 2014). This is particularly true if the Fed is too late to intervene to 
slow down inflation (Skarica, 2014). The way to clamp down on inflation is through moral 
persuasion, raising prime interest rates and/or reducing the money supply. The problem is that 
the higher inflation gets, the more aggressive the Fed will have to be to get inflation back in 
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line (Skarica, 2014). Therefore letting inflation rise before clamping down is a policy that could 
be very hard to implement and control if the Fed is behind the curve (Skarica, 2014).  
The second scenario would include the US Government and the Fed choosing to engineer 
inflation in the face of deflation (El-Erian, 2016). As outlined in Chapter 2, both the Debt 
Deflation Theory and the Financial Instability Hypothesis explain how excessive levels of debt 
can lead to a deflation trap/spiral. This, of course, makes the real value of debt worse (King, 
2016). Therefore, thanks to the lessons hopefully learned from the Great Depression in the 
1930s, the government and the Fed will try and engineer inflation to avoid a depression 
(Bergsten, 2009).  
Unlike the first scenario, the government and Fed are trying to engineer inflation instead of 
managing inflation (Skarica, 2014). Or in other words, they are being proactive instead of 
reactive. Therefore, through the use of manipulating interest rates and the size of QE policies 
in a surgical manner, the Fed will have a better chance of being able to achieve a range of 
inflation that is in the sweet spot. For central banks trying to inflate away debt, the ideal rate 
of inflation is in the 3–5% range (Skarica, 2014). This is because it is better to slowly over time 
inflate the debt away instead of trying to do it all at once (Skarica, 2014). If done slowly 
enough, markets and households will not immediately notice that inflation is eroding the value 
of the fiat US dollar, and subsequently its purchasing power (Carbaugh et al., 2008). Even if 
they do notice, as long as the market consensus is that inflation will not rise higher thanks to 
the credibility and strong statements of moral persuasion made by the government and the 
Federal Reserve, households and businesses will not rush to spend money as soon as it is earned 
(Carbaugh et al., 2008). This will keep the velocity of money in check and hence inflation in 
check (Carbaugh et al., 2008).  
However, if the Fed engineers inflation rates that are too high, say in the 10–15% range, there 
is the real risk that the government and Fed will lose its credibility to control inflation (Kristijan 
et al., 2016). This will subsequently lead to a rapid rise in the velocity of money as individuals 
lose faith in the value and purchasing power of the fiat US dollar (Kristijan et al., 2016).  An 
analogy is that it’s like an employee who is more likely to go unnoticed stealing a couple of 
dollars at a time from a till as opposed to stealing $50 at once. Therefore both the US and the 
Fed have to ensure they keep inflation at moderate rates in order to ensure confidence in the 
US dollar as a store of value, and hence its ability to function as a reserve currency, is not lost 
(El-Erian, 2016).  
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As the late famous economist Friedrich Hayek said, “I do not think it is an exaggeration to say 
history is largely a history of inflation, usually inflation’s engineered by governments for the 
gain of governments” (Brainyquote, 2017, Para. 1). Therefore, assuming inflation can 
persistently remain in the 3–5% range, plus assuming the growth in budget deficits is less than 
the rate of inflation, the real value of debt will decrease, which is a positive development for 
the US Government. Numerically an inflation rate of 4% over 10 years will erode the value of 
the dollar by 48%. Put differently, if the $20 trillion dollar debt was to remain constant 
nominally for 10 years, in real terms it would be worth $13.5 trillion in today’s dollars. This, 
of course, would be fantastic for the US government if it could engineer this.  
It’s important to re-stress what was noted earlier in this chapter that as monetary policy has 
already been excessively used the Fed is going to have to be careful when trying to engineer 
inflation as markets may react in ways the Fed does not intend, such as the reaction to the 
‘Taper Tantrum’ speech (El-Erian, 2016). In saying this, if the government and the Fed can 
achieve a moderate rate of inflation without the markets losing confidence in the dollar’s value, 
then this is an attractive and credible way for the US to service its debt (El-Erian, 2016). 
However, it needs to be restressed that this is easier said than done, as inflation can quickly get 
out of hand if credibility is lost (King, 2016).   
Default  
The US defaulting on their debt is the least likely painful option of the three that would be 
implemented by the government. This is due to the fact that the loss in confidence and damage 
to the economy and the US dollar would be a dire self-inflicted wound that likely would make 
economic and financial problems far worse than the original debt crisis. In a 2011 letter to 
Congress, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner outlined the consequences and repercussions 
of such policy. In his letter, he made four key points:  
(1) Defaulting on legal obligations would cause “catastrophic damage to the economy, 
potentially much more harmful than the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009” 
(US Department of the Treasury, 2011).   
(2) Default would place a considerable tax on Americas as all forms of borrowing would 
see their costs increase as the benchmark treasuring borrowing rate would markedly 
rise (US Department of the Treasury, 2011). In Geithner’s words, “Interest rates for 
state and local government, corporate and consumer borrowing, including home 
mortgage interest, would all rise sharply.  Equity prices and home values would decline, 
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reducing retirement savings and hurting the economic security of all Americans, 
leading to reductions in spending and investment, which would cause job losses and 
business failures on a significant scale” (US Department of the Treasury, 2011, Para. 
3). 
(3) Geithner said, “Default would have prolonged and far-reaching negative consequences 
on the safe-haven status of Treasuries and the dollar’s dominant role in the international 
financial system, causing further increases in interest rates and reducing the willingness 
of investors here and around the world to invest in the US” (US Department of the 
Treasury, 2011, Para, 4). 
(4) Finally, Geithner listed key groups that would be adversely impacted by a default. 
These include “U.S. military salaries and retirement benefits; Social Security and 
Medicare benefits; veterans’ benefits; federal civil service salaries and retirement 
benefits; individual and corporate tax refunds; unemployment benefits to states; 
defence vendor payments; interest and principal payments on Treasury bonds and other 
securities; student loan payments; Medicaid payments to states; and payments 
necessary to keep government facilities open” (US Department of the Treasury, 2011, 
Para. 5).  
In his summary, Geithner went on to say, “any default on the legal debt obligations of the US 
is unthinkable and must be avoided” (US Department of the Treasury, 2011, Para. 7). 
Additionally, he added,  
Throughout our history, that confidence has made U.S. Government bonds among 
the best and safest investments available and has allowed us to borrow at very low 
rates. Failure to increase the debt limit in a timely manner would threaten this 
position and compromise America’s creditworthiness in the eyes of the world. 
Given the gravity of the challenges facing the U.S. and world economies, the 
world’s confidence in our creditworthiness is even more critical today (US 
Department of the Treasury, 2011, Para. 9). 
All four points, as well as his concluding remarks, clearly outline the negative consequences 
the US would face if it defaulted on its debt. What makes the US defaulting on its debt even 
more unlikely is that austerity measures and inflating the debt problem away are far better 
options to pursue when trying to service the debt. This is because, while confidence in the 
dollar potentially can be lost with these two options, it is not guaranteed if the government and 
Fed can maintain economic control, whereas a default would all but certainly lead to a complete 
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loss in confidence of the US dollar as a reserve currency in a short amount of time. Therefore 
the only rationale for the US Government to default on their debt is if they are already in a dire 
economic/financial position where confidence in the US dollar has already been lost.  
The final important point is that there potentially is the option for the US Government to default 
on a sub ownership group of US debt. As outlined in Chapter 3, the broad breakdown of sub 
ownership of US debt can be divided by foreign ownership of US debt standing at 
approximately $6.2 trillion, private ownership $5.5 trillion, intergovernmental office 
ownership stands at $5.4 trillion and finally the Fed owning approximately $2.5 trillion 
(Federal Reserve, 2017; US Department of Treasury, 2017). In the realm of speculation, 
potentially, in some capacity, defaulting on the debt owned by the intergovernmental agencies 
and the Fed could be implemented without markets completely losing confidence in the US 
dollar. However, again this is just speculation.   
Summed up succinctly, the US Treasury Secretary at the time, Jack Lew, in a letter to congress 
during the 2013 government shutdown outlined,  
Any plan to prioritize some payments over others is simply default by another 
name. The US should never have to choose, for example, whether to pay Social 
Security to seniors, pay benefits to our veterans, or make payments to state and 
local jurisdictions and health care providers under Medicare and Medicaid. There 
is no way of knowing the damage any prioritization plan would have on our 
economy and financial markets (US Department of the Treasury, 2013, Para. 5). 
 In conclusion, the US defaulting on their debt would truly be a very large black swan event 
that hopefully will never transpire as it would be a certain death to the fiat US dollar in its role 
as a reserve currency.  
Impact on the US dollar’s Role as a Reserve Currency  
As was alluded to earlier in this chapter, large additional fiscal policies implemented in the 
future have the very real potential to lead to a loss in confidence in the US dollar’s ability to 
act as a reserve currency. This is because markets, worried about the government’s ability to 
repay its future debt, will not want to own US dollars, as the value and purchasing power of 
the fiat dollar will be placed in question. Therefore a multi trillion-dollar fiscal stimulus 
package, similar to what was implemented during the GFC, may not be implementable as the 
markets will not allow the US government to continue to borrow. In this case, the US dollar 
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will lose its ability to function as a reserve currency. With this in mind, the government will be 
forced to consider one of the following four options to deal with their debt.   
The first option of growing out of the debt is obviously the most preferable option when trying 
to address and service the debt. This is because the US will be able to continue to enjoy the 
high standards of living they have grown accustomed to without having to make cuts to living 
standards to address the debt problem. However, it is also the hardest of the four options when 
dealing with debt to implement. For argument’s sake, if the US was able to generate growth in 
the 3–4% range over the medium to long-term, as well as also assuming budget surpluses in 
the 3–5% of GDP are achievable for multiple consecutive years, then there is a very strong 
chance the US dollar’s role as the reserve currency will survive. If anything, under the 
conditions described above, the US dollar’s role as the reserve currency would likely 
strengthen. Again, this is hypothetical.  
The second option of deep austerity without question will be very painful to the US, and indeed 
globally, as Greece has shown. In short, it would be akin to another global Great Depression 
or at a minimum another GFC. If the US does go down this path, and does not pursue a path of 
defaulting and/or excessively inflating away the debt problem, it is likely the US dollar’s roll 
as the global reserve currency will remain strong. As the 2008 GFC crisis showed, despite the 
GFC starting from problems with US subprime mortgages, the US dollar strongly appreciated 
in value. This was due to the fact that the US during the crisis was seen as the ultimate safe 
haven currency. Or, as other market commutators quip, the US is the tallest midget, the cleanest 
shirt in the dirty basket, the prettiest girl in the brothel, etc. Therefore if the US chooses a path 
of austerity to address its debt problem, it is highly likely markets will continue to trust and 
view the US dollar as the ultimate safe haven and subsequently its ability to be the key global 
reserve currency.  
If the US decided to inflate their way out of debt, as was discussed, the value, and subsequently 
its role as a reserve currency, depends on the rate of inflation. If inflation remains modest and 
not too high, confidence in the US dollar’s ability to be a store of value will likely remain, even 
if it’s not as strong as it used to be. However, if inflation is too high, there is the risk that there 
will be a run on the US dollar, making it unable to provide the role of being the key reserve 
currency. As discussed in Chapter 1, when inflation in the US during the late 1970s was in the 
10–12% range, there was real concern among market participants that the fiat US dollar was 
incapable of being an effective store of value as evidenced by the rapid rise in gold prices. As 
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a result, the higher rates of inflation that transpire, the greater the risk that markets will stop 
accepting the US dollar as a store of value and hence its ability to function as a reserve currency. 
Finally, as was discussed, the US government defaulting on their debt would all but certainly 
lead to the US dollar being unable to function as a key reserve currency.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there will be another economic/financial crisis. While it may not be directly 
caused from excess debt levels, responding to it with similar fiscal and monetary policies as 
those implemented during the GFC are going to bring the problems of excessive indebtedness 
to the forefront. In other words, governments cannot continue to keep kicking the can down 
the road indefinitely as they will eventually have to deal with excessive indebtedness if debt 
levels continue to increase. As a result, if and when the US finds itself in this situation, the 
ability of the US dollar in its fiat form to continue to act as the global reserve currency will 
depend on which of the four paths the US chooses to address their debt problem. 
The last important area of this thesis to study, in order to determine whether the US dollar will 
remain the key global reserve currency, is to study what currencies may become popular and 
widely acceptable as a reserve currency in the future. World trade will not stop if the US dollar 
ceases to function as the key sole global reserve currency. Consequently, if the US dollar can 
no longer act as the key reserve currency, another currency will have to take its place. In saying 
this, the US has the ability to transform the fiat US dollar towards an intrinsically backed 
currency.  Such a move could shore up confidence in the US dollar’s ability to act as a reserve 
currency even if it experiences a full-on sovereign debt crisis; therefore it is also important to 
explore this option. As a result, before a conclusion can be deliberated as to what degree the 
US dollar is in jeopardy of not being able to continue to facilitate the role of being the key 
global reserve currency, it is vital to study the rise of future currencies and the options the US 
has to transform the US dollar.  
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Chapter 6: The Rise of Potential Future Reserve Currencies  
The last important aspect of the thesis to study and explore is the future potential global reserve 
systems that have the possibility of replacing the US dollar’s role as the current key global 
reserve currency. From a broad view perspective, as to what is considered money, four factors 
have to be present for an asset to be considered a currency. These include being a median of 
exchange, a store of value, a unit of account, and a standard of deferred payment (debt 
ownership/repayment). With these four factors that characterised what is money in 
consideration, the following financial assets will be studied. These include other key 
established global currencies, the Chinese yuan, SDRs, gold backed currencies and cyber 
currencies.  
Other Currencies 
When considering other key potential currency replacements for substituting the USD’s role as 
a reserve currency as of today, the list would be short. Specifically, they would only include 
the euro, yen, pound and, to a far smaller degree, a couple of other influential global currencies 
such as the Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar, and the South Korean won. Finally, 
it’s important to mention the Russian-led actions to create a currency across its Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) to rival the euro need to be considered.  
As was shown in Chapter 1, the euro, being the second largest global currency used as a reserve, 
only makes up 19.7% of total reserves (IMF, 2017). With this percentage it is very unlikely the 
euro will get close to replacing the US dollar’s 64% anytime soon (IMF, 2017). This is 
particularly due to the fact the eurozone collectively is in an equally, if not worse, sovereign 
debt position as the US. Plus, economically the eurozone compared to the US in the post GFC 
collectively struggles with higher levels of unemployment, lower growth rates, and worse 
demographic trends (King, 2016). Therefore it is hard to see the euro being able to supersede 
the US dollar as the sole key global reserve currency (Costiganm et al., 2017).  
Looking at the yen and the pound, with Japan’s demographic problems and record high levels 
of debt, and the United Kingdom’s Brexit escapade, it is not very likely these two currencies 
will come to pose a threat to the US role as the sole key reserve currency (Prasad, 2016). It is 
very important to note, while not a threat to the US dollar’s dominance, the euro, yen and pound 
will for decades to come remain very important global currencies and will still act as minor 
reserve currencies as they do today (Gupta, 2014). Studying the other middle tier currencies 
listed above, none could meaningfully replace the USD’s role as the global reserve currency 
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simply due to their home economies being far too small as a percentage of global trade (Gupta, 
2014). This is not to say these currencies could not grow in global influence and importance. 
They, at best, could rival currencies like the yen and pound in the distant future but not the US 
dollar (Costiganm et al., 2017).    
Finally, one important development that could one day provide a challenge to the US dollar is 
the creation of a common currency in the EEU. The EEU is a Russian-led trading bloc that 
includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (The Diplomat, 2014). They have 
expressed interest in forming a common currency, particularly after the GFC (The Diplomat, 
2014). The strongest and most promising expression of this came from both Russia’s First 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. At the July 2014 
EEU summit Igor Shuvalov said,  
The issue of a common currency will certainly be solved in five to ten years; there 
will be issuing centres and there will be a common currency. We could have 
avoided this if we had not broken the ruble when the Soviet Union collapsed. We 
wrecked our common economic space and now, being independent states, we are 
creating such space again (TASS, 2014, Para. 5).  
A year later at a conference when asked about the EEU, Vladimir Putin said, “The time has 
come to start thinking about forming a currency union.” (The Independent, 2015, Para. 9). 
It is too early to know if the EEU currency will have any meaningful impact on the US dollar.  
If a country like Iran, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, etc. became members, the calculus 
would change (Blackwill, & Harris, 2016). Additionally, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter, it cannot be ruled out that Russia and China could form some type of joint currency in 
the future. A final point on Russia is that their oil dependent economy is a handcuff to the ruble, 
or other Russian backed currency, from gaining increased global influence (Rickards, 2016). 
However, if backed by gold, discussed later in this chapter, this calculus could change. What 
can be said is Russia does not try and hide their intentions to create a rival currency to the US 
dollar.  
Overall, looking at all the other key globally reaching currencies, none look like they will come 
close to pressuring the US dollar’s role as the leading global reserve currency now or in the 
foreseeable future (Pop, 2016). Discussed in Chapter 3, this is particularly evident due to the 
home economies of the eurozone, Japan and the United Kingdom all suffering from sovereign 
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debt problems. This does not mean that these currencies will not be relevant in the future and 
nor does it mean that they cannot act as minor reserve currencies as they currently do (Pop, 
2016). Additionally, it will be important to continue to study Russia’s future currency 
ambitions. But, as of today, and over the medium term, it is of no threat. While none of the 
above are likely to replace the US dollar, there is one currency, namely the Chinese yuan, that 
potentially is capable of one day dethroning the US dollar’s role as the sole key global reserve 
currency.  
Chinese Yuan 
Due to the phenomenal economic growth that China has experienced over the last three 
decades, they have, over time, become economically powerful to the extent that they now are 
starting to conduct a sizeable amount of bilateral trade denominated in yuan instead of US 
dollars. Additionally, China is increasingly becoming a global economic superpower that is 
competing with the US hegemonically. Both facets will be discussed as they are important in 
determining if the yuan could one day challenge the US dollar as a key reserve currency.   
Yuan Denominated Bilateral Trade 
 In December 2011 China and Japan agreed to trade directly yuan for yen and vice-versa when 
trading with each other (Bloomberg, 2011). This agreement between historical rivals makes 
economic sense for the second and third largest global economies (Bloomberg, 2011). As part 
of the announcement, the Japanese Finance Minister Jun Azumi said, “By conducting 
transactions without using the third country's currency, it will bring merits of reducing 
transaction costs and lowering risks involved in settlements at financial institutions” (Reuters, 
2012, Para. 3). While the majority of trade between these two countries is still in US dollars 
due to the yuan not being fully convertible, it is still significant that these two countries are 
willing to trade with each other rather than use the US dollar (Bloomberg, 2011). Going 
forward, as the yuan becomes more convertible, trade between these two countries not using 
the US dollar will likely increase simply due to the massive economic savings that can be 
achieved (Reuters, 2012).  
Shortly after the trade agreement was reached between China and Japan, China started to trade 
with Iran in 2012 in yuan (BBC, 2012). This was in large part due to the fact that China relies 
on Iranian oil and the US had shut Iran from trading in US dollars as part of economic sanctions 
over their nuclear programme (BBC, 2012). As a side note, Iran, in response to President 
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Trump’s Muslim travel ban, has called for eventually stopping all their foreign trade in US 
dollars (Forbes, 2017). Subsequently, going forward, while they have announced a preference 
for euros, it is likely Iran will also increase their trade in yuan when trading directly with China.   
In addition to trading yuan for Iran’s oil, similar deals and transactions have been reached with 
the United Arab Emirates and Qatar for their oil and natural gas in recent years (CNBC, 2017). 
Since the 2015 opening of a Chinese clearing house in Qatar, 590 billion yuan (US$86 billion) 
worth of transactions has taken place with these countries as of April 2017 (CNBC, 2017). 
Although the majority of total oil and gas transactions between China and these nations is still 
financed in US dollars, there is growing acceptance and a willingness from these Middle 
Eastern nations to trade more in yuan (CNBC, 2017). On this subject, the head of the Chinese 
clearing house in Doha said, “As the trade volume between China and the region continues to 
grow in a rapid pace, we are looking forward to seeing more and more usage of RMB in the 
region” (CNBC, 2017, Para. 5). While China trading yuan for Middle Eastern oil is growing, 
the most important yuan oil trade, and indeed yuan denominated trading in general, is with 
Russia.  
In the aftermath of the GFC, and particularly after the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, it is evident 
that Russia and China have formed a strategic partnership with the intention of delegitimising 
and weakening the hegemony of the US dollar’s global role (The Diplomat, 2016). This has 
been seen in a variety of ways, including through closer economic integration. China, for a 
long time, has purchased oil and natural gas from Russia (Bloomberg, 2013). However, there 
has been two major deals that have been reached between each nation in recent years that are 
unprecedented in size. The first was a 25-year $270 billion oil deal agreed to on June 2013 
(Bloomberg, 2013). The second was a 30-year $400 billion natural gas deal that was agreed to 
in May 2014 (The New York Times, 2014). What is particularly significant with these deals is 
that China is paying Russia in yuan (The New York Times, 2014).  
Oil is not the only good that Russia and China trade with each other in yuan. Since 2014, Russia 
and China have agreed to conduct currency swaps with each other (CNBC, 2017). In total 815 
billion rubles and 150 billion yuan so far have been swapped, which allows each country to 
purchase goods from each other (CNBC, 2017). While this is a large amount of currency that 
has been traded between each country, it is not large enough to facilitate all trade between them 
(CNBC, 2017). Therefore both nations still use US dollars for bilateral trade (CNBC, 2017). 
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Going forward, based on the words and intentions expressed by both nations, it’s evident they 
want to increase trade between each other without having to rely on US dollars.  
In addition to rubles and yuan being increasingly traded between Russia and China, there are 
other ways in which both nations are economically integrating with each other that are negative 
for the US dollar (Prasad, 2016). In March 2017 a Chinese clearing bank opened in Moscow 
which is the first of its kind (Global Research, 2017). The clearing bank allows both nations to 
increase their financial bilateral interconnectedness (Global Research, 2017). Specifically, the 
clearing bank creates a pool of yuan liquidity in Russia that allows Russia and China to trade 
in yuan, which subsequently means circumnavigating bi-lateral trade in US dollars (Global 
Research, 2017). Additionally, in the same month, Russia announced that for the first time they 
will be issuing yuan denominated bonds worth the equivalent of approximately US$1 billion 
(CNBC, 2017). 
Without question, China is increasingly trading globally in yuan on a bilateral basis, something 
that is likely to continue. In saying this, there is no meaningful trade being conducted in yuan 
that does not involve China (Prasad, 2016); i.e. Australia is not trading with South Korea in 
yuan. Although this eventually will likely change in the future, particularly if China backs the 
yuan with gold, as will be discussed in the gold section of this chapter (Prasad, 2016). However, 
before that discussion, it is also important to consider the other structural elements and 
measures China has, and continues to take, with regard to competing with the US for global 
economic hegemony.   
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China’s Growing Economic Hegemony  
(In order, the following themes will be covered) 
 
1) The Structural Opening of Their Economy and Financial Markets  
Historically, the Chinese financial market and investment market has been very restricted and 
closed off from the international community. If they ever want to have the yuan act as a true 
global reserve currency, they are going to have to have an open economy and financial system. 
In saying this, China, in recent years, has taken large and substantial steps to open up 
internationally in their ambition to become similar to the highly open and developed financial 
markets that are found in the US, United Kingdom, EU, Japan, etc.  
Firstly, in November 2014, arguably long overdue, China finally allowed all and not just some 
foreign investors to purchase shares on their Shanghai Stock Exchange (Wang, et al., 2015). 
This is very important for China if they want to continue to develop world class companies like 
Alibaba, Huawei and Lenovo, who benefit greatly from going public (Kroeber, 2016). Also, if 
China wants the yuan to act as a reserve currency, it is important to allow foreigners to be able 
to hold their reserves in a liquid asset such as stocks (Prasad, 2016). Additionally, the inflow 
of foreign capital will long-term be of benefit to the Chinese economy if and when it freely 
floats the yuan (Blackwill, & Harris, 2016).  
Secondly, in March 2017, regulators in Hong Kong and China agreed to allow Hong Kong 
traders to purchase Chinese debt (Bloomberg, 2017). However, it is only a one-way trade, 
meaning Chinese on the mainland cannot yet purchase Hong Kong debt (Bloomberg, 2017). 
Additionally, foreign countries cannot yet purchase Chinese debt. However, due to Hong Kong 
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being a key global financial hub, foreigners will be able to purchase Chinese debt indirectly 
through Hong Kong, albeit not as cheaply or efficiently as buying it directly. In the future, 
China has indicated that the long-term goal is eventual full liberalisation and opening of their 
debt mark to the entire world once the Chinese economy is financially and economically 
capable (Prasad, 2016). Again, like the stocks, it is vital China has an open debt market as 
reserve currencies need to allow foreigners the ability to invest their foreign exchange receivers 
(Blackwill, & Harris, 2016).  
 Thirdly, while China has Free Trade Zones, it is challenging for multinationals to invest in 
China as they are required to make strategic investments by partnering with Chinese firms 
(Kroeber, 2016). This often leads to accusations from multinationals that the Chinese 
counterpart is stealing production and trade secrets (Wang, et al., 2015). Many global and US 
multinationals, such as Facebook, Google and Apple, complain vigorously about this restrictive 
investment climate in China (Kroeber, 2016). However, since 2008, China and the US have 
been negotiating on a possible bilateral investment treaty between both countries (Kroeber, 
2016). While such an agreement was close to being agreed on under the Obama administration, 
it still has not been signed as of October 2017 (Kroeber, 2016). However, it does not mean it 
will not happen. Both sides continue to work towards finally reaching an investment agreement. 
Additionally, China is currently negotiating similar types of bilateral investment treaties with 
other key global economies such as the EU, who in July 2017 conducted their 14th round of 
talks (European Commission, 2017). Eventually, as China becomes richer, the need for 
investment treaties will increase. Therefore, in the coming years, China will finally reach 
agreements with investment treaties with key countries globally.   
Fourthly, with regard to free trade agreements, the Chinese have, in recent years, actively 
engaged diplomatically to secure free trade agreements globally. The first developed country 
China signed a free trade agreement with was New Zealand in 2008 (China FTA Network, 
2017). Since then, as of October 2017, in addition to a free trade agreement with ASEAN 
nations, China has 11 other free trade agreements with other countries (China FTA Network, 
2017). Australia, South Korea, Singapore and Switzerland being the most important (China 
FTA Network, 2017). Additionally, along with four other countries, negotiations for free trade 
agreements with Japan, and the six nations that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council, are 
under negotiation (China FTA Network, 2017). Finally, although there is no guarantee it will 
come into existence, China is a part of the 16 Asian nations trying to sign the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); the trade deal that is arguably a direct rival to 
 
113 
 
the TPP (China FTA Network, 2017). Free trade deals are inherently open as by definition they 
mean the reduction of protectionist policies such as tariffs, quotes, etc. As a result, the fact that 
China, in the last 10 years, has been so active in pursuing free trade deals is a strong indication 
of them opening up their economy globally.  
The final point that needs to be made is the strong words of intent China has used to show they 
are serious about continuing to open their economy and financial system. While there are many 
examples of this, two notable examples are as follows. In a parallel universe that would have 
been unimaginable by many in the West just five years ago, China has become the champion 
and main voice of globalisation. At the 2017 Davos World Economic Forum, President Xi 
Jinping in response to the rise in global nationalism said, “We must promote trade and 
investment, liberalization and facilitation through opening up – and say no to protectionism” 
(World Economic Forum, 2017, Para, 6). During October 2017 at the 19th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping told the world,  
China’s open door will not be closed, it will only be opened wider. We will clean 
up rules and practices that hinder a unified market and fair competition, support 
development of private firms and stimulate vitality of all types of market entities 
(Reuters, 2017, Para. 7). 
 Both examples are clear that China plans to continue to open their economy and financial 
markets long-term.  
While China clearly wants to open their economy and financial markets, there is still a long 
way to go for China to be considered an open financial market. The yuan is still pegged to the 
US dollar, capital flow restrictions are still in place for both Chinese and foreign investors and 
foreign ownership still make up a very small percentage of total financial assets owned. 
Additionally, China’s financial regulations need to be improved and clarified as there are many 
questions and concerns foreign investors still face with regard to taxes, ability to withdraw 
funds, legal aspects, etc. However, assuming China remains committed to opening up their 
economy and financial markets, it is likely, in the years ahead, they will be similarly open as 
key western economies and markets are today.   
2) One Belt One Road Project 
Regarded as the “Project of the Century” by Chinese president Xi, the One Belt One Road 
project, also known as the New Silk Road, is the key initiative in helping China achieve its 
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goal of achieving economic hegemony (Kroeber, 2016). Announced on October 2013, this 
multi decade-long project aims to connect up to 60 countries through land and sea routes 
through infrastructure investment in roads, rail links, sea ports, etc (Miller, 2017). Ultimately, 
the intention is to connect Europe and Africa to China to allow effective transportation of goods 
(Kroeber, 2016). Additionally, the development of other crucial infrastructure projects, such as 
dams and power stations, for poor developing nations are also a part of the One Belt One Road 
initiative (Miller, 2017). As it is an open-ended initiative, the final cost is unknown. However, 
estimates of the cost range from $4–8 trillion dollars (Miller, 2017).  
China benefits from this initiative in two key ways. Firstly, by providing subsidised loans, 
cheap Chinese labour, engineering know-how and, in some cases, free development, China is 
able to buy economic favours and influence in the nations they help (Miller, 2017); i.e. Pakistan 
in 2017 announced they will open up the mineral-rich Baluchistan region of the country 
exclusively to China’s ‘Silk Road’ firms (Reuters, 2017). This long-term game of increasing 
their economic hegemony brings the countries China helps closer to them while simultaneously 
driving them away from the US economic influence (Blackwill & Harris, 2016). Secondly, by 
improving the infrastructure route between nations, it is cheaper for China to export their 
manufactured goods while simultaneously reducing the cost of importing key goods such as 
oil and natural gas. Both factors are economically beneficial to the Chinese economy by 
reducing transportation costs.  
As a historical reference, the One Belt One Road project is similar to the US Marshall plan in 
which the US was able to buy influence in Europe by partially paying for the cost of rebuilding 
Europe in the aftermath of WWⅡ (Haass, 2017). This policy is generally regarded as being 
successful in advancing the US interests well into the second half of the 20th century (Haass, 
2017). Crucially, with the US America First stance under President Trump, it is not helping the 
US maintain their global economic position (Haass, 2017). Trump’s threat to terminate free 
trade agreements and the cuts in foreign aid are evidence of this (Haas, 2017). As a result, 
China could close the economic hegemony gap that America enjoys far faster than what would 
have been previously thought possible during the Obama administration, simply as China is 
doing everything to foster economic hegemony whereas the US is not (Haass, 2017).  
3) Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
In 2014 China announced that they will be creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) (The Guardian, 2015). The AIIB was established to provide international loans for 
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development projects for poorer nations, effectively doing the same job the US controlled 
World Bank once did (Financial Times, 2015). The US was originally vocal in urging many of 
its key allies to think carefully about joining the AIIB (The Guardian, 2015), as the US sees 
China trying to increase their global economic hegemony at their expense (Financial Times, 
2015). While not a direct threat, the US was making it clear to countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Australia, South Korea etc., that the US did not want them to join (The 
Guardian, 2015).  
However, with virtually all major US allies joining, the US had to grudgingly change its stance 
(Financial Times, 2015). President Obama would go as far as saying the AIIB “could be 
positive for Asia” (Financial Times, 2015). These words are by no means a ringing 
endorsement but they are also not explicitly antagonistic towards China (Financial Times, 
2015). In saying this, the US continues to express concerns saying that they hope the AIIB 
meets “high standards, particularly related to governance, and environmental and social 
safeguards” (The Guardian, 2015). China has expressed interest in the US joining, saying it 
would be a “good thing” (The Economic Times, 2016). As of October 2017, the US is yet to 
have joined.   
4) BRICS New Development Bank 
Another very important multilateral institution China has helped create is the BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB). With the treaty signed in July 2014, the NDB is an attempt of the 
BRICS nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to compete with the role the 
US-led World Bank facilitates (Kroeber, 2016). Additionally, if one of these five countries was 
to run into financial trouble, this institution can replace the role the IMF traditionally does by 
bailing out one of these nations with cheap loans (Kroeber, 2016). As evidence of its 
importance, Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said the NDB is a “fundamental 
change in global economic and political power” (RT, 2014). While China has only one-fifth 
control of this organisation, it is still a valuable institution, along with the AIIB, to challenge 
the American-led World Bank (NDB, 2017).   
5) China International Payment System 
Known as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the 
US has effectively had a monopoly on the global payment system (Armstrong Economics, 
2016). As has been demonstrated with Iran in response to their nuclear programme, China and 
Russia, who to a degree are at the mercy of the US in this regard, have created their own 
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international payment systems in recent years (Prasad, 2016). Focusing on China’s payment 
system, their system was founded in 2015 and is known as the China International Payment 
System, or the CIPS network (Financial Times, 2015). As of time of writing, 47 nations have 
established financial institutions that can carry out financial tractions with the CIPS network 
(Armstrong Economics, 2016). Compared to the SWIFT system, the CIPS has far less financial 
institutions signed up (Armstrong Economics, 2016). In saying this, the network is established 
and could rapidly and easily be expanded in the future if more financial institutions choose to 
sign up (Financial Times, 2015). 
6) Final Notable Points   
An important point to mention briefly is that President Trump’s decision for the US to withdraw 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) was a self-inflicted wound to the US 
economic hegemony and benefited China (Haass, 2017). Just a week prior to the US 
withdrawal from the TPPA, the Chinese government news agency wrote the TPPA was “the 
economic arm of the Obama administration's geopolitical strategy to make sure that 
Washington rules supreme in the region” (BBC, 2017, Para 4) Although China has been quiet 
on the matter, they will have been very happy with this outcome as crucially China was not a 
potential member and would have missed out on the economic benefits the TPPA promised to 
provide (Haass, 2017). 
Finally, the Chinese yuan becoming the fifth currency to be incorporated as part of the IMF’s 
SDR was an important event. As evidence of China’s growing role and position in the IMF, 
Christine Lagarde in July 2017 said, “If we have this conversation in 10 years’ time...we might 
not be sitting in Washington, D.C. We’ll do it in our Beijing head office” (The New York 
Times, 2017, Para. 2). Her comments implied that the head office of the IMF could be relocated 
from Washington D.C. to Beijing, which as can be imagined, drew criticism from American 
officials and politicians (The New York Times, 2017). More on China’s growing role in the 
IMF will be discussed in the next section.  
In conclusion, it is clear that China, with the help of Russia to a degree, have long-term strategic 
objectives of making the Chinese yuan an economic rival to the US dollar. While arguably not 
there yet, the Chinese yuan has the propensity to rival the US dollar as a key global reserve 
currency. More on this will be discussed in the gold section of this chapter.   
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Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, SDRs are a world currency that was created by the IMF in 1969 
during the backdrop of great uncertainty in the US dollar’s global role (IMF, 2017). With the 
IMF acting as the bank, governments internationally can trade SDRs among each other to settle 
balance of payments (IMF, 2017). With regard to its value, a SDRs value originally was valued 
in gold at 0.888671 grams of fine gold to one SDR (IMF, 2017). After the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods agreement, the five key currencies of the time comprised of the US dollar, 
British pound, French franc, German mark and Japanese yen (IMF, 2017). Each were allocated 
on a weighted basis by the currency’s global influence (IMF, 2017). Today, with the Chinese 
yuan inclusion in October 2016, the five currencies include the US dollar, the euro, yuan, yen 
and pound, making up respectively 41.73%, 30.93%, 10.92%, 8.33%, and 8.09% of a SDRs 
composition (IMF, 2017). This means that as of October 2016, the true value of a SDR is the 
collective value of US$0.58252, €0.38671, 1.0174 Yuan, ¥11.9 and £0.085947 (IMF, 2016).  
The inclusion of the Chinese yuan was a very important development, as it gives the yuan 
legitimacy as an integral global currency. The point of view of the Chinese, in a statement made 
by the People’s Bank of China, they said, “The inclusion into the SDR is a milestone in the 
internationalization of the renminbi, and is an affirmation of the success of China’s economic 
development and results of the reform and opening up of the financial sector” (Business Insider, 
2016, Para. 4). The director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, highlights and articulately explains 
the significance of this event by saying,  
The Renminbi’s inclusion reflects the progress made in reforming China’s 
monetary, foreign exchange, and financial systems, and acknowledges the 
advances made in liberalizing and improving the infrastructure of its financial 
markets. The continuation and deepening of these efforts, with appropriate 
safeguards, will bring about a more robust international monetary and financial 
system, which in turn will support the growth and stability of China and the global 
economy (IMF, 2016, Para. 15).  
Christine Lagarde’s comments are very important as it shows the growing reality that China is 
likely going to continue to gain global financial influence.  
Looking at the amount of SDRs in circulation, the first allocation was a total of 9.3 billion 
SDRs which were distributed between 1970 and 1972 (IMF, 2017). The second allocation was 
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an additional 12.1 billion distributed between 1979 and 1981 (IMF, 2017). Finally, the latest, 
and by far the largest, allocation was 161.2 billion additional SDRs which was conducted on 
August 28, 2009 (IMF, 2009). This allocation was in the immediate aftermath of the GFC and 
was conducted to ensure there was enough liquidity globally to facilitate world trade if there 
was a global credit crunch or a run on the US dollar (IMF, 2009). If there is a complete run on 
the US dollar, it would not be surprising to see another large allocation of new SDRs, like what 
transpired in 2009 in order to ensure there is ample global liquidity.  
One key difference between SDRs and normal conventional currencies is that only 
governments can own, buy or sell SDRs (Dailami et al., 2014). Therefore, in its current form, 
SDRs would not be a suitable replacement as a global currency in its present form, at least not 
for businesses and households that purchase goods globally (Dailami et al., 2014). In saying 
this, there is nothing preventing SDRs from being used as the main reserve currency to balance 
trade payments between governments (Chey, 2012). This would likely happen in the event of 
a run on the US dollar (Chey, 2012). Whether the SDR would permanently replace the US 
dollar only temporarily fill the void, or whether the SDR would be used as a transition currency 
to allow the rise of another reserve currency, such as a gold backed yuan or the rise of a cyber 
currency, remains to be seen (Costiganm et al., 2017). In short, the SDR can be considered an 
insurance currency ready to facilitate the role of reserve currency of last resort in times of great 
economic uncertainty (Costiganm et al., 2017).  
Gold  
In the wake of the GFC, some world leaders have called for the reestablishment of currencies 
backed by gold instead of the fiat currencies we have today. As was briefly discussed in Chapter 
1, there were many benefits for the US when the US dollar was backed by gold. These included 
stable prices, exchange rate predictability and general level of confidence. As was studied in 
Chapter 5, the debt position and the unorthodox monetary policies that have been implemented 
in the post GFC era have reduced confidence in the value of these fiat currencies value due to 
the risk of the Bond Vigilantes concept.   
This problem could be solved by tying these fiat currencies back to a gold standard as owners 
of these currencies will have assurance their physical currency could be converted to the 
intrinsically valued gold on request (Rickards, 2016). Additionally, a gold standard keeps 
governments spending, and hence debt issuing, in check as excessive government expenditure 
is inflationary (Rickards, 2016). With moderate to high levels of inflation, holders of currency 
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are incentivised to convert their paper dollars to the comparatively nominally cheaper fixed 
gold price (Rickards, 2016). These market forces are what keeps government expenditure in 
check (Rickards, 2016). As a result, there is definitely the possibility of today’s key fiat 
currencies, including the US dollar, being converted back to a gold standard, particularly if 
there is a crisis of confidence and a run on these fiat currencies (Rickards, 2016).    
At the 2009 Arab League Summit in Doha, the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi proposed that 
African and Muslim nations create an international gold-based currency for the purpose of 
trading oil (Forbes, 2016). This obviously would be negative for the US petrodollar system and 
therefore the US dollar as a global reserve currency (Foreign Policy Journal, 2016). Evidence 
from leaked emails from Hillary Clinton, when she was Secretary of State, show that stopping 
Gaddafi’s gold backed currency plans played a part in the decision to overthrow Gaddafi in 
2011, instead of just on humanitarian grounds as was the official justification (Foreign Policy 
Journal, 2016). Similar parallels have been drawn to the former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, 
who was toppled by the US in 2003 (Foreign Policy Journal, 2016). Before he was overthrown, 
the Iraqi leader refused to trade Iraqi oil for US dollars due to, in his words, “not wanting to 
deal in the currency of the enemy” (Time, 2000).  
In 2010 the president of the World Bank grabbed a considerable amount of attention from 
global leaders when he called on G20 nations to consider the idea of implementing a Bretton 
Woods 2.0 system (Financial Times, 2010). In his address Robert Zoellick said, 
 The system should also consider employing gold as an international reference 
point of market expectations about inflation, deflation and future currency values. 
Although textbooks may view gold as the old money, markets are using gold as an 
alternative monetary asset today (Financial Times, 2010, Para. 6). 
 Robert Zoellick’s words are particularly notable coming from an institution that is heavily 
influenced by the US.   
Some countries have even gone as far as already implementing a gold standard. In a world first 
in the fiat currency age, in 2016, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) have created a Shari’ah gold standard (Bloomberg, 2016). This 
new currency can be used for up to $1.88 trillion in Islamic financial transactions that are lawful 
with the Islamic religion (Bloomberg, 2016). While it is not a currency denominated to one 
specific country, as countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, etc. can use it, it 
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is still an important development that could pave the way for more established currencies 
converting to a gold standard (Bloomberg, 2016).  
Although the Shari’ah gold standard is a significant first step in a potential transition to gold 
backed currencies, the most influential movement towards this initiative have been those 
carried out by Russia and China and, to a smaller degree, Iran and the other BRICS nations. 
The rest of this section will focus on the actual gold owned by the seven countries studied in 
this thesis along with Russia and China. Following this, words and actions of Russia, China 
and the US with regards to potentially implementing a gold standard will be discussed. Finally, 
a brief point with regard to multiple gold backed currencies will be discussed to conclude this 
section of the chapter.  
Total Governmental Ownership of Gold 
Looking at Figure 46, all seven key countries studied in this thesis show that their gold holdings 
have not changed in the last 17 years, with the exception of France and Spain who have 
modestly decreased their holdings (World Gold Council, 2017). At 8,133.5 tonnes of gold, the 
US is by far the biggest owner of gold globally. Studying Figure 47, it is very clear that unlike 
western nations, Russia and China are increasing their ownership of gold. Russia’s increase in 
holdings of gold started around the GFC (World Gold Council, 2017). In the last 10 years, 
Russia’s gold holdings have increased steadily from approximately 400 tonnes to the current 
1,680 tonnes (World Gold Council, 2017). This is particularly noticeable as Russia has 
prioritised building up their gold reserves in recent years despite the collapse in oil price and 
the implementation of western sanctions that have noticeably hit the Russian economy hard 
(Rickards, 2016).   
China, which does not publish their gold holdings regularly, has over the last 17 years seen its 
holdings increase from approximately 400 tonnes to over 1,842 tonnes as of October 2017 
(World Gold Council, 2017). While both Russia’s and China’s gold holdings are far smaller 
than the US’s 8,133 tonnes or Germany’s 3,377 tonnes, they have made remarkable progress 
in closing the gap since the GFC (World Gold Council, 2017). It’s also important to note that 
China and Russia are the first and third biggest miners of gold respectively and continue to 
increase their gold mining capacity (World Gold Council, 2017). While these efforts to increase 
gold holdings are important, it’s the words from Russian and Chinese governmental officials 
that are most telling of both countries’ intentions.   
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Russia  
Starting with Russia, at a G8 currency meeting in 2009, the Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev held up a gold coin where he was quoted as saying this “is an example of a future 
world currency” (Forbes, 2016). These comments were framed in the context of Russian 
dissatisfaction with the US dollar, particularly as the Russians viewed the US largely 
responsible for the GFC. Additionally, at this meeting, the Russian delegation voiced their 
support for a gold backed SDR that would also “logically” include rubles and yuans (Forbes, 
2016). The strongest words of Russia’s disapproval of the US dollar came from Vladimir Putin 
on numerous occasions. In one instance, in 2011, he was quoted as saying, 
 They (the US) are living beyond their means and shifting a part of the weight of 
their problems to the world economy. They are living like parasites off the global 
economy and their monopoly of the dollar. Countries like Russia and China hold a 
significant part of their reserves in American securities. There should be other 
reserve currencies (Reuters, 2011, Para. 7). 
While words matter, Russia has to be pragmatic. As at time of writing, the Russian economy 
is only the twelfth biggest in the world, they are heavily economically sanctioned by the West, 
their economy is far too dependent on natural resources such as oil and they have very 
unfavourable long-term demographic trends (Haass, 2017). As a result, it is very unlikely a 
gold backed ruble by itself could dethrone the US dollar as the key global reserve currency. 
Expressed differently, in the future, it’s very unlikely Europeans will demand Russian rubles 
when trading with Japan, Australia, US, etc. In saying this, as Europe realises, on Russian oil, 
this economic weapon, which has been applied twice in the winter months of 2006 and 2009, 
could effectively force European nations to trade with Russia in rubles in the future. Therefore, 
at best the Russians could only demand all trade with them be done in gold backed rubles. With 
the above points in mind, the best way Russia can undermine the US dollar as the key global 
reserve currency is to form a closer economic alliance with China, which they are doing. 
 As was mentioned in the Chinese yuan section, Russia is opening up clearing banks in Beijing 
and is now issuing yuan denominated bonds. In addition to these moves, both Russian and 
Chinese economic and financial officials are increasingly working closer together on the 
currency front. In 2015 the Russian Central Bank chief, after meeting his Chinese counterpart, 
said, 
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 We discussed the question of trade in gold. The BRICS countries are large 
economies with large gold reserves and impressive volumes of production and 
purchase of this precious metal. In China, gold is traded in Shanghai, in Russia, 
Moscow. Our idea is to create a link between these sites in order to intensify trade 
between our marketplaces (Sputnik, 2016, Para. 8).  
A year later, when the Russian and Chinese Bank officials met again, the Russian Bank stated, 
“The Russia and the People’s Bank of China are working on a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) on gold trading, in order to solve technical problems for China to import Russian gold” 
(Reuters, 2017, Para. 3). Therefore, looking forward, it is going to be very important to closely 
watch the increasing integration and cooperation of Russia and China on the currency front.  
China 
Focusing on China, in May 2015, the Chinese government announced they had established a 
state-owned Gold Investment Fund (Reuters, 2015). The aim of this fund is to invest in gold 
mining projects as part of the One Belt One Road project (Reuters, 2015). With initial funds of 
$16 billion, it is the largest gold investment fund in the world (Reuters, 2015). Additionally, 
this fund complemented China’s Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) by increasing its trade in 
gold. The long-term goal for the SGE is to make the SGE available to foreign financial 
institutions and governments. 
 In September 2016 Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank, was granted membership to trade gold on 
the SGE (Reuters, 2017). Shortly after, VTB, another large Russian bank also gained access to 
the SGE to trade physical gold (Reuters, 2017). In June 2017, it was announced that the SGE 
would be opening a Budapest branch; the first overseas branch (South China Morning Post, 
2017). Over time, there will likely be more financial institutions and countries that sign up with 
the SGE to physically trade gold (CNBC, 2016). As of late 2017, the SGE is now the world’s 
largest physical bullion exchange ahead of the London Gold Exchange (Reuters, 2017). While 
the trading of physical gold internationally is an important milestone, there is a more efficient 
way to do so without having to actually physically move the gold. This can be done by trading 
gold backed yuan-futures. 
A financial future is a contract that obligates the seller to sell an asset or the buyer to purchase 
an asset, such as commodities or other financial instrument, at a prearranged price and future 
date (Investopedia, 2017). So a gold backed yuan future allows a buyer to purchase an X 
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amount of goods and pay for the goods as a predetermined price denominated in yuan at a 
predetermined future to the seller (Investopedia, 2017). Being backed by gold, if a holder of 
these yuan futures wants to convert it to physical gold they can do so through the SGE. 
Otherwise, as most investors will likely choose, they will be content holding yuan with the 
insurance and knowledge that they can convert it to gold at any time if they choose to.  
In April 2016 the Chinese government announced the SGE would offer such gold back yuan 
futures (CNBC, 2016). This is a major development that and is the strongest indication that 
China is planning on one day fully backing the yuan to gold. A year later, in July 2017, the 
Chinese government announced that they were going to implement a gold backed yuan future 
specifically for oil (South China Morning Post, 2017). As China is the world’s biggest oil 
importer, this will be very beneficial to them not having to use the US dollar to purchase a vital 
commodity (South China Morning Post, 2017). Going forward, assuming this gold back yuan 
future and its oil variant are successful it would not be unreasonable to expect the yuan itself 
to be backed by gold. Time will tell but without question gold backed yuan futures are a very 
important step.  
United States  
Looking at the US, influential individuals appear to be opening up to the idea of reinstating the 
US dollar on a gold standard. However, as   Starting with President Trump, in a November 
2016 interview he said, “Bringing back the gold standard would be very hard to do, but boy, 
would it be wonderful. We’d have a standard on which to base our money” (The New York 
Times, 2016, Para. 3). It’s important to note that it is unclear to the degree of President Trump’s 
understanding on the matter as he said in the same interview, “We don’t have the gold. Other 
places have the gold” (The New York Times, 2016, Para. 3). When in reality, the US has more 
gold than the next three governments combined (World Gold Council, 2017). Nonetheless, it 
is still very notable that President Trump suggested this, as his ‘shoot from the hip’ unorthodox 
approach to politics suggests he is more likely than prior presidents to implement such a 
consequential decision.   
On the 2016 campaign trail, both republican candidates, Ted Cruz and Rand Paul, made 
campaign promises to place the US dollar on a gold standard if they were elected (The Atlantic, 
2015). On the campaign trail Ted Cruz said on the matter, “Instead of adjusting monetary policy 
according to whims and getting it wrong over and over again and causing booms and busts, 
what the Fed should be doing is ... keeping our money tied to a stable level of gold” (The 
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Atlantic, 2015, Para 2). In additional to politicians, there have been dozens of influential 
economists and financial titans who have also called for a gold standard. Some of which include 
Jim Rickards, George Soros, Marc Faber and Kenneth Rogoff who think all emerging markets 
should adopt a gold standard. However, arguably one of the most important supporters for the 
gold standard is the ex-head of the Fed, Alan Greenspan. 
In Greenspan’s view, if the US was still on a gold standard it would not be in the debt situation 
it finds itself in today. He specifically said, 
 Today, going back on to the gold standard would be perceived as an act of 
desperation. But if the gold standard were in place today we would not have 
reached the situation in which we now find ourselves. We cannot afford to spend 
on infrastructure in the way that we should. Much such infrastructure would have 
to be funded with government debt. We are already in danger of seeing the ratio of 
federal debt to GDP edging toward triple digits. We would never have reached this 
position of extreme indebtedness were we on the gold standard, because the gold 
standard is a way of ensuring that fiscal policy never gets out of line (Business 
Insider, 2017, Para. 5). 
 Although he is a retired central banker, it is still noteworthy, as he still is a highly respected 
individual whose opinion carries weight to this day with key Fed decision makers.  
However, it’s also important to note that more critics and individuals of influence are against 
the US adopting a gold standard than are for it. Some include Nobel prize-winning economists 
Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, as well as other prominent individuals, such as Nouriel 
Roubini and Warren Buffett. Most influentially, current Fed Chairlady Janet Yellen and former 
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke are against the idea. Ben Bernanke has been quoted as saying, 
 Since the gold standard determines the money supply, there is not much scope for 
the Central Bank to use monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Under a gold 
standard, typically the money supply goes up and interest rates go down in a period 
of strong economic activity — so that's the reverse of what a Central Bank would 
normally do today (Reuters, 2012, Para. 6).  
While there are more influential individuals who are against adopting a gold standard than 
those for adopting a gold standard, the fact that it has become a discussion in the political and 
academic communities is notable. Prior to the GFC, only fringe economists discussed the 
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merits of adopting a gold standard (Eichengreen, 2012). However, as was discussed, in the 
event of a run of fiat currencies, converting back to a gold standard could be the answer to 
generate confidence. When faced with such a scenario, critics will still have legitimate concerns 
about adopting a gold standard. It’s likely they will want a lesser of two evils compared to 
completely letting the fiat currencies crash. Many of the vocal critics today may change their 
opinions on the subject when faced with a crisis of confidence.  
With regard to the feasibility of converting the US dollar back to a gold standard, some 
individuals claim there is not enough gold to back a currency. But with 8,133.5 tonnes of gold, 
the US owns more than enough to do so (Rickards, 2016). This is because a gold standard does 
not require a 100% gold to dollar ratio (Rickards, 2016); i.e. if gold was back at 40%, as it was 
mandated by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, there can be $2.50 of paper currency in 
circulation for every $1 in gold (Rickards, 2016). Additionally, if the US was to go back to a 
gold standard, the nominal price of gold would have to nominally be valued far higher than its 
current price of roughly $1,300 an ounce (Gold Price, 2017). 
As a back of an envelope calculation, assuming a 40% backing ratio, the price of gold would 
be valued in nominal terms at $6,070 an ounce today. This value is derived by dividing the 
current monetary base of $3.95 trillion by the 260.3 million ounces owned by the US 
government multiplied by 0.40 (FRED, 2017). Therefore the issue is not whether there is 
enough gold supply for a gold standard, there is. The question is what the backing would have 
to be to instil enough public confidence in the system and what the convertible nominal price 
of gold should be (Rickards, 2016).  
Multiple Gold Backed Currencies 
The last important point to discuss is that there is nothing preventing multiple nations 
implementing their own gold backed currency. At US$1,300 an ounce, the US gold holdings 
value as a percentage of GDP is 1.82% (Ottawa Bullion, 2017). Compared to Russia, China, 
the eurozone, Japan and the United Kingdom, their gold holding values as a percentage of GDP 
are 5.6%, 1.5%, 3.6%, 0.65% and 0.50%, respectively (Ottawa Bullion, 2017). The most 
glaring number is Russia’s 5.6% which is three times larger than the US (Ottawa Bullion, 
2017). Russia, by having this much gold, gives them more legitimacy and would provide more 
confidence in holders of rubles as they could have a higher gold backed ratio. This is important 
for Russia as the ruble is relatively more of a fringe currency than the other key global 
currencies.  
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Additionally, if China keeps acquiring gold at the rate that they have been they will, in the 
coming years, reach parity with the US, which will be symbolically important if there is a 
global rush to back currencies with gold. As a result, even if the US dollar one day is backed 
by gold, there could also be a gold back yuan and a gold backed ruble for the US dollar to 
compete with. As gold is gold, in this potential future scenario, the US dollar may have to 
compete with other nations for the title of having their currency act as the sole key reserve 
currency. Alternatively, in the future there may be a world in where there is no sole key reserve 
currency and instead there is a world in which two, three, four, etc. currencies are used for the 
vast majority of all global financial transactions.  
 
Cyber Currencies  
The most popular cyber currency, Bitcoin, was created in 2009 by a mysterious 
programme/group of programmes under the name of Satoshi Nakamoto (Narayanan, Bonneau, 
Felten, Miller, & Goldfeder, 2016). At the time, it was hard to consider bitcoin as a currency 
as it did not meet the characterisation of a median of exchange as no merchant accepted it as a 
form of payment (Narayanan et al., 2016). However, bitcoin first found a niche market with 
drug dealers and other illegal activities due to its untraceable nature (Narayanan et al., 2016). 
Over time, more and more merchants have started to accept bitcoin, with estimates of over 100-
150k merchants globally accepting bitcoin as payment in 2017 (Narayanan et al., 2016). 
Additionally, with the success of bitcoin, other cyber currencies have been created.  As of 2017, 
there are dozens of other cyber currencies that have unique characteristics including ethereum, 
ripple and litecoin (Coinmarketcap, 2017).  
Since the start of 2017, bitcoin has risen in value by over 500% in value while ethereum is up 
over 4,000% (Charts, 2017). These remarkable growth rates have subsequently attracted a 
considerable amount of attention by the financial media and market commentators who are not 
shy about predicting the future value of bitcoin and cyber currencies in general. Saxo Bank 
analysis Kay Van-Petersen, who correctly predicted that bitcoin would hit $2,000 when it was 
trading at $700, now predicts it will be worth $100,000 in 10 years (CNBC, 2017). Jeremy 
Liew, the first investor in Snapchat, and Peter Smith, the Blockchain CEO and cofounder, both 
believe bitcoin could be worth $500,000 by 2030 (Business Insider, 2017).  
These predictions are on the high end and do not reflect the majority position. Additionally, 
there are plenty of bears on cyber currencies, such as billionaire Howard Marks who calls 
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bitcoin a “pyramid scheme”, billionaire Mark Cuban who calls bitcoin a “bubble” and JP 
Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon who thinks anyone buying bitcoin is an “idiot” (CNBC, 2017; 
CNBC, 2017). What cannot be denied is that bitcoin, and cyber currencies in general, are not 
a fad and nor are they likely to go away in importance. The big unknown going forward is 
whether cyber currencies could be the key global reserve currency, an important minority 
reserve currency or just a fringe currency in the future.  
Cyber Currency Benefits  
There are two key innovative technological breakthroughs that cyber currencies have brought 
forth that will ensure cyber currencies remain relevant with regard to future currencies. The 
first technological breakthrough is the blockchain technology which is the vital feature that 
makes cyber currencies safe from manipulation (Narayanan et al., 2016). Looking at bitcoin, a 
bitcoin is a continuously growing list of records of every single transaction ever conducted in 
the past (Narayanan et al., 2016). Every 10 minutes, all transactions are updated across the 
entire network of bitcoins (Narayanan et al., 2016). This means that when a bitcoin transaction 
is conducted, in order for it to be approved, the bitcoin being traded has to match every other 
bitcoin globally (Narayanan et al., 2016). This peer to peer verification ensures that bitcoins 
cannot be hacked, stolen or manipulated as any tampering of a bitcoin would make it different 
from the entire network of bitcoins; hence making them useless (Narayanan et al., 2016).  
This ingenious system is what provides trust and faith in the system (Ross, 2016). It’s important 
to note that bitcoins can be stolen if passwords to one’s bitcoin account (bitcoin wallet) are not 
secure (Ross, 2016). In effect, it is possible to be robbed outside the bank but it’s impossible 
to rob the bank itself. This means, in theory, it’s impossible for a hacker to conduct a system 
wide hack of the bitcoin network or for any individual for that matter, assuming they do not 
have the individual’s password (Narayanan et al., 2016). This blockchain innovation system is 
revolutionary and is already finding other uses in other fields such as artificial intelligence, the 
recording of medical records, electricity market, property markets etc (Ross, 2016). As a result, 
blockchain technology and its inherent security aspect make cyber currencies a legitimate 
potential global reserve currency.   
The second very important technological breakthrough cyber currencies bring is that they 
mimic a gold standard due to their finite supply. Looking at bitcoin, in total there will one day 
be a maximum of 21 million bitcoins in circulation (Narayanan et al., 2016). Currently, 14 
million have been ‘mined’ with the last one to be mined set to occur in 2140 (Narayanan et al., 
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2016). To mine a bitcoin, a computer is required to solve complex mathematical problems with 
its processing power (Narayanan et al., 2016). The more computer processing power, the more 
bitcoins that can be mined (Narayanan et al., 2016). Professional bitcoin miners used tens of 
thousands of computers to do just this (Narayanan et al., 2016). The genius of the system is 
that the more bitcoins that are mined, the more processing power is required to mine the next 
coin (Narayanan et al., 2016). This mimics gold.  
Originally, gold was easy to find as it was on the earth’s surface located in river beds 
(Narayanan et al., 2016). Once more miners (computers) started to mine for gold (bitcoins), the 
low-lying fruit disappeared. To continue to get gold (bitcoins), miners had to start digging 
deeper (needed more computer power) which costs more (Narayanan et al., 2016). This, in turn, 
leads to higher prices for gold (bitcoins) (Narayanan et al., 2016). Under a gold standard, if the 
world economy is booming, the price of gold increases, causing more miners to mine for gold 
(Rickards, 2011). If the world economy is contracting, the price of gold decreases making gold 
unprofitable to mine (Rickards, 2011). This self-stabilising dynamic is what makes a gold 
standard attractive as it leads to stable prices as long as the dollar to gold ratio is set 
appropriately (Rickards, 2011). As cyber currencies possess the same dynamics as gold, in 
theory there is nothing preventing cyber currencies providing the same benefit that a gold 
standard would (Rickards, 2016).     
Governments’ Response to Cyber Currencies  
There is the potential for governments globally to crackdown and prevent the use of bitcoin as 
a legitimate form of payment (Ross, 2016). This is because it is very hard/near impossible for 
central banks to control cyber currencies as they are a peer to peer network that does not require 
a central bank to issue the currency (Ross, 2016). Additionally, concerns about money 
laundering and the ability to collect tax on cyber currency transactions remain (Ross, 2016). 
However, there is a growing trend of nations globally officially accepting the use of cyber 
currencies as legitimate currencies (Ross, 2016). With this being said, while cyber currencies 
are being recognised as legitimate, there is a rising trend of nations implementing regulations 
on the use of cyber currencies (CNBC, 2017). China, Japan, United Kingdom and Australia are 
all globally significant nations that have recently taken such measures (CNBC, 2017). 
Venezuela, with its economic and political struggles, has gone as far as making it illegal to 
trade in bitcoins (CNBC, 2017). However, a lot of market participants feel growing global 
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regulatory pressure is a good thing as it shows governments are recognising cyber currencies 
as legitimate currencies (CNBC, 2017).    
A final important aspect to consider with cyber currencies is that there is a growing trend of 
nations striving to create a cashless society (Rickards, 2016). Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands are leading the way with Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands aiming to be 
completely cashless by 2020 (Rickards, 2016). Another example is India who, in one day in 
2016, took 86% of the money base out of circulation (Bloomberg, 2016). There are clear 
benefits for governments transitioning towards a cashless society, such as cracking down on 
black markets and tax evasion (Merki, 2015). It may only be a matter of time before it happens 
globally (Merki, 2015). While these are digital currencies, they are not the same as cyber 
currencies as they do not incorporate blockchain technology (Ross, 2016). Additionally, they 
do not possess characteristics of a gold standard, as there is nothing stopping these nations 
printing digital money (QE) as the money base is not finite like bitcoins’ 21 million coins 
(Rickards, 2016). 
Going forward, as governments continue to transition towards a cashless society, there is 
nothing stopping them from incorporating both blockchain technology and the gold standard 
aspect of scarcity that cyber currencies have (Rickards, 2016). Indeed, China and Russia have 
only just recently announced that this is their intention. In February 2017, after three years of 
research, China’s Central Bank announced that they have test run the use of a Chinese cyber 
currency that “one day soon” will be implemented (Bloomberg, 2017). The deputy chief of the 
Russian Central Bank, Olga Skorobogatova, at the June 2017 St Petersburg Economic Forum 
said, “It's time to develop national crypto currencies, this is the future” (BRICS Business 
Council, 2017). As part of this speech she announced that the Russian Central Bank is working 
on creating their own national cyber currency (BRICS Business Council, 2017). Other 
prominent countries that are researching the use of cyber currencies include Germany, Canada 
and Singapore (Bloomberg, 2017).  
As of October 2017, the US government has been quiet on the matter. However, if there is a 
future run on the US dollar, or any other currency for that matter, implementing a government 
controlled cyber currency arguably would be a viable way to restore confidence (Ross, 2016). 
There are many questions that would have to be addressed for this to happen, such as how to 
deal with sovereign debt, what the conversion rate would be between the fiat and new cyber 
currency, whether both currencies would trade in tandem, etc. (Costiganm et al., 2017). 
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Nevertheless, assuming these issues can be addressed and overcome, a US or Chinese backed 
cyber currency could very well act as a future global reserve currency.    
Conclusion 
It is clear that there are many developments that will have an influence on what future global 
currencies will look like. Considering the debt and monetary policies that have been 
implemented globally, it is improbable the current fiat currencies globally will continue to be 
the status quo over the long-term. To recap, the other minor reserve currencies of today are 
unlikely to become the key reserve currency as the home nations of these currencies have 
similar levels of debt and have implemented extraordinary levels of unorthodox monetary 
policy like the US. The SDR should be considered as an insurance currency to ensure that there 
will always be a reserve currency of some form. While it could be widely used in the aftermath 
of a future global crisis, it would likely only be used to buy time until the global economic 
superpowers can work out a perinate solution to the crisis.  
As was discussed, China is increasingly conducting world trade in yuan which inherently 
weakens the US dollar’s role in being the key global reserve currency. Additionally, it is very 
apparent that China’s global economic hegemony is increasing and likely to continue to do so. 
However, a fiat yuan by itself is unlikely going to be able to function as a sole key global 
currency. The last two potential future reserve currencies are a gold backed currency and cyber 
currencies. In addition to acquiring large amounts of gold over the last 15 years, both Russia 
and China are telegraphing through words and actions that they may back their currency by 
gold in the future. If this was to happen, these new currencies would gain a considerable amount 
of legitimacy globally due to their intrinsic value. Importantly, there is nothing stopping the 
US from also pegging the US dollar to gold. Therefore it is very possible there could be multiple 
gold backed currencies in the future. In this scenario, the US dollar and Chinese yuan would 
likely share the role of being the key reserve currency globally.  
Finally, 2017 has been a year where cyber currencies have gained a considerable amount of 
legitimacy globally. Or at the very least, are now widely talked about in financial and economic 
circles. There is the real possibility that bitcoin could be the key future global reserve currency. 
However, as mentioned, governments have started cracking down on cyber currencies for a 
variety of reasons. More likely, governments may issue their own cyber-backed currency, as 
China and Russia are experimenting with, to take advantage of the innovative block chain 
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technology. Again, like a gold standard, the US could also back the US currency to a cyber 
currency to counteract China and Russia if they do so in the future.  
 Going forward, the transition to a new global reserve currency will likely happen in one of two 
ways. Firstly, likely in the event of a global crisis of financial confidence, it would not be 
surprising to see a Bretton Wood 2.0 conference taking place to determine what the future 
global monetary system will look like. In this environment the US would have to make 
consensus demands from China, and to a lesser extend the Russians, in having their currencies 
play a greater role globally than they do today. However, the US would likely still be able to 
maintain the US dollar’s role as a key reserve currency albeit in a diminished role than what it 
experiences today.   
The second potential path towards transitioning to a new global reserve currency could come 
from China and Russia proactively undermining the US dollar. As mentioned, this could be 
done by these countries backing their currencies by either gold or a cyber currency. In this 
environment the US will have to be reactive to these developments by also backing their 
currency to gold or to a cyber currency. While the US dollar likely would be able to maintain 
its reserve currency status, it would be less influential than it is today. 
Between these two options, it would be in the US interest to be proactive by initiating a Bretton 
Wood 2.0 conference as the US would be able to have a considerable amount of influence in 
dictating the future of the global monetary order. Put differently, there will be a considerable 
first mover advantage. As a result, the US has tough dissections to make in the future if they 
are serious about maintaining the US dollar’s role as a key global reserve currency.  
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Conclusion  
With all the above chapters explored, it’s important to address the thesis research question: 
Will the US dollar remain the sole key global reserve currency in the future? The short 
answer is that it is in jeopardy and it is likely that, in the long term, the US dollar will be the 
first or second most important key reserve currency in a duplicity/multiplicity key reserve 
currency world. As was covered in Chapter 1, history shows the US government cannot be 
complacent in thinking that the US dollar role as the key reserve currency will always remain 
so.  In saying this, the US dollar’s complete demise is by far from being inevitable. However, 
the two key risks to the US dollar which have been covered in this thesis have to be addressed 
and properly managed by the US if they want the US dollar to remain as a key reserve currency 
globally.   
This leads to the US government having to make two difficult decisions. The first decision is 
how they are going to deal with their growing level of debt. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the 
way the US chooses to address their sovereign indebtedness will have a significant impact on 
the US dollar’s ability to function as the key global reserve currency in the future.  The second 
decision that needs to be made is whether the US dollar will remain as a fiat currency, as it is 
today, or whether they will re-estate the US dollar to a gold standard or experiment with the 
implementation of a US dollar cyber currency. As was covered in Chapter 6, while the US 
government will not be able to fully control a bellicose Russia and an economically rising 
China, it could take steps to improve and ensure confidence that the US dollar’s value remains 
which in doing so will weaken Russia’s and Chinese actions in attempting to undermine the 
US dollar as the sole key reserve currency globally. If implemented correctly, both decisions 
together can ensure the US dollar, at the minimum, remains a key reserve currency or, at best, 
ensures it still remains the sole key reserve currency that it enjoys today.  
With regard to the first decision of addressing excessive indebtedness, Chapter 5 outlined the 
only four paths governments can choose when dealing with excessive indebtedness, as 
articulated by the Debt Super Cycle Theory.  To recap, the four paths are growing out of the 
debt, the austerity path, inflating away the debt or defaulting on the debt. As Complexity 
Theory outlines, it is impossible to predict when the US will not be able to continue to kick the 
can down the road with regard to addressing the growing indebtedness. Therefore the tough 
decisions that eventually will need to be made may transpire under President Trump’s 
presidency or under another president. As a result, it is impossible to precisely predict which 
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path the US government will ultimately pursue to address the debt crisis as it is not clear who 
will be in power. However, it is possible to distinguish which of the four paths is more likely 
to be pursued.  
As was discussed in Chapter 5, growing out of the debt is by far the most attractive option but 
also the hardest to implement. If this policy can be achieved, the US dollar’s role as the sole 
key reserve currency will likely only increase in importance. However, this option requires 
being proactive before the debt crisis develops. Based on President Trump’s first nine months 
in office, there appears to be little willingness and concrete evidence to suggest the Trump 
administration is going to be able to grow the debt problem away as was discussed in Chapter 
5.  Defaulting on the debt will all but guarantee the US dollar’s role as the sole key reserve 
currency will end. Therefore it is the least likely of the paths to be pursued as the other options 
are less economically destructive. If the growth path fails, the only other two options available 
to deal with excessive indebtedness is strict austerity or inflating away the debt.  
If inflation can stay in the 3–5% range, then inflating away the debt is an attractive option when 
compared to strict austerity, which is politically very difficult to implement for leaders wanting 
to be re-elected. Expressed differently, the negative impact of cutting someone’s social security 
is a lot more apparent to households compared to experiencing a 2–3% decrease in their real 
income which is not easily noticed.  However, inflation can be hard to manage, particularly 
when you are trying to engineer inflation. As a result, there is the real possibility that high 
levels of inflation will lead to the demise of the US dollar’s ability to function as the sole key 
reserve currency. 
Strict austerity by definition is all but certain to be economically painful. However, a 
government cutting costs and prioritising the payments of debt is viewed by markets 
favourably. Therefore, with the risk of default lower, the confidence in the underlining value 
of the currency improves, which ultimately means confidence in the US dollar’s ability to 
function as a key reserve currency remains. Therefore, assuming that the main goal is to ensure 
that the US dollar remains as the sole key reserve currency, the inflation path is the higher risk, 
higher reward option compared to the strict austerity option, which is the safer but more certain 
to be economically and politically painful.  
Summing up this point, while it’s impossible to predict which of the four options will be 
chosen, likely the growth option will fail to prevent a debt crisis. Therefore either inflating 
away the debt or implementing strict austerity will have to be the way forward to deal with the 
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excessive indebtedness. Both options have merits and shortcomings. If the US government 
wants to do ‘whatever it takes’ to restore faith in the US dollar value, strict austerity is the best 
option to take. However, the inflation option could be a path that enables the real value of debt 
to decrease, ensure the US dollar remains the key reserve currency and inflict less economic 
pain compared to strict austerity. This tough economic decision cannot be taken lightly as it 
will have far reaching impacts regardless of which path is chosen. However, this decision can 
have a successful outcome in which excessive indebtedness does not have long term irreputable 
impacts on the US dollar’s status of being the sole key reserve currency.   
The second decision, or indecision that has to be made, is what the future of the US dollar will 
look like. As was discussed in Chapter 6, both the Chinese and the Russians are already starting 
to circumnavigate the use of the US dollar when conducting global trade. Additionally, it is 
evident that both China and Russia are amassing substantial amounts of physical gold and have 
expressed interest in exploring cyber currencies. As a result, the US should not take these 
developments lightly. Essentially, the US can be proactive or reactive. Being proactive means 
the US will acknowledge that the US dollar in its fiat form cannot remain indefinitely as the 
key reserve currency. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, this is largely due to its 
sovereign debt level and the monetary policies that have been implemented by the Federal 
Reserve.  
Acknowledging the fiat US dollar can’t remain indefinitely as the key reserve currency is the 
first step. The US then needs to ultimately transform the dollar into an intrinsically backed 
currency. This likely means either backed by gold or backed by block chain technology in the 
form of a cyber currency. The best way to do this would be in a Bretton Woods 2.0 style global 
monetary conference with all the key economies of the world. While China, and Russia to a 
smaller degree, would both require concessions in order for them to have more say and 
influence globally, the US would have first mover advantage and likely would still be able to 
assert enough influence to ensure the US dollar remains a key element of a new reserve 
currency system.  
If the US chooses not to transform the fiat US dollar and lets China and Russia make the first 
move, the outcome for the US dollar’s long-term role is less certain. In this environment the 
US would have to react to China and Russia’s actions. For example, if the Chinese and Russians 
both announce that they will be placing their currencies on a gold standard, the US will have 
to do the same if they want the US dollar to remain a key global reserve currency long term. 
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This is because in the world of excessive indebtedness where governments can default, having 
a currency backed intrinsically becomes more valuable. While the US dollar, in this 
environment, would likely still remain a key global reserve currency long-term, it likely would 
not be the sole key reserve currency and the terms of the new global monetary order likely 
would not be as favourable if the US spearheaded the change.   
In saying the above, the US should be pragmatic and realise that China is a growing economic 
superpower that eventually will reach economic parity with the US. Consequently, the best the 
US should hope for long term is the US dollar and the Chinese yuan both being the two key 
reserve currencies of the future. As a result, the US dollar having a near monopoly on reserve 
currency status, which it has enjoyed since World War Ⅱ, will likely eventually end considering 
the qualitative and quantitative data covered in this thesis.  
However, as was outlined in Chapter 1, the rise of a new global reserve currency is generally a 
multi-decade process. Additionally, in the decades of transition, such as between the Spanish 
silver and Dutch guilder, both currencies can be considered key reserve currencies. Therefore, 
while nothing is guaranteed, it would not be surprising in 20 years for the US dollar and the 
Chinese yuan to each comprise 30–40% of total global reserves with all other minor reserve 
currencies comprising 20–30% of total global reserves. What will largely determine how quick 
this transpires is how the US addresses its sovereign debt and what decision or indecision the 
US makes to its fiat US dollar. 
In conclusion to this thesis, the key finding is that in its current fiat form, in which 64% of all 
global reserves are US dollars, it is highly unlikely long term the US dollar will remain the sole 
key reserve currency. In saying this, it likely will remain either the first or second most 
important key reserve currency in a duplicity/multiplicity key reserve currency world based on 
the likely long-term impacts of the two key risks identified. The first risk of excessive 
indebtedness if managed properly should not have an irreparable impact on the US dollar acting 
as the sole key reserve currency. However, the second risk of rising future currencies is going 
to be a greater challenge for the US. This is because even if the US does everything right to 
mitigate this risk, the US, short of war or China suffering a severe domestic crisis of some 
form, cannot stop China, and to a smaller degree Russia, from wanting and achieving greater 
influence economically in the world in the form of their currencies acting as reserve currencies.  
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Table 1  
Currency Distribution of Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover (Percentages) 
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Table 2 
International Bonds and Notes Outstanding (Selected Currencies)  
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Figure 1. Countries GDP as a Percentage of World GDP (2016 
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Figure 2. The Value of Gold in USD's During the 1970s 
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Figure 3. Long Term Effective Fed Fund Rate  
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Figure 4. United States Annual Inflation Rate in the 1970-80s   
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Figure 5. Total Foreign Reserves (Valued In US dollars) 
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Figure 6. Allocated Reserves Valued in US Dollars (Allocated Reserves) 
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Figure 7. Share of the U.S. Dollar as a Percentage of Allocated Reserves 
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Figure 8. Long Term United States Debt to GDP % 
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Figure 9. United States Long Term Budget Deficits/Surplus 
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Figure 10. United States Sovereign Debt Breakdown  
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Figure 11. Foreign Ownership of US Sovereign Debt 
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Figure 12. Annual United States Real GDP Growth Rate Percentage (2010 Prices) 
 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Annual United States Real GDP Growth Rate Percentage (2010 Prices)
 
172 
 
 
Figure 13. US State and Local Government Debt  
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Figure 14. Total Sovereign Debt as a Percentage of GDP  
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Figure 15. Japan’s Total Sovereign Debt as a Percentage of GDP  
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Figure 16. General Government Net Lending/Borrowing (Percent of GDP) 
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Figure 17. Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Gross Loans Percentage 
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Figure 18. Percentage Change in Real GDP Compared to 2008 Levels 
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Figure 19. Total Value of Liquid Reserves (Valued in US Dollars) 
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Figure 20. Total Reserves as a Percentage of Total Debt  
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Figure 21. 1 Year US Bond Yield (Historical) 
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Figure 22. 1 Year US Bond Yield 
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Figure 23. 10 Year US Bond Yield (Historical)  
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Figure 24. 10 Year US Bond Yield  
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Figure 25. Interest Payments Expense as a Percentage of Federal Tax Revenue 
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Figure 26. 1Year Bond Yields (Historical) 
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Figure 27. 1 Year Bond Yields  
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Figure 28. 10 Year Bond Yields (Historical)  
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Figure 29. 10 Year Bond Yields 
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Figure 30. Federal Reserve Funds Rate 
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Figure 31. European Central Bank Interest Rates  
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
Ja
n
-9
9
Ja
n
-9
9
A
p
r-
9
9
N
o
v-
9
9
Fe
b
-0
0
M
ar
-0
0
A
p
r-
0
0
Ju
n
-0
0
Ju
n
-0
0
Se
p
-0
0
O
ct
-0
0
1
-M
ay
A
u
g-
0
1
Se
p
-0
1
N
o
v-
0
1
D
ec
-0
2
M
ar
-0
5
Ju
n
-0
5
D
ec
-0
5
M
ar
-0
6
Ju
n
-0
6
A
u
g-
0
6
O
ct
-0
6
D
ec
-0
6
M
ar
-0
7
Ju
n
-0
7
Ju
l-
0
8
O
c-
0
8
O
ct
-0
8
O
ct
-0
8
N
o
v-
0
8
D
ec
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
M
ar
-0
9
A
p
r-
0
9
1
-M
ay
A
p
r-
1
1
Ju
l-
1
1
N
o
v-
1
1
D
ec
-1
1
Ju
l-
1
2
M
ay
-1
3
N
o
v-
1
3
Ju
n
-1
4
Se
p
-1
4
D
ec
-1
5
M
ar
-1
6
A
u
g-
1
6
D
ec
-1
6
M
ar
-1
7
D
ec
-1
7
European Central Bank Interest Rates 
Deposit facility Marginal lending facility
 
191 
 
 
Figure 32. Bank of Japan Interest Rates  
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Figure 33. Bank of England Prime Interest Rate  
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Figure 34. Inflation Rates in the Post GFC Era 
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Figure 35. Federal Reserve Balance Sheet 
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Figure 36. Bank of Japan Balance Sheet (In Trillions of ¥) 
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Figure 37. ECB Balance Sheet (In Trillions of €) 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
TR
IL
LI
O
N
S
ECB Balance Sheet (In Trillions of €)
 Gold and gold receivables  Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
  Lending to euro area credit institutions Other Assets
  Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro
 
197 
 
 
Figure 38. Central Bank Balance Sheet Value as a Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 39. United States Adjusted Monetary Base  
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Figure 40. United States M2 Money Supply  
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Figure 41. United States Velocity of M1 Money Stock  
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Figure 42. United States Velocity of M2 Money Stock  
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Figure 43. Future Population Projections  
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Figure 44. United States Future Population Projections  
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Figure 45. Median Age of Population (Years) 
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Figure 46. Governments Ownership of Gold  
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Figure 47. China and Russia’s Government Ownership of Gold (Tonnes)  
 
